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The premise of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency is that success 
depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy among local populations.  The path to 
legitimacy is often seen as the improvement of governance in the form of effectiv  and 
efficient administration of government and public services.  However, good governanc  
is not the only possible basis for claims to legitimacy.  Prompted by recent experience in 
Iraq, the research presented here formally considers whether in insurgencies wher  ethno-
religious identities are politically salient, claims to legitimacy may rest more on the 
identity of who governs, rather than on how whoever governs governs.  Specifically, this 
dissertation poses and tests the hypothesis that in the presence of major ethno-religious 
cleavages, good governance will contribute much less to counterinsurgent success than 
will efforts toward reaching political agreements that directly address those cleavages. 
The dissertation reviews and synthesizes the record of scholarship and policy 
regarding insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the politics of ethnic identity, 
 
 
governance, and legitimacy.  Building on this synthesis, it presents an analytic frmework 
designed to formalize the terms of the main hypothesis sufficiently to enable empirical 
tests.   
It then applies that framework to brief analyses of counterinsurgent experiences in 
Malaya, Algeria, South Vietnam, and then of two detailed local cases studies of 
American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq: Ramadi from 2004-2005; and Tal Afar 
from 2005-2006.  These Iraq case studies are based on primary research, including 37 
interviews with participants and eyewitnesses. 
The cases examined yield ample evidence that ethno-religious identity politics do 
shape counterinsurgency outcomes in important ways, and also offer qualified supportfor 
the hypothesis about the relative importance to counterinsurgent success of identity 
politics versus good governance.  However, the cases do not discredit the utility to 
counterinsurgents of providing good governance, and they corroborate the traditional 
view that population security is the most important element of successful 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Key policy implications include the importance of making 
strategy development as sensitive as possible to the dynamics of identity politics, and to 
local variations and complexity in causal relationships among popular loyalties, 
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“If you’re not confused, then you don’t know how complex the situation is.” 








“It is so damn complex.  If you ever think you have the solution to this, you’re wrong, 
and you’re dangerous.”   
 
Colonel H.R. McMaster, United States Army, Tal Afar, February 20062 
 
                                                
1 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 
343. 
2 George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lessons of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, p. 57. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 
This study was born of an attempt to make sense of two strong but somewhat 
contradictory intuitions about counterinsurgency. The first intuition is captured by an
Iraqi Sunni tribal leader’s comment that Iraq’s Shi’a Muslims “cannot take charge of Iraq 
in the same manner as the Sunnis.  The [Shi’a] are backwards.  They are barbarian 
savages . . .”1  From this perspective, in civil conflict, it matters who is in charge, and the 
ability of any party to succeed – insurgent or counterinsurgent – is at least partly a 
function of who they are, not just how they behave.  Clearly, conflict is often rooted 
deeply in the politics of group identities and in such cases, the principal objective of the 
insurgents may be to overturn rule by some “other” group.  In such a case, settling the 
conflict over identity politics would become one of the keys to resolving the broader 
conflict. 
But the second intuition is that what most people want overwhelmingly is just a 
peaceful life where they can work, raise their children, provide for their fam lies and have 
a society that functions and provides them the security and essential services that they 
need.  Again, an example from Iraq illustrates the point.  A woman in Baghdad told a 
reporter, “We want security and we want stability.  Anyone who comes along is fi e as 
long as he brings security and stability.”2  Or as an American soldier put it, “He who is 
able to fix the public utilities holds the keys to the kingdom in terms of winning the 
                                                
1 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 
71-72. 
2 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2005), p. 149. 
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support of the Iraqi people and ultimately ending this conflict.”3  By this way of thinking, 
resolving the conflict in insurgencies is all about establishing good governance.  If th  
counterinsurgent can only manage to give people a good life, they will have a stakein the 
status quo and will abandon their support for the insurgents who threaten that status quo.   
Each of these two intuitions implies a priority for counterinsurgency strategy.  If 
people fight over ethnic or religious identity, then counterinsurgents must get the 
incumbent political system to deal effectively with the distribution of power across those 
groups.  If people fight over provision of basic governance, then counterinsurgents must 
ensure that they are capable of “outgoverning” their insurgent opponents.  While both of 
these intuitions can be valid to some degree, they are also not entirely compatible with 
each other.  If different groups of people under a common system really oppose each 
other for who they are, or simply conceive of their political interests within ethnically-
defined boundaries, then how much should a counterinsurgent expect to achieve by 
making the electricity and the sewers work, and by providing employment?  Conversely, 
if all people want is a peaceful, comfortable life, why have ethnic and religious group 
loyalties seemed so often to have subverted counterinsurgents’ attempts to improve 
governance in conflict-stricken lands? 
The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made the tension between these 
intuitions increasingly evident in American counterinsurgency policy and military 
doctrine.  The counterinsurgency field manual published by the United States Army and 
Marine Corps in December 2006 states that “The primary objective of any 
counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate 
                                                
3 Michael R. Gordon, “In Baghdad, Struggle Ties Security to Basic Services,” New York Times, April 22, 
2008, p. 1. 
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government.”4  This judgment is in keeping with a conventional wisdom about 
counterinsurgency strategy that has accumulated over several decades of war and 
scholarship.  Its premise, like that of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency, is that 
success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy for the ruling regime among 
some critical portion of the local population.  And among the mechanisms available to 
counterinsurgents for establishing that legitimacy, the most prominent in both prac ice 
and doctrine has been the improvement of governance in the form of effective and 
efficient administration of government and public services.  Good governance, by this
logic, is the key to “winning hearts and minds.” 
But beginning in 2003, the U.S.’s struggle to manage expanding sectarian civil 
conflict in Iraq began to call this traditional logic into question.  As Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden told the Iraq Study Group in December 2006,
The current situation, with regard to governance in Iraq, was probably irreversible in the 
short term, because of the world views of many of the [Iraqi] government leaders, which 
were shaped by a sectarian filter and a government that was organized for its ethnic and 
religious balance rather than competence or capacity. . . The Iraqi identity is muted.  The 
Sunni or Shi’a identity is foremost.5   
 
What the Iraqi experience was suggesting was that good governance is not the 
only plausible basis for claims to legitimacy among contending political factions, 
especially in environments where ethnic or religious identities are politically salient.  
Instead, perhaps in such conflicts, claims to legitimacy may rest primarily on the identity 
of who governs, rather than on how whoever governs governs.   
                                                
4 Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
Department of the Navy, December 2006), p. 1-21. 
5 Quoted in Bob Woodward, “CIA Said Instability Seemed ‘Irreversible,’” Washington Post, July 12, 2007, 
p. 1. 
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Scholars and policymakers are just beginning to acknowledge and address these 
challenges to traditional views on counterinsurgency strategy.  This process will require a 
careful synthesis of ideas and empirical insights from a wide range of academi  
disciplines and historical experiences that bear on the complex interactions among 
concepts of legitimacy, governance, ethnic identity, and political violence.  With this 
notion as a point of departure, this dissertation explores the implications of differing 
bases of claims to legitimacy among different types of communities for political and 
military strategies employed by counterinsurgents.  It presents the results of research on 
the relationship between counterinsurgency strategies focused on improving the quality 
of governance among affected populations and the dynamics of ethnic and religious 
identities among those populations.   
In the broadest sense, the question it seeks to answer is simply: 
Is provision of good governance necessary to defeat insurgencies? 
More specifically, it poses and tests the general hypothesis that: 
In the presence of major ethno-religious cleavages, good governance will contribute 
much less to counterinsurgent success than will efforts toward reaching political 
agreements that directly address those cleavages. 
 
Although this question and hypothesis were motivated in part by the challenges 
facing the United States and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the significance of the 
subject clearly extends beyond current events and beyond the interests of Western policy 
makers.  Irregular warfare, civil conflict and attempts to mitigate them are likely to be 
common features of the international policymaking landscape for the foreseeable future, 
and the hypothesis under examination here has significant implications for the design of 
any counterinsurgency strategy.  As one scholar has summarized it, “an effectiv  
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counterinsurgency program depends on an accurate, substantive, and comprehensive 
profile of the adversary and the environmental context with which he operates.”6  This 
research would suggest that close attention to the role and dynamics of ethnic and 
religious identities be a first-order issue in developing such a “comprehensive profile.” 
 
This dissertation attempts to address the topics outlined above in five main steps, 
divided across eight chapters, including this introductory chapter.   
• First, it reviews and synthesizes the record of scholarship and policy regarding 
insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the politics of ethnic identity, governanc , and 
legitimacy (Chapter 2).   
• Second, drawing on this review and synthesis, it presents an analytic framework and 
method designed to formalize the terms of the research question and hypothesis 
sufficiently to enable empirical tests (Chapter 3).   
• Third, it presents brief analyses of three modern counterinsurgencies, basd on 
secondary sources and designed to refine the analytic framework with provisional 
tests of the hypothesis (Chapter 4).   
• Fourth, it examines Iraq: the history of Iraq’s ethno-religious identity politics and the 
recent counterinsurgency there (Chapter 5), followed by two detailed local cases of 
American counterinsurgency operations, in Ramadi from 2004-2005 (Chapter 6), and 
in Tal Afar from 2005-2006 (Chapter 7).   
• Finally, it concludes with a comparative analysis of the Iraqi cases and derives 
conclusions and policy implications from all of the preceding analysis (Chapter 8). 
                                                
6 Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd Edition (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2005), p. 155. 
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Chapter 2: Governance, Identity and Legitimacy: Cracks in the Intellectual 
Foundations of Traditional Counterinsurgency Strategy 
 
Irregular Warfare – Past as Prologue? 
 Political violence in the second half of the twentieth century was dominated by 
irregular warfare.1  While the world’s great powers developed firepower of 
unprecedented volume and technical sophistication, the era’s military history was being 
acted out principally by insurgents and counterinsurgents in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.  This phenomenon may be attributed to two major historical factors.  First, the 
collapse of European colonial rule prompted a torrent of violent struggles for power and 
political identity in newly independent, but politically and economically immature 
regions.  Second, the global reach of political and ideological competition between 
Western democracies and the Soviet Union sparked or exacerbated civil conflicts for over 
forty years, from Greece in the late 1940s to Nicaragua in the 1980s.  
 Today, the immediate traumas of decolonization and the Cold War are largely 
past, but the prospect of widespread and persistent irregular warfare remains.  According 
to one common view of the future security environment,2 threats to international security 
                                                
1 This general type of warfare goes by many names: revolutionary, insurgency and counterinsurgency, 
irregular, guerrilla, fourth-generation, and low-inte sity conflict, to name the most prominent ones.  
Differences among these terms can be distinguished, but all of them refer to warfare conducted by 
relatively weak parties against more powerful adversaries often by sporadic and indirect means and usually 
toward the goal of gaining political concessions or c ntrol.  I will favor the term “counterinsurgency” here, 
since it is the term most applicable to the strategies and tactics of the more powerful, albeit reactive, side of 
this type of warfare, the side on which the United States has repeatedly found itself.  I will generally use 
“irregular” warfare to refer to the broader category. 
2 See Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), Robert D. 
Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post C ld War (New York: Random House, 
2000), Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century (New York: 
Putnam, 2004), Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: 
Zenith Press, 2004), Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 379, 2006), Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art 
of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007).   
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will arise in large part from countries or groups that are either unable or unwilling to 
accommodate a globalized economic system, together with all of the cultural implications 
of such a system.  Such groups are likely to be both economically marginalized and 
militarily weak, leaving guerrilla-type tactics as one of their fewmeans of advancing 
their interests. 
 While the significance of this trend remains speculative, American experienc s in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have accelerated a growing perception of the need to prevent, 
counter, and conduct irregular warfare.  One reflection of this perception is thatform l 
strategic planning in the U.S. government has elevated the priority given to preparing for 
these challenges.3 
The sense of urgency apparent in current policy debates on counterinsurgency can 
be attributed in part to the fact that this type of warfare has often been performed poorly 
by modern governments and militaries.  While notable exceptions exist, 
counterinsurgents have tended to overemphasize military operations in 
counterinsurgencies and underemphasize political solutions. 
Perhaps two reasons for the mixed performance stand out.  First, fighting this kind 
of warfare is inherently difficult.  Targets are elusive and few; and the loyalties of civilian 
populations are constantly shifting and difficult to gauge in any case.  The resulting 
slowness and messiness of such operations prompted the celebrated British officer T. E. 
Lawrence to compare fighting guerrilla wars to “eating soup with a knife.”4     
                                                
3 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Executive Office of the President, 2006), pp. 
43-44, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of Defense, 2006), pp. 19, 37-38, National 
Defense Strategy (Department of Defense, June 2008), pp. 4, 7-9, Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: 
Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.  
4 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: G.H. Doran, 1926), p. 182 (Book III, Chapter 
XXXIII) . 
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Second, modern militaries, especially those of large, rich nations like the United 
States have not typically been organized, trained, and equipped to fight 
counterinsurgencies.  Two of the most prominent examples of the chasm between extant 
military doctrine and the demands of counterinsurgencies are the American experience in 
Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.  In both cases, conspicuously superior 
military forces were defeated at least in part because of their inability to adjust 
organizationally to strategic environments very different from those for which t ey were 
designed.  In recent years, the U.S. government and military have come under harsh and 
widespread criticism for again misunderstanding the nature of the war they are fighting, 
this time in Iraq. 
At the same time, the history of modern counterinsurgency is not one of universal 
failure.  In many instances, such as those in the Philippines, Malaya, and Peru, to name
only a few, counterinsurgents succeeded in defeating challenges to their control through 
various combinations of political, military, and other means.  Indeed, a conventional 
wisdom is emerging that U.S. operations in Iraq since 2007 represent a model of 
successful counterinsurgency as well.  What accounts for the differences between the 
successes and the failures?  Answers to this question, of course, are far from 
straightforward.  Nevertheless, a great deal has been written about the q estion, and some 
common themes are evident in that literature, as well as in the policies and doctrine that 





Winning Hearts and Minds: Popular Support and Governance 
Rebellion and counter-rebellion are as old as civilization.  For most of political 
history, the main tools of defeating rebellion – that is, what today we would call 
“counterinsurgency strategy” – were coercion, repression, annihilation, intimidation, nd 
fear.5  So, while the 20th century produced the phrase, “winning hearts and minds,” the 
19th century British imperial experience offered up the ditty, “Whatever happens, we 
have got / The Maxim gun, and they have not.”6  Notwithstanding all of the carnage piled 
up by irregular warfare in the twentieth century, default to this “Roman model” f 
threatening wholesale slaughter generally ceased to be a viable choice in the 
counterinsurgency strategies of Western governments.  Although paternalism remained 
firmly entrenched in Western policies toward the rest of the world, Wilsonian concepts of 
self-determination and legitimacy7 largely displaced one of the main philosophical pillars 
of counter-revolutionary policy in colonial and earlier times: that might makes right.   
These changing attitudes, however, made insurgency and counterinsurgency 
neither simpler nor rarer, and their prevalence in the 20th century has generated a vast 
literature on the subject by historians, political scientists, sociologists, military analysts, 
and others.  Lists of principles for the conduct of successful counterinsurgency ar 
                                                
5 For a concise summary, see Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas 
and Their Opponents Since 1750 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 26-43. 
6 The Maxim gun was one of the first machine guns invented and was used to devastating effect in late 19th 
century colonial wars.  See Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice 3rd Edition 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 (originally published in 1906)), pp. 440-441. 
7 For a discussion of Wilson’s impact on the formation of the state of Iraq, see Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: 
The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 
12-16. 
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abundant in this literature.8  Variations abound, but if all these principles were reduced to 
a single central theme it would be that success and failure depend to a large extent on the 
resolution of the political conflicts underlying the military hostilities.  According to this 
line of reasoning, the application of military force is not nearly as efficacious as in more 
conventional warfare.  Rather, the contest between insurgents and counterinsurgents is 
seen as a competition for the prevailing sympathies of the non-combatant populations 
where the conflicts are taking place.  In one of the classic works of this literatur , Mao 
Tse-tung famously observed that the relationship between insurgents and the broader 
population in which they operate is akin to fish and water, such that “guerrilla warfre 
basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor 
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”9   
From this understanding of insurgency came a broad consensus that one of the 
chief objectives of any organization conducting counterinsurgency operations must be to 
gain the loyalty and trust of the local civilian population.  The popular shorthand for this 
complex socio-economic-political-military objective became “winning hearts and 
minds,” a term that has survived in common usage to the present day.  To be sure, other 
considerations, including more traditional military ones such as intelligence, logistics, 
                                                
8 For example, David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1964), pp. 74-90, Robert G. K. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; The Lessons of 
Malaya and Vietnam (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 50-58, Anthony James Joes, Resisting 
Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2004), pp. 233-246, Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 
2nd Edition (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), pp. 164-190, Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan 
Horvath, John Nagl, ”Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 
March-April 2006, pp. 49-53, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 
3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, December 2006) (hereafter 
referred to as “FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5”), pp. 1-21 to 1-29. 
9 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), 
Chapter 6, p. 4 and Chapter 1, p. 2. 
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and attrition of enemy forces, are crucial elements of counterinsurgency strategies as 
well.  But in this type of warfare, it is supposed that the hearts and minds of the people,
not territorial control or leadership, constitute the strategic “center of gravity” for which 
the adversaries compete.10  In his renowned study, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 
and Practice, French army officer and theorist David Galula listed as his “first law”of 
counterinsurgency that “the support of the population is as necessary for the 
counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”11 
With popular support as the foundation of counterinsurgency strategy, the 
question must turn then to how counterinsurgents can prevail in their competition for the 
people’s allegiance.  In this regard, winning hearts and minds is very often equated with 
the provision of good governance, in the form of improved material standards of living 
and government efficiency.  The British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson, 
who served in Malaya and as an advisor to the American and South Vietnamese 
governments, concluded that “‘Winning’ the population can tritely be summed up as 
good government in all its aspects. . . such as improved health measures and clinics . . . 
new schools . . . and improved livelihood and standard of living.”  Later in the same 
work, he continues, “the real purpose of aid in all contexts, including counter-insurgency 
                                                
10 The first use of the phrase “hearts and minds” in the context of revolutionary warfare is often attributed 
to the British administrator during much of the Malayan Emergency, Sir Gerald Templer, who argued that 
“the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”  See 
Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya andVietnam (New York: 
Praeger, 1966), p. 3, and Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan 
Emergency 1948-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1-2. 
11 Galula, p. 74. 
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[is] to help the local government get its organization right and its departments working 
efficiently.”12 
One representative scholarly rendering of this view comes from the widely-cit d 
author and National War College professor Bard O’Neill:  
. . . popular support [for insurgency] from the elites and especially the masses stems 
primarily from concrete grievances concerning such things as land reform, injustice, 
unfair taxation, and corruption.  It is over these issues that the battle to win hearts and 
minds is most directly enjoined.  History suggests that a government can most effectively 
undercut insurgencies that rely on mass support by splitting the rank and file away from 
the leadership through calculated reforms that address the material grievances and needs 
of the people.13 
 
Insurgency and counterinsurgency historian Thomas Mockaitis argues along similar
lines: “Trust and cooperation depend . . . on recognizing and as far as possible addressing 
the real needs and the legitimate grievances on which the insurgency feeds. . . People
generally support an insurgency out of a shared sense of wrong or frustration at not 
having their basic needs met.”14  Or, as writer and retired Marine T. X. Hammes has 
succinctly put it, “the fundamental weapon in counterinsurgency is good governance.”15 
This perspective is not limited to scholars or political commentators.  It is also 
clearly evident in the way U.S. government organizations approach the problem of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency.  One prominent example of this view can be found in 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” which 
argues that 
                                                
12 Thompson, pp. 112-113, 161. 
13 O’Neill, pp. 171-172. 
14 Thomas Mockaitis, “Winning Hearts and Minds in the‘War on Terrorism,’” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, vol. 14, no. 2 (March 2003), pp. 21-22. 
15 Thomas X. Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review, July-August 2006, pp. 
20-21. 
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Support of the people is vital to the survival of the insurgents who depend on them for 
food, shelter, recruits, and intelligence.  The government’s challenge is to regain the 
allegiance of a population already alienated by government failures to address basic 
grievances.  Poor peasants and farmers are, however, seldom motivated by abstractions or 
vague promises.  Their willingness to provide support hinges on concrete incentives – 
material benefits or demonstrable threats.16  
 
Also, as noted in Chapter 1, the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency doctrine 
features this conception of the centrality of popular support and governance, stating that 
“The primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective 
governance by a legitimate government.”17  An even more recent guide to 
counterinsurgency co-authored by the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development asserts that “central to gaining the 
confidence and support of the population is [improving] the quality of governance 
through political reform, strengthening the rule of law and conducting economic 
development as appropriate.”18  And the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 
written by the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command, asserts that forces 
conducting irregular warfare should emphasize “winning the support of the relevant 
populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, 
influence, and support.”19 
Moreover, beyond these academic and doctrinal assertions is a history replete 
with projects launched by counterinsurgents focused on land reform, economic 
                                                
16 Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (undated), p. 8. 
17 FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, p. 1-21. 
18 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency 
Initiative, January 2009), p. 14. 
19 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (Version 1.0) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Defense, September 11, 2007), p. 19. 
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development, public health, education, construction of infrastructure and other such 
initiatives. 
 In sum, the strength and ubiquity of such views on the importance of providing 
good governance and of winning hearts and minds amounts to what might reasonably be 
labeled conventional wisdom on counterinsurgency strategy.  What accounts for this 
phenomenon?  How did this conventional wisdom develop and why has it retained its 
appeal over several decades of irregular warfare? 
The Roots of Conventional Wisdom:  Legitimacy, People’s Wars and Modernization 
Theory 
 
The association of legitimacy and good governance is rooted in the dominant 
traditions of Western political philosophy.  In the works of such foundational thinkers as 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, legitimacy is seen as derived 
from a social contract between a government and free individuals.  Individuals relinquish 
some of their own sovereignty to the government in exchange for a specific set of 
privileges and protections.  In this formulation, legitimacy and good governance are 
tightly woven, if not synonymous.  Max Weber characterized this conception of 
legitimacy as a “legal” or “rational” paradigm, one of three pure types of authority, or 
“legitimate domination.”  Legal authority, according to Weber, rests “on a belief in the 
legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands.”20  Weber contrasts this form of authority with “traditional” and 
“charismatic” forms in which legitimacy comes more from, respectively, traditional 
social hierarchies or individual personal character than from codified rules and laws.  The 
                                                
20 Max Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination,” in Michael Hechter, ed. Theories of Social Order 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 184. 
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discussion will return to “traditional authority” later in the chapter, but it is the legal-
rational conception of legitimacy that has dominated Western political thought in the 
modern world.   
Moreover, a rational, governance-based view of legitimacy formed the basis for 
political development not only in advanced, Western, or industrialized societies.  
Crucially important to this discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency, it also
formed the foundation of the most prominent revolutionary philosophy of the twentieth 
century – Marxism.  In their emphasis on developmental aspects of capitalism and on 
economic classes as the basic units of political life, both Leninist and Maoist incarnations 
of Marxism were deeply modern and, at least in principle, hostile to traditionally-based, 
nationalist or ethnic political structures.21  Accordingly, communist insurgents throughout 
the developing world advanced a fundamentally materialist view of social justice.  In 
their view, legitimate government was not simply one that guaranteed freedoms and basic 
public goods, but one that enforced a particular distribution of resources and capital seen 
to be inextricably linked to freedom.  In this sense, Marxist revolutionaries that 
dominated the landscape of post-World War II insurgency saw legitimacy as even mor  
closely linked to specific forms of “good governance” than did their liberal opponents.   
Probably the most important variety of this revolutionary ideology in action was 
the Maoist “people’s war.”  Over nearly two decades of civil war in China, Mao Tse-tung 
transformed V. I. Lenin’s urban, elite-driven interpretation of Marxism into a rural, 
peasant-based revolutionary doctrine.  Revolutionaries throughout the developing world 
                                                
21 For an overview, see John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers 
of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
especially pp. 826-828, 838-845.   
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have since seized on Mao’s principles to help organize popular revolts among rural 
masses against elite, allegedly repressive governments.  Rebels from the Viet Minh in the 
1940s to the Shining Path in the 1980s to the Communist Party of Nepal in the 2000s 
have claimed Mao’s mantle.  Though people’s wars have varied considerably across 
different times and cultures, Maoist ideology retained most of its central Maxist 
elements related to class conflict, social justice, and economic determinism, especially at 
the height of the Cold War.22   
At the same time, opponents of Marxist ideology and revolution, especially in the 
United States, were constructing their own interpretive framework for explaining political 
and economic development in the post-war era.  The 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence 
of “modernization theory” in Western academic and policy communities (also known as 
“political development theory”), a theory of development that emphasized a teleological 
convergence of societies through several stages of modernization from primitive 
“traditional” forms toward Western-style industrialization, secularization, and political 
pluralism.23  Legitimacy in this framework was earned by whoever could most reliably 
guide the society along these hypothesized paths of modernization, with their 
characteristic signals of good governance – economic growth, political representation and 
efficient administration.   
The principles of modernization theory were quite influential among policy 
makers in Washington who were eager for guidance in navigating the complex Cold War 
                                                
22 Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Routledge, 1996). 
23 Representative works include David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1965), Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), and Edward Shils, Political Development in the 
New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1962). 
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competition underway in the decolonizing “third” world.  Modernization theory played a 
significant role in guiding American policy toward the developing world generally,24 and 
toward counterinsurgency specifically.25  Walt Rostow, an economist who had written 
one of the most prominent books on modernization and development, became President 
John F. Kennedy’s deputy national security advisor.  In a 1961 speech to Army Special 
Forces graduates, he characterized the Kennedy administration’s perspective this way:   
The U.S. has a special responsibility of leadership . . . in aiding the long-run development 
of those nations which are serious about modernizing their economy and social life.  And, 
as President Kennedy has made clear, he regards no program of his Administration as 
more important than his program for long-term economic development . . . Independence 
cannot be maintained by defensive measures alone.  Modern societies must be built, and 
we are prepared to help build them.26 
 
 By 1962, these concepts had been formalized in the U.S. Overseas Internal 
Defense Policy statement of August 1962 and in the Inter-departmental Seminar on 
Counterinsurgency that was taught at the State Department.  These new statements of 
policy and doctrine codified the notion that the remedy to political violence and 
instability in the developing world, in the words of historian Ian Beckett, “lay in socio-
economic development and appropriate nation-building measures based on concepts of 
security, good government and progress.”27 
                                                
24 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003) and Lisa Anderson, Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power: Social Science 
and Public Policy in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 94-97.  
25 D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), especially Chapter 5, Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: 
U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), Chapter 3, Austin 
Long, On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), pp. 21-23. 
26 Walt W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas,” Speech at the U.S. Army Special 
Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 1961. 
27 Beckett (2001), p. 186. 
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 Before long, the application of this philosophy to counterinsurgency policy had 
acquired the name “hearts-and-minds theory.”  RAND Corporation analysts Nathan 
Leites and Charles Wolf summarized the principal tenets of hearts-and-minds theory as: 
emphasis on popular support based on inherent “ardor and preferences”; stress on internal 
grievances over external influence; emphasis on economic deprivation and inequality; 
and conception of insurgent conflict in terms of “electoral analogy,” where outcomes are 
driven by and reflect the prevailing affiliations of majorities or substantial minorities.  In 
their judgment, made in 1970, hearts-and-minds theory “influences and perhaps 
dominates much discussion and thinking about this range of problems.”28   
 Viewed through the lens of Cold War competition between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, Marxist revolutionary ideology and hearts-and-minds 
counterrevolutionary ideology may appear to stand in stark opposition to one another.  
And within the framework of Western political philosophy, they do.  Outside of this 
framework, however, they might more usefully be characterized as opposite sides of th  
same Western coin.  While their normative aspects point in different directions, their 
assumptions and descriptions of the developing world share much in common.  As 
political scientist D. Michael Shafer argues, 
Both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries assume that the Third World’s shared 
experience with colonialism had everywhere produced a potentially revolutionary 
situation.  Thus, Americans fret over the consequences of modernization – in particular, 
the possibility of Communists capturing uprooted peopl s in the hiatus between tradition 
and a higher state, modernity.  The revolutionary masters also focus on the inevitable, 
universal course of development, but in the deracinatio  process they see the formation of 
classes, and so the fundamental dynamic of development.  Each, however, assumes the 
malleability of the masses and, despite reference to an overarching process of change, 
                                                
28 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 150.  Also see Shafer, pp. 116-118. 
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focuses on tactical measures for ‘helping history.’  In other words, both revolutionaries 
and counterrevolutionaries identify their role as manager of modernization.29 
 
Based in part on this assessment, Shafer characterizes American counterins rg ncy 
doctrine as “Mao minus Marx.”30 
 Among the important similarities between these approaches to insurgency and 
counterinsurgency are the factors they assume to be dominant in establishing political
legitimacy.  In Weber’s terms, both approaches posit rationalist grounds for legitimate 
authority.  In his study of the role of legitimacy in insurgencies, Timothy Lomperis points 
out that 
. . . modern legitimacy can turn to several different models, including communist ones.  
Communism, after all, is a product of, or at least a reaction to, the industrial revolution of 
the West and offers a competitive system of modern political legitimacy to that of the 
liberal democracies.  Yet even communists hold to the two hallmarks of modern 
legitimacy.  They, too, have a view of history rooted in a ‘dialectic’ of material progress . 
. .31 
 
One important product of the similarities in these opposing strategies is that 
successful application of one may in fact defeat the other, since they are comp ting, in 
some sense, on equivalent terms.  From this perspective, the gradual expansion in the 
numbers of liberal democracies around the world may have something to do with the 
declining incidence of Maoist people’s wars.  As Ian Beckett concludes, “where states 
genuinely embraced or moved toward democracy the Maoist model had little to offer, 
since much depended on convincing the population that the limited consultation process 
                                                
29 Shafer, p. 108. 
30 Ibid., p. 104. 
31 Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of 
Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 66. 
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envisaged in the relationship between the party and the ‘masses’ was sufficient 
democracy.”32 
Thus was forged the intellectual foundations of counterinsurgency strategy in the 
United States, and much of this foundation is still visible in the current policy and 
doctrine cited earlier in this chapter.  Even so, the influence and longevity of these 
concepts and policies have not been without their critics. 
Modernization Theory Under Assault: Hearts and Minds Dethroned or Refined? 
For all of its influence in academic and policy circles, modernization theory came
under widespread attack by the late 1960s, both for its conceptual shallowness and for its 
inability to account for the frequency of insurgency and revolution throughout the 
developing world.  Most conspicuously, the persistence of the Viet Cong’s resistance to 
American and South Vietnamese counterinsurgency efforts raised pointed questions 
about the viability of the assumptions of prevailing strategy and doctrine. 
Another wave of literature emerged aiming to correct some of the flaws of 
modernization theory, particularly its emphasis on elites as critical agents of 
modernization and its tendency to link economic development inextricably with political 
stability.  This literature sought to address the causes of revolution and insurgency 
directly and tended to locate those causes in socio-economic dislocations associated with 
the transition of societies from traditional to modern forms.  One of the earliest nd most 
influential of these works was Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing 
Societies, where he argued that violence and instability “was in large part the product of 
rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics, coupled with 
                                                
32 Beckett (2001), p. 81. 
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the slow development of political institutions.”33  On the one hand, this argument was a 
departure from the more optimistic perspectives of earlier works that touted the inevitable 
correlation of modernization and peaceful progress.  On the other hand, as Charles Tilly 
points out, Huntington largely operates from within the broader framework that 
associates development with Western forms of political and economic organization.34 
Another focus of criticism of modernization theory was its general insensitivity to 
variations in local conditions and the resulting universalism of its policy prescriptions.  If, 
in fact, modernization was supposed to follow similar paths throughout the developing 
world, then successful policy implementation need not depend on deep expertise or 
experience in particular regions or cultures.  What followed from this were policies of 
U.S. support for development that were probably more ambitious and optimistic than was 
warranted, such as the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and the early American 
involvement in South Vietnam.  Former Undersecretary of State George Ball, for one, 
took a skeptical view of this trend in what he referred to as “nation building,” 
complaining that “the most presumptuous undertaking of all [assumed that] American 
professors could make bricks without the straw of experience and with indifferent and 
infinitely various kinds of clay.”35   
In time, skepticism of grand theories of development helped to foster a new 
emphasis in academic work on the sociological roots of revolution and insurgency, and 
                                                
33 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 
4. 
34 Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 3 (April 1973), 
pp. 430-436. 
35 Quoted in Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts 
Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 
1999), p. 30. 
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particularly on the interaction of modern economic practices with traditional political 
structures in peasant villages.  Sociologist Timothy Wickham-Crowley identifies three 
“microstructural schools” in this body of work.36  One school argues that different 
economic structures encourage different dynamics of collective action, and that 
“revolutionary action is to be found when cultivators derive their income from ‘wages’ 
(rather than land).”37  According to the second school, capitalism tends to break down 
“age-old systems of patron-client . . . systems of reciprocity.”  Peasant revol s, in turn, 
represent efforts to protect those systems.38  The third school holds that peasants do not 
respond to a shared “moral economy” of the kind postulated by the second school, but 
rather to rational self-interest “in a way perfectly intelligible to the economics of utility-
maximization.”39 
Other analysts seeking explanations for political violence in the developing world 
looked to the psychological dynamics of individuals and groups in areas of conflict.  
Prominent among these arguments is the theory that revolution is caused by feelings of 
relative deprivation.  According to this theory, it is not poverty or repression, per se, that 
cause people to take up arms against their government, but rather the unfulfilled promises 
of rising expectations in societies in transition.  In the words of political scientist Ted 
Robert Gurr, “Discontent [is] not a function of the discrepancy between what men want 
                                                
36 Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of 
Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 92. 
37 See Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the 
Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 1975).  
38 See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1976) and Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).  
39 See Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam 
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1979).  
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and what they have, but between what they want and what they believe they are capabl  
of attaining.”40  This relationship between rising expectations and revolt is explicitly 
recognized in the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency manual.41 
In addition to these works of sociology and political psychology, the national 
security policy community also offered some dissents to prevailing views of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency during the late 1960s and 1970s.  Most directly relevant to this 
discussion is the work cited earlier of two scholars working for the RAND Corporation, 
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr.  These analysts argued that the common focus i  
counterinsurgency strategy on hearts and minds was misdirected and overly ambitious.  
First, they argued that the popular support generally considered to be the focus of 
competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents could be readily understood in 
terms of cost-benefit trade-offs rather than inherent preferences.  “Far (damage-limiting) 
and reward (profit-maximizing) may be as powerful spurs to desired behavior as 
conscience and conviction.”  Second, they suggested that actions taken to constrain the 
behavior of insurgents are more likely to be effective than actions taken to persuade the 
population to support the government’s side.42  Leites and Wolf also questioned the 
linkage between economic aid and winning popular support, pointing out that greater 
resources might simply allow people to exercise their existing preferences more 
effectively rather than causing them to change their preferences.43 
                                                
40 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 359.  Also see James 
C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (February 
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41 FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, p. 1-3. 
42 Leites and Wolf, especially pp. 13, 37. 
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 Overall, academic and policy-oriented reactions to modernization theory and 
hearts-and-minds counterinsurgency theory made substantial strides toward refining 
understandings and assumptions about development and the causes of political violence.  
However, two factors limited the impact of these critiques as an impetus for 
reconceptualizing how counterinsurgency strategy was actually developed and practiced 
by the United States and its allies.  First, even these more sophisticated fram works 
tended to focus on rural, peasant-based insurgencies and, in emphasizing the economic 
effects of modernization, retained a predominantly materialist viewpoint on the sources 
and dynamics of political legitimacy.44   
Second, the end of the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam in 1973 
initiated an era of intellectual cleansing of the U.S. military’s strategy and doctrine.  The 
prevailing view among American military officers and defense intellectuals after Vietnam 
was that counterinsurgency and nation-building activities had been a harmful distraction 
from the military’s pre-eminent mission of deterring and preparing to fight the massed 
conventional forces of the Soviet Union or its proxies.45  Combined with détente’s more 
accommodating posture toward Soviet policies in the developing world, this attitude 
among the U.S.’s military leadership went a long way toward severing the link between 
academic work on insurgency and counterinsurgency and its heretofore receptive 
government audience.   
                                                
44 For example, Leites and Wolf explicitly acknowledg their methodological similarities with 
modernization theory while advancing a theory somewhat at odds with its conventional interpretations.  See 
pp. 49-50. 
45 Wray R. Johnson, From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The Evolution of U.S. 
Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961-1996, unpublished dissertation, The Florida State 
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Interest among national security policy makers in “low intensity conflict” (as 
irregular warfare came to be known) was somewhat refreshed in the 1980s by U.S. 
involvement in Central American counterinsurgencies and in the 1990s by a spate of 
small wars that prompted U.S. interventions from Somalia to Bosnia.  Nevertheless, the 
study of counterinsurgency remained an intellectual backwater in defense and military 
education, policy, planning, and discourse.46  Counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1980s, in 
the form of the Army Field Manual on Low Intensity Conflict, became little more than a 
modification of “AirLand Battle,” the Defense Department’s newly ascendant concept for 
large-scale, conventional, mechanized warfare.47   
Only after the U.S. found itself in the midst of major counterinsurgency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan did the national security policy community turn 
seriously to the task of revisiting the intellectual roots and assumptions of its extant
strategy and doctrine on counterinsurgency.  And when it did so, what it had to turn to 
was something of a hodgepodge of modernization theory, anti-communism, and a set of 
historical experiences that had been only partially digested in any coherent intellectual or 
strategic sense.  Scholars and policymakers have made progress in recent years i  
rebuilding the foundation of counterinsurgency strategy, and tailoring it to its new 21st 
century context, and it is to this broad effort that this research aims to contribute. 
Yet there remains one major piece missing from the overview presented here of
the intellectual foundations of counterinsurgency strategy.  This piece is central to the 
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argument advanced in these pages: the role of ethnic and religious identity in irregular 
warfare.  One of modernization theory’s and hearts-and-minds theory’s most conspicu u  
faults, according to some critics, was its discounting, sometimes implicitly, sometimes 
explicitly, of the role of ethnicity in determining how people relate to their governments.  
As political scientist Milton Esman explains, policies grounded in the materialist, 
progressive assumptions of modernization tended to presume 
. . . that with industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, and secularization, local, 
parochial, ethnic, and other ‘traditional’ identities would become increasingly irrelevant 
and would be succeeded by more ‘rational’ loyalties and association such as state 
nationalism, economic class, and cultural and recreational interests.48 
 
Esman’s language echoes that used by Weber to delineate different bases for 
political legitimacy.  In those terms, “rational” grounds for legitimacy would comprise 
more concrete interests and basic grievances than those related to ethnicity, religion, or 
tribe.  But Weber also points out that “traditional” authority, in contrast to “ration l” 
authority, rests “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the 
legitimacy of those exercising authority under them.”49  So, what if “concrete interests” 
and “basic grievances” in some insurgencies do not arise principally from issues
surrounding material benefits or conditions?  What if legitimacy is sometimes conferred 
to governments not according to the quality of their governance, but according to their 
conformance to group loyalties and traditional hierarchies of power?  The next section 
outlines some of the major contributions of scholarship of the last few decades on ethnic 
identity and conflict, and suggests the importance of these contributions to the design of 
counterinsurgency strategies. 
                                                
48 Milton J. Esman, Introduction to Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), p. 18. 
49 Weber, p. 184. 
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Ethnic Identity and Conflict 
The end of the Cold War prompted a surge of interest in ethnicity and nationalism 
as causes of political violence.  Bitter civil wars on the periphery of the former Soviet 
bloc, such as those in Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia, conveyed a sense that ancient 
ethnic passions, long suppressed by totalitarian regimes, were once again in the 
ascendancy.  Genocidal violence in Rwanda in 1994 did nothing to moderate this 
impression.  But in fact, large-scale, ethnically- and religiously-driven political violence 
had been a constant feature of the post-World War II era, as any residents of southern 
Nigeria, Bangladesh, or Lebanon, to name only a few, could attest. 
Scholars taking up this subject began to examine the ways in which political 
identities and loyalties can be influenced and even dominated by affiliations w th ethnic 
and religious communities.  Debates in this literature begin, naturally, with the definition 
of ethnicity, itself.  Max Weber’s conception that ethnic identity is tied to but not limited 
to genetic kinship has proved to be quite durable over time.  He defined ethnicity as “a 
subjective belief” in “common descent . . . whether or not an objective blood relationship 
exists.”50  In one of the most influential modern works on ethnicity and conflict, Donald 
Horowitz adopts a similar perspective, saying that “ethnicity is based on a myth of 
collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.  Some notion 
of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the 
concept of ethnicity.”51   
                                                
50 Quoted in Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1985), p. 53. 
51 Ibid., p. 52. 
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An even broader definition was offered by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, who argued that “forms of identity based on social realities as different as 
religion, language, and national origin all have something in common, such that a new 
term is coined to refer to all of them – ethnicity.  What they have in common is thatthey 
have all become effective foci for group mobilization for concrete political ends.”52  
However, while the emphasis in this definition on the political mobilization of ethnic 
groups is helpful, as nationalism expert Walker Connor points out, lumping “national 
origin” together with other dimensions of ethnic identification begs some of the most 
important questions about politics and ethnic identity.53 
 This semantic confusion derives in part from the modern conflation of the terms 
“nation” and “state.”  According to Connor, states are delimited by political boundaries, 
and nations are delimited by ethnic boundaries, where “nation connotes a group of people 
who believe they are ancestrally related.”54  In practice, however, the two terms are often 
used interchangeably, together with “nation-state,” a term originally reserv d for the 
occasional correlation between an ethnically-based nation and a politically-based st te. 
As a result, the study of nationalism has developed concepts of different kinds of 
nationalism.  For example, scholar Anthony Smith distinguishes between “civic-
territorial” nationalism and “ethnic” nationalism.  The former, which Smith calls “  
peculiarly Western conception of the nation,” is characterized by “historic ter tory, legal-
political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and 
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ideology.”  With the latter, Smith argues, “the nation is seen as a fictive ‘super-family’, 
and it boasts pedigrees and genealogies to back up its claims . . . the place of law in the 
Western civic model is taken by vernacular culture, usually languages and customs . . .”55  
Clearly, one of the principal differences between the two models is the basis on which 
membership and allegiance rests.  In the civic model, they are matters of location and 
individual choice.  In the ethnic model, they are matters of birth and group history. 
 Of course, though these distinctions are indispensable as analytic constructs, clean 
categorizations of real nations or states are seldom possible.  As Smith himself
acknowledges, “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees 
and different forms.”56  And Horowitz argues that in divided societies there is 
competition between kinship and territory (“consanguinity and contiguity,” in his elegant 
formulation) as the dominant principle for socio-political organization.57   
The ambiguity and subjectivity of such classification schema provide the occasion 
for one of the other principal topics of debate in the literature on ethnicity and 
nationalism.  In simplest terms, this debate concerns the stability and robustness of 
political identities.58  On one side of the debate are “primordialists” or “essentialists,” 
who see identities as deeply rooted, powerful political motivations that are very slow to 
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change.59  On the other side are “instrumentalists” or “modernists,” who see group 
identification primarily as a means of political mobilization designed to maxi ize 
material and political gains.  Instrumentalists see ethnic identities as somewhat contingent 
and open to manipulation by elites and “political entrepreneurs.”60  Analysts offering 
explanations of ethnic group behavior based on rational choice models and international 
relations theories such as the security dilemma can reasonably be grouped in with this 
modernist school.61  In between these two positions are the “constructivists,” who agree 
with instrumentalists that group identities are socially constructed and therefore 
malleable, but look to a broader set of factors operating over longer periods of time to 
explain changes in the dynamics of political identities.62  The essence of the debate has 
been captured most colorfully, perhaps, by Ernest Gellner, who wondered, “do nations 
have navels?”63   
Beyond quips, Brenden O’Leary has provided a useful framework for 
summarizing these approaches to ethnic identity.  He divides approaches along two 
dimensions – modernists, ethnocontinuists (similar to constructivists), and primordialists; 
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and then whether the analysts believe that ideas, interests, or identities are most important 
in influencing behavior.  He concludes the following:  
Modernists tend to have greater optimism about the management and transcendence of 
national and ethnic conflict than do ethnocontinuists and primordialists.  Those who 
emphasize the salience of ideas in explaining natiolism tend to emphasize the 
possibilities for conflict resolution created through alternative ideological mobilization or 
educational transcendence.  Those who emphasize the salience of interests tend to explain 
ethnic relations through a realist focus on the balance of power between groups.  Those 
who emphasize identities focus on the recognition and the misrecognition of collective 
identities.64 
 
Recent scholarship has tended to favor the modernist and constructivist positions 
in the debate.  As another summary of the debate observed, “‘Essentialism’ has . . . been 
vigorously criticized, and constructivist gestures now accompany most discussions of 
‘identity.’” 65  However, as with many such debates, ample opportunity exists to 
incorporate aspects from each of these perspectives into coherent analysis of ethnic 
identity and conflict.  Many scholars have taken just such an ecumenical approach.  Ted 
Robert Gurr points out that “the fact that . . . resurgent nationalisms are usually led by 
modern political entrepreneurs . . . should not obscure the fact that their success depends 
on the persistence of deep-rooted sentiments of separate identity. . .”66  Horowitz advises 
that “many of the puzzles presented by ethnicity become much less confusing once we 
abandon the attempt to discover the vital essence of ethnicity and instead regard ethnic 
                                                
64 Brendan O’Leary, “Nationalism and Ethnicity: Research Agendas on Theories of their Sources and their 
Regulation,” in Daniel Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, 
and Possible Solutions (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001), pp. 37-48.  
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applicable (see p. 38). 
65 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society, vol. 29, no. 1 
(February 2000), p. 6. 
66 Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Institute of Peace, 1993), p. 91. 
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affiliations as being located along a continuum of ways in which people organize and 
categorize themselves. . . Group boundaries are made of neither stone nor putty.”67 
Overall, the literature on the subject makes clear that, while ethnic identities can 
be malleable and are not the only types of identities that are politically relevant,68 they do 
often have important effects that cannot be adequately described or predicted by focusing 
on individual, rational behavior.  This general conclusion is buttressed not only by the 
work in political science and sociology described above, but also by work in social 
psychology on the impact of group identification on individual behavior.  As one analyst 
describes it, “Group identification is part of a larger phenomenon in which, contrary to 
the assumptions of economists and sociobiologists, humans find it easy to care about 
people and things in a way that goes far beyond narrow self-interest.”69 
One other factor indicates potential for high relevance of ethnic identity in the 
context of insurgency and counterinsurgency.  Group identities usually take on increased 
salience during civil conflict in multi-ethnic societies.  In this way, ethnic conflict can 
become self-reinforcing as group boundaries are made more important and distinct 
simply by the onset of the initial violence.70  This dynamic is crucial to account for in 
                                                
67 Horowitz, pp. 55, 66. 
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War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 46-47, Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Addressing 
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applying insights from the literature on identity and ethnic conflict to any analsis of 
counterinsurgency strategy. 
An ambiguity along Horowitz’s “continuum of ways in which people organize 
and categorize themselves” is the difference between ethnic and religious identity.  
Looking ahead in this study to the context of conflict in Iraq between Shi’a Arabs and 
Sunni Arabs, any significant theoretical differences could be quite important.  May 
analysts consider religious affiliation as a powerful form of identity, but somewhat less so 
than ethnicity.  For example, Chaim Kaufmann asserts that  
Ideological identity is relatively soft, as it is a matter of individual belief, or sometimes 
political behavior.  Religious identities are harder, because while they also depend on 
belief, change generally requires formal acceptance by the new faith, which may be 
denied.  Ethnic identities are hardest, since they depend on language, culture, and 
religion, which are hard to change, as well as parent ge, which no one can change.71 
 
Others stress the similarities in the emotional and political effects of religious and ethnic 
identification.  As Anthony Smith argues, “Both religious and ethnic identities have 
striven to include more than one class within the communities created on their bases. . . 
Both stem from similar cultural criteria of classification.  They frequently overlap and 
reinforce one another.  And singly or together, they can mobilize and sustain strong 
communities.”72  In general terms, this study is sympathetic to Smith’s notion that 
religious and ethnic identities can operate in very similar ways and have similar effects.  
Accordingly, the study will use the terms “ethnic” and “ethno-religious” interchangeably, 
a choice that will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
                                                
71 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions t  Ethnic Civil War,” International Security, vol. 
20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 141. 
72 Smith, pp. 6-8. 
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One of the most important questions about how and to what extent ethnic 
identities contribute to political violence is the relative importance of those identities 
versus economic factors.  Analytically, this often (though not necessarily) corresponds to 
a choice between focusing on behavioral processes in groups and focusing on structural 
incentives and preferences of individuals.  This dichotomy brings the discussion around 
again to the previous section of this chapter on the historical influence and limitations of 
modernization theory.  To reiterate the broad point, theories and policies of development 
and counterinsurgency in the United States and other European governments focused 
heavily on economic factors, structural incentives, and individual preferences.  The 
judgment of the noted British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson is 
representative of this general view:  “However powerful national or religious forces may 
be, that of material well-being is as strong if not stronger.”73  The neglect of ethnic 
identity in the formulation of these theories and policies was sometimes unconscious, 
sometimes deliberate, but there is little doubt that it was neglected. 
Many of the works cited above are littered with critiques of excessive emphasis 
among academicians and policymakers on rationalist, materialist approaches to 
explaining and addressing civil conflict in the developing world.74  Two renderings of 
this point will stand here for the rest of them, quoted at length because of their direct 
relevance to the topic of this study.  Both passages were written in the 1980s, before th  
                                                
73 Thompson, p. 65. 
74 In addition to the quotations here, see Connor, 29-57, 72-74, 145-161, Harff and Gurr, p. 96, Horowitz, 
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end of the Cold War had thrust ethnic conflicts into the spotlight of international 
relations.   
The first is from Walker Connor: 
To some, ethnonational identity seems little more than an epiphenomenon that becomes 
active as a result of economic deprivation and that will dissipate with greater 
egalitarianism.  Others reduce it to the level of apressure group that mobilizes in order to 
compete for scarce resources.  A variation on the pressure group concept places greater 
emphasis on the role of elites; rather than a somewhat spontaneous mass response to 
competition, the stirring of national consciousness is seen as a ploy utilized by aspiring 
elites in order to enhance their own status.  Finally, in the hands of many adherents of the 
“internal colonialism” model, entire ethnonational consciousness becomes equated with 
class consciousness. . . Explanations of behavior in terms of pressure groups, elite 
ambitions, and rational choice theory hint not at all at the passions that motivate Kurdish, 
Tamil, and Tigre guerrillas or Basque, Corsican, Irish, and Palestinian terrorists.  Nor at 
the passions leading to the massacre of Bengalis by Assamese or Punjabis by Sikhs.  In 
short, these explanations are a poor guide to ethnonationally inspired behavior. . . 
 
. . . Analysts have been beguiled by the fact that observable economic discrepancies are 
near universal concomitants of ethnic strife . . . [but] defining ethnonational conflicts in 
terms of economic inequality is a bit like defining them in terms of oxygen.75 
 
The second is from Donald Horowitz: 
Processual theories of politics, developed in the United States at a time when ethnic 
claims were largely dormant, contain an inadvertent bias that impedes the understanding 
of ethnic politics.  These theories hold that politics is a process for deciding ‘who gets 
what’. . . following Hobbes, they conceive of power principally as a ‘means to some 
future apparent good’. . . To understand ethnic conflict, it is necessary to reverse this 
emphasis.  Power is, of course, often an instrument to secure other, tangible goods and 
benefits, . . but power may also be the benefit. . . Broad matters of group status regularly 
have equal or superior standing to the narrow alloctive decisions often taken to be the 
uniform stuff of everyday politics.76 
 
None of this criticism is meant to suggest that economic and material factors re 
insignificant, that ethnic grievances are more likely to cause civil confli t than economic 
                                                
75 Connor, pp. 73-74, 146, 147.  Note that the collection referenced above was published in 1994, but the 
essays from which these quotes are taken were published in 1984 and 1987. 
76 Horowitz, pp. 186-187 (emphasis in original).  A similar point is made by Indraneel Sircar, 
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grievances, or that ethnic and economic factors are always clearly separabl .77  To the 
contrary, a full appreciation of the roots and dynamics of irregular warfare undoubtedly 
benefits from complementary perspectives on legitimacy as it relates to both ethnic or 
religious identities and the quality of governance.  The British insurgency expert Thomas 
Marks has argued persuasively that these different elements of insurgency have long co-
existed to a greater extent than has been widely appreciated.78  And another insurgency 
expert, Tony Joes, reminds us that “even during the Cold War, conflicts ostensibly about 
Communism exhibited deep ethno-religious roots, as in Malaya, Vietnam, Tibet, Angola, 
Peru, and Afghanistan.”79   
A debate on the relative importance of political and economic factors, and private 
and public factors in causing civil wars has emerged in the past decade in a subfield often 
referred to as the “economics of conflict.”  Using econometric techniques and large-N 
data sets, some analysts have presented evidence that economic factors tend t be more 
potent sparks for civil wars than ethnic diversity.80  Other analysts using similar methods 
have found direct linkages between the types of ethnic divisions in a society and their 
proclivity for political violence.81 
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This study does not seek to resolve these questions since it is not principally 
concerned with the onset, frequency, or duration of civil wars, per se.  But what the 
preceding discussion is meant to suggest, is that when ethnic conflicts do result in wars 
and insurgencies, their ethnic dimensions are likely to be extremely important in shaping 
the course of those wars and in determining the success or failure of efforts to stop hem.  
And perhaps there is no better way to summarize this relationship between ethnic identity 
and political violence than by returning to the various grounds on which legitimacy is 
claimed.  Horowitz directly addresses this issue and lays out four different potential bases 
for claims of “group legitimacy” in a given geographical space:82  “prior occupation,” or 
indigenousness; “special mission,” usually one associated with religious claims; 
“traditional rule,” where a group has ruled in a given area in the past; and “the right to 
succeed the colonial power,” which relates to the status of particular groups at the point 
in time when colonial rule was ending.  Note that none of these bases have much at all to 
do with Weber’s notion of “rational” legitimacy or what would generally be associated 
with good governance.  They all relate to the provenance and identity of the wielders of 
power. 
Another important strand of the scholarly literature dedicated to ethnic conflict 
has focused on alternative political structures that have been used to mitigate ethnic 
conflict.  Broadly, these structures can be placed on a spectrum bounded by assimilation 
on one end and secession or partition on the other, with intermediate steps mixing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Civil War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, no. 3 (June 2002), pp. 307-334, Henry Hale, 
“Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse,” World Politics, 
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different measures of integration and accommodation across ethnic groups within a s ngle 
state.83  As might be expected, those with views of ethnic identity tending toward the 
primordialist are more likely to support accommodationist political structures o  even 
partition as institutional responses to ethnic conflict, while those with more 
instrumentalist views of identity are more likely to back integrationist responses. 
One of the most prominent debates in this institutional arena has been between 
Horowitz and Arendt Lijphart.  Horowitz advocates construction of federal constitutions 
and electoral systems that deliberately work against ethnic solidarity, such as those in 
Nigeria, South Africa, Malaysia, and India.84  Lijphart advocates “consociational” power-
sharing mechanisms that guarantee identity-based representation in key governmental 
posts, such as those in Belgium, Switzerland, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland.85  These 
scholars disagree on whether institutions should be made to reflect ethnic identities 
directly or to decrease the political salience of those identities.  But both sides of this 
debate proceed from the premise that ethnic identity is a powerful force that must be 
addressed by the political institutions of divided societies.  
Finally, it is important to note the contributions of a relatively recent trend in 
scholarship on civil conflict that bears on the role of ethnic identities in such conflict.  
This literature, exemplified by Yale political scientist Stathis Kalyvas’s work,86 
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demonstrates the limitations of macro or national measures of factors such as identity or 
governance or class as causal explanations of particular instances of local conflict.  This 
work argues that the complexity and variability of motivations for individual and group 
behavior in civil conflict is so great that causal theories must address local “mi ro-level” 
variables, not only national-level ones.  This insight need not divert an analytic emphasis 
on ethnic identities, however, so much as it sharpens that emphasis.  As Kalyvas says, 
recommending a micro-level empirical focus “is not to say that ethnic, religious, or class 
allegiances are false or irrelevant, but rather that their effect varies considerably across 
time and space within the same civil war . . .”87  The methodological implications of this 
perspective will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Recent Analysis of Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency 
To be fair, the importance of ethnic identities and dynamics has not escaped the 
attention of analysts of insurgency, especially in recent years.  For example, Bard O’Neill 
distinguishes insurgent grievances arising from dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
“political communities” from those arising from grievances related to “political systems” 
or “policies.”88  Steven Metz distinguishes “spiritual” from “commercial” insurgencies.89  
And Timothy Lomperis distinguishes legitimacy derived from “belief” from legitimacy 
derived from “opportunity” or “interest.”90  Each of these frameworks is directly related 
                                                                                                                                                 
Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and 
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to the distinction made here between “identity” and “governance” as potential bases for 
legitimacy.  More recently, the newest U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency 
manual counts “identity-focused” insurgencies as one of six main types of insurgencies.91  
And other analysts writing about irregular warfare in the midst of the war in Iraq have 
noted the powerful influence of ethnicity and religion on such wars.92  Nevertheless, the 
implications of these dynamics for the design and conduct of counterinsurgency strategy 
remain under-examined by systematic empirical inquiry.93  And many still hold out great 
hope for the contributions of improved governance to prosecuting counterinsurgency in 
Iraq.  
Therefore, with the body of scholarship outlined in this chapter as a conceptual 
frame of reference, it is reasonable if not imperative to wonder whether improving 
governance in the form of economic benefits and material standard of living is always an 
effective instrument for dampening civil conflict.  In cases where ethnic identities are 
salient, it seems quite possible that the individually-based social contract of Western 
political philosophy would be displaced by a “contract” based on groups or communities, 
and that the quality of governance would then take a back seat to identity in the 
conference of legitimacy on political institutions.   
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The conflict begun in 2003 with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq provides a 
particularly complex environment in which to explore alternative concepts of identity, 
governance, and legitimacy.  The insurgencies there have been unusually, if not uniquely, 
decentralized, and comprise a variety of disparate interests.94  One consequence of this 
complexity was significant disagreement over time among policy makers and analysts in 
the United States about the best course for counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.   
Perhaps four distinguishable, though overlapping, views have been evident since 
the beginning of the conflict in 2003.  First, particularly prevalent in the war’s early d ys, 
was a “kinetic” approach to counterinsurgency.  Taken somewhat by surprise by the fact 
of the insurgency and its intensity, the U.S. military reverted to its organizational and 
doctrinal propensity to address hostile action through the application of overwhelming 
force.95  This was coupled with resistance at strategic levels to the idea that an insurgency 
was under way, and therefore, that counterinsurgency was the appropriate framework for 
the U.S. and Coalition response. 
A second approach quickly emerged, partly in response to the first, which cast the 
Iraqi insurgency as a successor to the long line of insurgencies faced in the pas  by 
American and other Western militaries.  According to this view, counterinsurgents in Iraq 
should be looking to the lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies, such as those in 
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Malaya, Vietnam, and Algeria, for guidance on their strategies and tactics.96  This view 
emphasized the centrality of winning hearts and minds in its traditional sense, focused on 
provision of security and good governance.  This view gained some traction at the 
strategic level in Washington and Baghdad, but was coupled inextricably with an 
overriding focus on the transition of responsibility for counterinsurgency operations from 
Coalition forces to Iraqi forces.  
A third view, emerging in 2006, began to question the applicability of traditional 
approaches to counterinsurgency, and emphasized the differences between today’s 
insurgents and those of the twentieth century.97  This view took exception to the notion 
that defeating the Iraqi insurgency depends on winning hearts and minds, emphasizing 
the sectarian nature of much of the violence in Iraq and concluding that addressing 
material grievances would matter little in squelching the insurgency.  For example, 
defense analyst Stephen Biddle argued,  
The current struggle is not a Maoist ‘people’s war’ of national liberation; it is a 
communal civil war with very different dynamics. . . Economic aid or reconstruction 
assistance cannot fix the problem: would Sunnis really get over their fear of Shiite 
domination if only the sewers were fixed and the electricity kept working?98 
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In a similar vein, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Governance Coordinator 
in al Anbar province in 2003-2004 concluded that “a good political settlement 
without economic aid can still lead to stability, while no level of macroeconomic 
support can produce stability absent a viable political process.”99   
A fourth view became pre-eminent in 2007 with the arrival of General 
David Petraeus as the head of the Coalition’s military effort and a “surge” of U.S. 
combat forces.  This view seemed to balance aspects of both the second and third 
views while replacing the Coalition’s strategic focus on transition of security 
responsibilities to a focus on directly providing population security in Baghdad.   
At the time of this writing, the first drafts of history are giving great credit 
to the fourth of these views.  But what combinations of security and good 
governance and identity-politics really drove events in Iraq?  What kind of 
legitimacy has been at stake in there?  And what should that mean for the 
policymakers charged with creating a successful counterinsurgency strategy?  
These questions are certainly far from settled, and the facts on the ground 
continue to change.  One observation, though, seems safe to make: that claims to 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of insurgent and counterinsurgent operations 
have varied significantly in various regions within Iraq.  Discerning whether and 
how these variations have been systematic present a great empirical challenge nd 
opportunity, one which this study seeks to begin to take on. 
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The Case for New Analysis on Identity, Governance, and Counterinsurgency Strategy 
This chapter has tried to draw a clear distinction between the political dynamics 
of, on the one hand, government performance in meeting the needs of its citizens 
(“governance”) and, on the other, ethnically and religiously driven group loyalties 
(“identity”) as they relate to insurgency and counterinsurgency.  At the samtime, it has 
acknowledged that this distinction between governance and identity as potential bases for 
legitimacy is neither novel nor always stark in practice.  It is reasonable to ask, then, why 
does this question merit further study?  The preceding discussion reveals three crucial 
reasons for further study.  
1. Current counterinsurgency doctrine and policy continues to strongly reflect 
conventional wisdom that was forged in the 1950s and 1960s in response to formative 
experiences in that era, the heyday of Maoist people’s wars, modernization theory, 
and Cold War great power competition.100  In particular, the concept that “winning 
hearts and minds” is central to counterinsurgency strategy, while rhetorically flexible 
enough to transcend narrow interpretation, is, historically speaking, firmly rooted in 
this intellectual tradition.101  Most significantly for this research, both the liberal and 
the communist sides of this tradition are relatively insensitive to the divisive potential 
of ethnic and religious identity politics in civil conflicts.  This is true partly for 
diametrically opposed reasons: an emphasis on political pluralism in the liberal case; 
and a dedication to a singular cosmopolitan set of values in the communist case.  But 
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it is also partly true for a common reason: a materialist conception of socialwelf re, 
justice, and legitimate authority. 
2. Most of the social scientific literature in this field has focused on explaining the 
causes of revolution and insurgency, not on the causes of success or failure in the 
conduct of counterinsurgency.102  
3. The war in Iraq that began in 2003 presents new and unusually promising empirical 
opportunities to illuminate these issues.  This will be addressed in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
In some sense, then, a theory of counterinsurgency strategy that is integrative of  
diverse range of approaches to identity, governance, and legitimacy remains to be 
developed.  This research does not aspire to generate a full-fledged theory of this s rt.  
The cases and data presented here will not be sufficient, alone, to accomplish this.  But 
this research does aim to provide a foundation for that larger theoretical goal. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Analytic Framework 
 
 Irregular warfare and the politics of ethnic identity clearly pose formidable 
analytical challenges.  Relevant variables are legion, their interactions are complex, their 
descriptions subjective, and their associated data messy.  As with other complex 
phenomena, great simplifications are sometimes necessary to make a given problem 
analytically tractable.  The trick is to create a depiction of the world that is simple enough 
to make data available, questions coherent, and answers comprehensible, but no simpler 
than that.  Such is the goal of this chapter. 
 The chapter is divided into four parts: 1) definitions of the study’s central 
questions, hypotheses, and concepts; 2) description of its selection of case studies; 3) 
presentation of an analytic framework for the study; and 4) discussion of metrics and data 
sources for key parameters. 
Bounding the Problem – Questions, Hypotheses, and Concepts 
At the broadest level, as stated in Chapter 1, the question that guides this research 
is:   
Is providing good governance necessary to defeat insurgencies? 
More specifically, it seeks to examine the following hypothesis: 
In the presence of major ethno-religious cleavages, good governance will contribute 
much less to counterinsurgent success than will efforts toward reaching political 
agreements that directly address those cleavages. 
 
Broadly speaking, testing this hypothesis could produce three alternative results, ach 
with different implications for policy and strategy. 
1. Hypothesis supported:  Where major ethno-religious cleavages exist, those identities 
and group loyalties are clearly more important factors than the prevailing quality of 
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governance in explaining the dynamics of insurgencies, so those factors should be the 
basis on which counterinsurgency strategy seeks to build political stability. 
2. Hypothesis partially supported:  Where major ethno-religious cleavages exist, those 
identities and group loyalties are clearly important factors in explaining the dynamics 
of insurgencies, though they may or may not be more important causal factors than 
the prevailing quality of governance.  Therefore, counterinsurgency strategy must 
seek to address both of these factors in building political stability. 
3. Hypotheses not supported:  Even where major ethno-religious cleavages exist, those 
identities and group loyalties are poor indicators of the dynamics of insurgency, so 
the quality of governance is a more reliable foundation upon which 
counterinsurgency strategy should seek to build political stability. 
In any case, the first methodological task arising from the question and hypothesis 
above is to define what is meant by the key terms they employ. 
Good Governance 
“Good governance” is defined here as effective and efficient administration of 
public services and allocation of public resources.  As such, assessment of the qualiy of 
governance will focus on issues such as economic organization, public health, education, 
the justice system, sanitation, power, and water.  Governance is a general enough t rm 
that the choice of this particular definition is worth a few extra words of clarii ation and 
justification, especially since this definition is narrower than some conceptions of 
governance, yet broader than some others.   
Most important, “good governance” here is not used in exactly the same way as it 
is often used in current literature and policy discourse on political and economic 
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development.  There, good governance carries such strong connotations of transparent, 
democratic, and liberal political institutions as to be almost synonymous with them.1  
There are two key reasons why this conception of good governance is not appropriate f r 
the context of this research.  First, this conception sets unreasonably high standard  of 
performance for governments under siege by insurgencies, and in so doing defines the 
majority of cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency as outside the scope of the 
question.  Second, this conception presumes an inextricable linkage between particular 
forms of political institutions and legitimacy (e.g. liberal democracy) that may not be 
universally valid.  Therefore, while some semblance of a functioning political system is a 
necessary component of good governance as defined here, such features as election and 
the separation of institutional powers are not. 
The World Bank tracks governance in six “dimensions:” 1) voice and 
accountability; 2) political stability and absence of violence; 3) government effectiveness; 
4) regulatory quality; 5) rule of law; and 6) control of corruption.2  These dimensions 
provide a closer approximation of what governance refers to in this research, but there are 
two very important differences.  First, the definition used in this research expressly 
excludes the second of these six dimensions: security.  As discussed at length lat r in this 
chapter, security in counterinsurgencies is both uniquely important and analytically 
problematic.  For both of these reasons, it will be treated in this research as a separate 
                                                
1 For example, see, Gita Welch and Zahra Nuru, ed., Governance for the Future: Democracy and 
Development in the Least Developed Countries, United Nations Development Programme, 2006, Chapter 
1. 
2 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4654, June 
2008.  Another proposed measurement scheme for quality of governance that is generally consistent with 
this approach is in Robert I. Rotberg and Deborah L. West, “The Good Governance Problem: Doing 
Something About It,” World Peace Foundation Report #39, 2004.   
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factor from the other dimensions of governance.  To be clear, the intent of this research i  
to test the utility of aspects of governance other than security in defeating insurgencies.   
Additionally, the first of the World Bank’s governance dimensions also requires 
some qualification as it relates to the definition used here.  “Voice and accountability,” or 
the idea that constituencies see themselves as having representation is an import t part 
of governance (though note that this need not necessarily be provided via democratic 
elections).  However, the existence of a mechanism for accountability does not equate to 
satisfaction with the representation itself.  The particular distribution of power among 
constituencies is considered in this study to be a separate variable from governance.  At 
first glance, this may appear to be an overly subtle distinction, but it is truly a  the heart 
of the issue under examination here.  The existence of mechanisms for accountability 
speaks to how a government governs.  The distribution of power across ethno-religious 
groups speaks to the issue of who governs. 
Despite these important limitations in scope, the definition used here is broader 
than some definitions of governance, notably the one offered by the U.S. military’s latest 
manual on counterinsurgency.  There, governance is defined as one of six separate “lines 
of operation,” which “relates to the host nation’s ability to gather and distribute resources 
while providing direction and control for society.”  While the activities that the 
counterinsurgency manual identifies with governance are included in the definition used 
here, so are activities that the manual identifies with two other lines of operatin: 
“essential services,” dealing with the operation of power, water, sanitatio , education, 
medical systems and the like; and “economic development,” dealing with the superviion 
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and regulation of a functioning economy that provides employment and creates and 
allocates resources.3 
Insurgency / Counterinsurgency 
“Insurgency” is defined here as an indigenous military or paramilitary challenge 
to the sovereignty of a constituted government over all or part of its territory.  
Accordingly, “counterinsurgency” is the collective strategy and operations of a 
government and its allies that are aimed to defeat an insurgency.4  This research will also 
focus on a specific subset of conflicts between insurgents and counterinsurgents:  those in 
which a significant counterinsurgent role is played by a foreign power.  
Defeat / Victory / Failure / Success 
“Defeat” and “victory” are notoriously difficult to define and depend largely on a
particular political point of view or point in time.  That said, the proceeding analysis will 
recognize defeat and victory in instances where explicit or imputed counterinsurge t 
objectives, commensurate with the geographic and temporal scope under consideration, 
are either demonstrably met and/or are judged to be met by key parties to the conflict.  As 
will be addressed later in this chapter, “success” and “failure” will be easi r concepts to 
                                                
3 Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, Department of the Navy, December 2006) (hereafter referred to as “FM 3-24 / 
MCWP 3-33.5”), pp. 5-14 to 5-17. 
4 These definitions are consistent with the U.S. military’s doctrinal definitions of insurgency (“an organized 
movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict”) and counterinsurgency (“those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and 
civil actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”).  Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms as amended through September 17, 2006.  Other similar definitions of 
“insurgency” are in Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd Edition 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 15, and Athony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History 
and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 1. 
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apply to the case studies than “victory” and “defeat,” in part because they allow for 
gradations of meaning and relative progress rather than absolute, definitive outcomes. 
Ethno-religious Identity-Based Cleavages 
A recent paper on the methodological dimensions of identity in the social sciences 
concluded that “the current state of the field amounts to a definitional anarchy.”5  Other 
scholars have commented that the term “identity,” as an analytical category, “tends to 
mean too much, . . too little, . . . or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).”6  Part 
of this state of confusion, no doubt, results from the variety of types of identity that 
operate in the variety of contexts relevant to the social sciences.   
Mindful of these pitfalls, the first step in narrowing down the concept for this 
study is to say that the identities of interest here are those that are group-based, related to 
ethnic and religious affiliations, and are manifest in political behavior.  As Chapter 2 
made clear, the boundaries of ethnic and religious identities can only be established with 
any validity on a case-by-case basis.  But as a starting point for distingu hing “identities” 
in this research, Weber’s definition of an ethnic group will serve: “… those human 
groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities 
of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and 
migration…”7 
                                                
5 Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a 
Variable,” Perspectives on Politics, vol 4, no. 4 (December 2006), p. 3. 
6 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society, vol. 29, no. 1 (February 
2000), p. 1. 
7 Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, translated by Ephraim Fischof  
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 389 (first published in 1922) . 
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Also as noted in Chapter 2, the category of interest in this research reaches 
beyond ethnic identity to include religious identity as well.  Hence, the term “ethno-
religious” is used to describe group identity and behavior associated with either ethnicity, 
religion or both together.  This combination is not meant to suggest that there are no 
differences between ethnic and religious identities.  Instead, the combination is made for 
analytic convenience and is based on the assumption that ethnic and religious identities 
are likely to manifest themselves in political behavior in similar ways.  Thisassumption 
is a common one in the study of ethnicity8 and also is implicit in the U.S. military’s 
definition of an ethnic group:  “a human community whose learned cultural practices, 
language, history, ancestry or religion distinguish them from others.”9   
Finally, the hypothesis above requires distinguishing environments with major 
ethno-religious “cleavages” from those without them.  Ethno-religious identities are 
present everywhere, but they are not equally politically salient everywhee.  This research 
uses the term “cleavage” to describe the presence of multiple politically salient ethno-
religious identities within a single political unit.  The term is rooted in theories f 
political sociology that distinguish societies with dominant “segmental cleavages” from 
those with dominant “cross-cutting cleavages.”10  With segmental cleavages, individuals’ 
interests across multiple domains such as ethnicity, religion, class, profession, region, etc. 
tend to align in relatively discrete social segments.  With cross-cutting cleavages, those 
                                                
8 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 17-
18. David Little and Donald K. Swearer, “Introduction,” in David Little and Donald K. Swearer, eds., 
Religion and Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006), pp. 3-7. 
9 FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, p. 3-4 (emphasis added). 
10 See Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), Arendt Lijphart, 
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 
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interests across multiple domains do not align particularly well, thus preventing strong 
linkages between group identity and political cohesiveness.  The ethno-religious identity-
based cleavages addressed in the above hypothesis, then, are segmental cleavages, and 
thus of high political salience. 
A Note on “Hearts and Minds” 
This research does aim to provide insight into the validity of the often-cited sin  
qua non of successful counterinsurgency strategy, “winning hearts and minds.”  In some 
sense, exploring the relative claims to legitimacy of ethno-religious identity versus 
expectations of good governance is tantamount to building a definition of “hearts and 
minds.”  Nevertheless, this particular terminology will be largely absent from the 
analysis.  Trying to speak analytically of the “hearts and minds” of the “people” probably 
commits a logical error that historian David Hackett Fischer calls the “pathetic fallacy,” 
that is, the “ascription of animate behavior to inanimate objects.”11  While “hearts and 
minds” may be useful shorthand in some contexts, it is distinctly opaque as an analytic 
category or as a strategic objective.  As Fischer goes on to say,  
It is . . . problematical to locate the point at which the behavior patterns of individuals can 
be transferred to groups. . . Sometimes the intention is merely metaphorical.  But it is an 
exceedingly doubtful and dangerous image to introduce into one’s thought, for it has a 
way of spreading swiftly out of control.12 
 
This seems an appropriate warning for analysts and strategists, alike, and is reflected in 
the research design for this study. 
 
 
                                                
11 David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper 




The empirical components of the study fall into two categories.  First, in Chapter 
4, brief analyses apply the analytic framework developed in this chapter to a macro view 
of three of the most “classic” cases of twentieth century counterinsurgency.  Se ond, in 
Chapters 5-7, the analytic framework is applied to two detailed case studies of American 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, from 2004-2006.   
The twentieth century set of case studies, based on secondary sources, serve two 
purposes in the study.  The first was methodological, in that they provided an opportunity 
to calibrate and refine the analytic framework and hypotheses developed here prior to the 
collection and analysis of original data.  Second, though abbreviated and intended to be 
more analytically instrumental than conclusive, the case studies also stand a tests of the 
research question and hypothesis in their own right.     
The cases were selected with an eye toward covering the most important episodes 
among the class of counterinsurgencies directly addressed by the research: conflicts in 
which a significant counterinsurgent role is played by a foreign power.  The cases 
considered in Chapter 4 are the United Kingdom in Malaya (1948-1960), France in 
Algeria (1954-1962), and the United States in South Vietnam (1962-1973).   
The second empirical component of this study is primary research on 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, during the period 2004-2006.  Apart from its clear 
historical importance and its relevance to near and mid-term policy considerations, Iraq 
provides rich opportunities for comparative analysis of the issues addressed in this study, 
arising from the various combinations across the country of key variables such as ethno-
religious demographics and counterinsurgent strategies applied.   
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In some cases, different organizations have been engaged in operations in very 
similar environments, with identical strategic goals, and yet have implement d different 
approaches to counterinsurgency.  For example, both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine 
Corps have fought extensively in the so-called “Sunni Triangle,” but, at the outset of U.S. 
involvement there, had very distinct histories and doctrines with regard to 
counterinsurgency.  Partly due to these differences, in the spring of 2004, the 1st Marine 
Division attempted to implement a different approach to its operations than the Army 
units it relieved in Anbar province.13  Conversely, there have been instances where 
similar strategies were adopted by different organizations operating in evironments that 
were quite different from one another.  Both the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division and 
British forces pursued strategies with a heavy emphasis on good governance and 
economic reconstruction, with the former operating in multi-ethnic Baghdad and the 
latter in Shia-Arab-dominated Basra. 
In many cases, partly due to the relative lack of preparedness and formal training 
for counterinsurgency, different approaches were adopted even by different units of the 
same organizations.  In some cases, operational planning and decision making was so 
decentralized that battalions within a single brigade and units responsible for the same 
locales at different times took very different approaches to achieving their operational 
objectives.  Examining the experiences of different units through a comparative lens, 
                                                
13 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 
327, Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 
2006), pp. 319-320, and Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New 
York: Bantam, 2005), pp. 49-52. 
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therefore, promises to provide some robust evidence for the efficacy or hazards of certain 
policies, doctrine, or tactics.14 
The study presents two case studies focused on the operations of brigade-level 
U.S. military organizations in two Iraqi cities:  the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd 
Infantry Division in Ramadi (2004-2005) and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal 
Afar in 2005-2006.  Case selection considerations will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The empirical focus here on military organizations is worthy of a point of 
clarification.  Counterinsurgency strategies and operations are not purely military 
functions, and this analysis aims to capture the full range of activities undertaken by 
military and civilian counterinsurgents alike, for the cases considered.  However, one 
premise of the research design is that in Iraq, local or regional dynamics have differed 
sufficiently to justify treating those localities as distinct analytic units.  Typically, 
military units have led operations at that level.  Focusing the analysis on these units, 
therefore, is not only a matter of analytic convenience, but also is probably the most 
viable method for constructing a holistic view of counterinsurgency operations in a given 
space and timeframe.   
This approach may come at the expense of some confusion about the use of 
traditional terms for the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Ambiguity in 
this regard is very common, but is particularly acute in an environment where nominally 
“tactical” units, such as brigades, are developing their own political-military “strategies,” 
                                                
14 I am aware of only two examples of this kind of comparison that address the war in Iraq: Jason Lyall and 
Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” 
International Organization, vol. 63, no. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 67-106, and Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, 
and Joseph H Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? T e Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 
NBER Working Paper 14606 (December 2008). 
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but whose objectives are considered “operational” by virtue of their being sub-national.  
This analysis will aim to minimize confusion on this subject with the understanding that 
the levels of this hierarchy will draw their meaning from their context rela iv  to their 
geographic units of analysis rather than from doctrine.  Hence counterinsurgency 
“strategy” may well be local in many instances. 
Finally, the rationale for selecting 2004-2006 as the timeframe for the analysis is 
that this is the period in which the conflict in Iraq can most clearly be characterized as an 
insurgency against the nascent Iraqi government and its Coalition allies.  By 2006, the 
conflict had evolved into a civil war with far less coherence about which parties could be 
considered “insurgents” and which “counterinsurgents.”  Clearly, there has been much 
debate about how to label the war in Iraq, a debate that has tended to generate more heat 
than light.  But by September 2006, even the top American general in Iraq was 
acknowledging that “We're starting to see this conflict here transition from an insurgency 
against us to a struggle for the division of political and economic power among the 
Iraqis.”15  The most commonly cited turning point in this transition is the bombing of 
the Askariya shrine in Samarra on February 22, 2006.  This point seems an appropriate 
demarcation point between the phase of the war dominated by insurgency and the phase 
dominated by wider civil war. 
Structuring the Problem – An Analytic Framework 
The first step in formally defining this problem should be to examine the basic 
causal logic usually hypothesized between counterinsurgency strategies and the ultimate 
defeat of insurgents.  The next two sections take on this challenge, and are followed by a 
                                                
15 General George Casey, quoted in Elena Becatoros, "T p U.S. General: Iraq Conflict Shifting to Internal 
Struggle," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 22, 2006. 
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discussion of how this logic may be formalized through creation and organization of key 
variables. 
The Logic of Counterinsurgency Strategy 
In the most general sense, counterinsurgency strategy can be divided into two 
classes of activities: improving governance and providing security.  The U.S. 
government’s new Counterinsurgency Guide frames the problem of counterinsurgency 
strategy this way:  “Effective COIN . . . involves a careful balance between constructive 
dimensions (building effective and legitimate government) and destructive dimensions 
(destroying the insurgent movements).”16  As political scientist D. Michael Shafer 
describes this logic, “[American counterinsurgency] doctrine emphasizes dev lopment 
and security. . . Without security, so the argument goes, development is impossible; 
without good government and economic progress, efforts to maintain it will be 
bootless.”17  Figure 1 below outlines this logic, with events labeled A-H and causal 
processes labeled 1-9.  In event A, counterinsurgents attempt to improve governance 
through the variety of mechanisms discussed in the definition above.  At the same time, 
they also conduct traditional security operations, including both police and military 
operations (event B).  If improvements in governance are realized (event C via processes 
1 and 2), then this is supposed to win popular loyalty and support for the government and 
                                                
16 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency 
Initiative, January 2009), p. 14. 
17 D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 79 (emphasis in original).  Other analyses employing two similar 
categories to describe counterinsurgency strategy include Jim Baker, “Systems Thinking and 
Counterinsurgencies,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07), pp.  26-43, Alice Hills, “Hearts and 
Minds or Search and Destroy? Controlling Civilians i  Urban Operations,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 
vol. 13, no. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 6, and William J. Hurley, Joel Resnick, Alec Wahlman, Improving 
Capabilities for Irregular Warfare (Volume I: Main Text) (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2007), p. II-3 and Appendix A. 
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thereby decrease popular support for the insurgency (event D).  This should then cause 
the insurgency to decline (event G) both directly, as it is denied safe havens and recruits 
(process 5), and indirectly, as the population grows more cooperative with 
counterinsurgent security operations (events E and F and processes 6-8).  Finally, the 
declining insurgency eventually results in a stable peace (process 9 and event H).  This, 
in essence, is the conventional explanation offered by much of the academic literature 
and operational doctrine on counterinsurgency for an observed correlation between 
events A (attempts to improve governance) and H (a resulting stable peace). 
 
Figure 1: Basic Causal Logic of Counterinsurgency Strategy 
If, however, we observe A but do not observe any evidence of H over time, we 
can infer that one or more of the causal processes in this chain has not operated as 
hypothesized.  Specifically, what might those breakdowns be?  Possibilities could be 
found in any one of the processes depicted in Figure 1, but this study focuses particular 
attention on process number 3: the mechanism that translates improved governance into 
shifting loyalties among the affected population.  For it is here that legitimacy is widely 
believed to reside and to operate as a key instrument of the counterinsurgent.  And it is 
Counterinsurgents attempt to improve governance
Improvements in governance are realized























here that conflicts involving identity may subvert the intended effects of improvements in 
governance on popular support for the insurgency. 
One of the principal problems with legitimacy as an analytic construct, of course, 
is that it is an abstraction, and therefore very difficult to observe.  A little like dark matter 
in astrophysics, it is recognizable primarily through its imputed effects.  In the model 
depicted here, those effects would be visible in events E, G, and ultimately H.  But this 
indirect inference of the causal role of legitimacy is problematic because each of these 
signal events (E, G, and H) can also be caused by events B, E, and F.  Moreover, events 
B, E, and F can plausibly operate without significant contribution from the supposed 
chain of legitimacy building, events A, C, and D.  For this reason, we cannot necessarily 
infer a causal relationship between events A and H, even when they are correlated.  
Perhaps this is one reason why, as Timothy Lomperis reported in his study of legitimacy 
and insurgency, “. . . in a personal letter to the author, Chalmers Johnson, a prominent 
scholar on revolution, warned against basing a study of insurgency on legitimacy bec use 
the concept is too ‘intellectually traumatic.’”18 
In fact, the conceptual challenge here is even thornier than this problem with 
legitimacy implies.  An additional complication arises from the fact that security is both 
an important input and an important output of any counterinsurgency strategy.  This has 
two troublesome logical implications. 
First, the dependent variable, represented here as event H, “stable peace,” may 
sometimes be difficult to distinguish from one of the key independent variables, the 
security operations depicted here as event B.  Sharp reductions in the magnitude and 
                                                
18 Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of 
Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. xii. 
 61
frequency of insurgent violence represent probably the clearest available indicator of the 
overall success of a counterinsurgent effort.  But such reductions can often be provided 
fairly readily, if only temporarily, with sufficient quantities of patrols by police or 
military forces.  This kind of militarized security could hardly be described as a 
successful counterinsurgency, however.  The real measure of success would have to be 
the relative absence of violence coupled with much smaller levels of force.  Political 
scientist Jeffrey Race refers to these two different types of security as tactical and 
strategic security, respectively.19  Distinguishing between the two empirically is certainly 
feasible, but it requires both explicit collection and interpretation of the data in these 
terms, and a considerable degree of subjectivity in that interpretation. 
 The second logical implication, following from the first, concerns process number 
2 in Figure 1.  This reflects the fact that improvements in security are likely to help allow 
improvements in governance to be realized in addition to, or instead of, the other way 
around.  If an observed improvement in security could, in fact, be either event B or event 
H, then we cannot be sure whether event C is actually a cause of improved security or an 
effect.  This potential for confusion about cause and effect is not simply a methodological 
problem, either.  It is an operational problem that strikes at the heart of strategy and 
decision-making.  As one reporter described this problem in relating the struggles of an 
American provincial reconstruction team in Baqubah, “. . . officials seemed unable to 
agree on whether poor security was preventing reconstruction or whether reconstructi  
                                                
19 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 146. 
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failures had caused security to erode.”20  In such an environment, what is the strategist or 
the analyst to do? 
Research Methods and Challenges of Causal Inference 
For the moment, we must leave the strategist to fend for himself and focus on the 
needs of the analyst.  The key to better understanding of complex phenomena such as 
these is in examining the detailed course of events in which the independent variables 
interacted to produce the outcomes of the dependent variable.  This method for seeking 
detailed causal linkages is often referred to as “process tracing.”21  The analysis here of 
the Iraqi case studies focuses its empirical effort on just such a process-tracing method 
for counterinsurgency operations at local levels.  This approach is inevitably challenging 
to execute and generates inconsistent data across different times and locales.  
Nevertheless, a focus on this level of detail offers the only hope of being able to re iably 
navigate the ambiguities outlined in the previous section.  An empirical focus on the 
national level, on simply establishing correlations among variables, or on achieving a 
large sample size for statistical analysis could not accommodate the interpretiv  burden 
demanded by the dynamics under examination here. 
This methodological judgment is one basis for the growing body of literature cited 
in Chapter 2 on “microlevel research” on social phenomena.  As Stathis Kalyvas 
explains, 
                                                
20 Solomon Moore, “A Promising Iraqi Province is Now a Tinderbox,” Los Angeles Times, January 3, 2007, 
p. 1. 
21 For overviews of process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 205-232 and 
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 85-87. 
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. . . emphasis on the macrolevel implies that ‘on-the-ground’ dynamics are perceived as a 
rather irrelevant local manifestation of the macrolevel.  Local actors are seen as local 
replicas of central actors, and studying them is justified only on grounds of local history 
or antiquarian interest.  This neglect has several causes: a division of labor separating the 
tasks of collecting evidence at the microlevel and interpreting macrodynamics; an 
epistemic preference that marginalizes the particular; and the interpretation of microlevel 
dynamics in the language of the master cleavage.22 
 
This research employs both macro and microlevel techniques; the former for the cases of 
Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam, and the latter for the Iraqi cases.  
Coalition operations in Iraq present particularly interesting comparative nalytic 
opportunities that this research begins to exploit.  An advantage of considering multiple 
Iraqi cases is that a large number of contextual variables are automatically controlled.  
Comparative analyses of historical counterinsurgencies, such as those betwen Malaya 
and Vietnam,23 are hampered by the large differences in context between cases.24  With 
the case of Iraq, such important variables as the national political context, the role of 
neighboring countries and regional dynamics, and the prevailing technologies that shape 
communications, commerce, and warfare, are all very similar, if not identical, across the 
multiple local cases.  Moreover, as described above, Iraq offers cases wher  different 
counterinsurgency strategies were attempted in areas with similar dyn mics of ethnic 
                                                
22 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 390. 
23 This has been a particularly popular comparison in the literature; see Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, 
Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), John A. Nagl, Learning 
to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), Sam Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), and Robert G. K. Thompson, Defeating 
Communist Insurgency; The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966). 
24 Bernard Fall was even less charitable about such comparisons, alleging that “any comparison between 
British victories in Malaya and the situation in Vietnam in the 1960s is nothing but a dangerous delusion, or 
worse, a deliberate oversimplification of the whole problem.” Quoted in Robert W. Komer, The Malayan 
Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, February 1972), p. 78. 
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political conflict; and it also offers cases where similar strategies were pursued in areas 
with quite different dynamics of ethnic political conflict.   
All of these conditions suggest an opportunity to conduct a “controlled 
comparison,” an analytic technique inspired by experimental science in which all 
conditions are held constant except for a single variable of interest.  If changes in that 
single variable are shown to be correlated with differences in the dependent variable 
outcomes, then the comparison suggests a causal connection between the two variables.  
Also, even short of the restrictive conditional requirements of controlled comparison, 
Iraqi cases also offer the possibility of multiple “congruence” tests.  With this method, 
“the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or 
predict the outcome in a particular case.”25 
These methods have the seductive quality of promising a link from the research’ 
empirical work to theory building.  But their attractiveness is limited becaus, for a 
variety of reasons, they provide only weak links from data to theory.  The limitations for 
hypothesis testing of the “methods of elimination” underlying controlled comparisons, 
for example, have been well understood since John Stuart Mill gave them that name in 
1843.26  One problem arises simply from the complexity of many social phenomena.  
Complexity usually means that even cases that appear quite similar are diffe nt in ways 
that may remain unspecified by anything less than a grand field theory of all the
phenomena involved in the cases.  This raises the possibility that variables omitted from 
the analysis actually account for case outcomes, either directly or through interactions 
                                                
25 George and Bennett, p. 181. 
26 Ibid., pp. 153-160, and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 56-58. 
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with specified variables.  Insurgency and counterinsurgency certainly qualify as complex 
problems in this sense.  Outcomes are subject to influence by an analytically 
unmanageable number of interdependent factors.  Theorists of complexity science have 
taken to calling such phenomena not just complex, but “wicked problems.”27 
A second challenge arises from the “equifinality”28 (or “multiple causality”29) of 
the outcomes under examination.  These terms refer to problems where multiple causal 
paths can lead to the same outcome.  Warfare is a good example of this kind of problem, 
where victory in one war is not likely to result from exactly the same combination of 
factors as victory in a different war. 
A third challenge, which is related to equifinality, is the lack of specificity n 
predictions made by many theories.  As Stephen Van Evera describes, Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity was widely considered confirmed by a single casstudy “congruence” 
test because it made a highly specific and unique prediction about the degree of apparent 
displacement of stars during a solar eclipse.30  By contrast, hypotheses such as the one 
proposed in this research are not highly specific, and multiple plausible explanations may 
fit a given combination of variable values.  The easiest way to address this problem is to 
narrow the focus of the dependent variable.  For example, rather than asking “will we in 
the war?” we ask, “at what rate will we attrit enemy forces?”  But in some instances, this 
approach amounts to asking the wrong question, and hence throwing out the substantive 
                                                
27 Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," Policy Sciences, 
vol. 4, 1973. pp 155-169. 
28 George and Bennett, pp. 161-162. 
29 King, Keohane, and Verba, pp. 87-89. 
30 Van Evera, pp. 66-67. 
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baby with the methodological bath water.  This is something of a common curse for the 
strategist.  As his questions become more integrative, they simultaneously become more 
important and less tractable.    
In sum, the essence of the problem with hypothesis testing for the subject of this 
research is that the variables of interest are not deterministic and they are not 
independent.  The main methodological implication of this condition is that inferences of 
causation from correlations between independent and dependent variables are likely to be 
weak.  But all is not lost.  First, from the perspective of theory-building, as George and 
Bennett point out, “theories can be tested in two different ways: by assessing the abili y 
of a theory to predict outcomes, and by assessing the ability of a theory to predictth  
intervening causal process that leads to outcomes.”31  For this research, the second of 
these methods will be much more important than the first. 
Second, this study is not primarily an exercise in theory-building in any case.  If it 
presents new information, stimulates thinking along new paths and is suggestive of new 
knowledge, it will have succeeded.  All of these considerations, then, led to the hybrid 
research design selected for this study and described at the beginning of this section: a 
mix of macro and micro case studies with process tracing in the latter to determin  how 
ethno-religious identities and counterinsurgency strategies interacted.     
Identifying the Variables 
 The model of counterinsurgency depicted in Figure 1 is exceedingly simple.  In 
the service of hypothesis generation and theory development, deductive reasoning could 
easily reveal additional layers of dynamics and complexity in the system at hand.  
                                                
31 George and Bennett, p. 209, n12. 
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However, an empirical research strategy demands a match between the analytic
framework and the data that is available to make use of the framework.  Therefore, the 
goal at this point is not to complicate the model, but rather to specify it and its variables 
with enough care to make it analytically functional.  With this in mind, how can we 
formalize the main research question and hypothesis?  The following few paragraphs 
outline the key variables that will be addressed.  The next section discusses issues of 
measurement and sources for describing these variables.   
In its most general form, the dependent variable is clearly the outcome of an 
insurgency – a victory or a defeat for the insurgents.  For the Iraqi case studies, how ver, 
victory and defeat will have to be treated as directions rather than endpoints.  The focus 
on local or regional cases within the larger national context prevents speaking strictly 
about outcomes for the whole insurgency.  And, in any case, the timeframe under 
examination ends before that whole insurgency had any resolution.  Therefore, the 
dependent variable for the case studies will essentially be the change in prospects for 
stable peace within the geographic and temporal boundaries of the case.  To emphasize 
this more general character of the dependent variable, it can be labeled “success” or 
“failure” rather than “victory” or “defeat.” 
The framework will address four independent variables.  For simplicity, each of 
them is described here as binary, though in fact they could just as easily be thoughtof as 
having multiple categories or even as continuous, accommodating multiple levels of 
assessment.  The first independent variable addresses whether politically salient ethno-
religious cleavages were present in a given case, that is, whether the identities 
represented among political leadership were a major factor in the grievances or evident 
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motives of insurgents.  The second independent variable addresses security operations, 
and whether those operations were conducted with appropriate capabilities, resources, 
and discrimination between hostile and neutral targets.  The third independent variable 
addresses whether or not initiatives for improving governance, as that concept is defined 
earlier in this chapter, were attempted and achieved by the counterinsurgents.   
Finally, the fourth independent variable addresses the main hypothesis presented 
at the beginning of this chapter, which posits that “in the presence of major ethno-
religious cleavages, good governance will contribute much less to counterinsurgent 
success than will efforts toward reaching political agreements that direc ly address those 
cleavages.”  Accordingly, the fourth independent variable in the framework is the 
presence of political agreements that directly address ethno-religious cleavages.  Such 
agreements may take many different forms.  As described in Chapter 2, these might 
include the establishment of consociational power-sharing mechanisms, arrangements of 
ethno-religious group autonomy, or perhaps electoral arrangements designed to foster 
greater cross-group cooperation.  The key qualifying criterion is that the political 
agreement expressly recognizes the extant cleavage in trying to resolve conflict.  Clearly, 
this factor would not be relevant in cases where identity-based cleavages were not 
present.  But in cases where they were, pursuit of such political agreements may provide 
one of the only alternatives to good governance in promising a stable political resolution 
to the insurgency.  Whether or not this is the case, and, if it is, how these activities 
operate and affect the course of the counterinsurgency, comprise the final element of the 
formal analytic framework employed in this study.   
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These five variables (one dependent, four independent) provide a focus for data 
collection and analysis in each of the case studies.  In this regard, each case study 
requires collection and classification of data according to the scheme outlined in Table 1 
below. 
Variable Data Required to Support Variable 
Classification 
Ethno-religious cleavages or not? 
Ethno-religious composition and political 
dynamics 
Good security operations conducted or not? Types and dynamics of security operations 
Good governance provided or not? 
Quantity/types of governance-focused 
initiatives undertaken 
Outcomes of governance-focused 
initiatives undertaken 
Efforts toward a political agreement that 
addresses ethno-religious cleavages or not? 
Ethno-religious composition and political 
dynamics 
Counterinsurgency successful or not? Counterinsurgency outcome metrics 
Table 1: Main Data and Classification Requirements 
With this data for each case, a summary of outcomes in the format of Table 2 
below can be constructed.  Again, representing these variables as having either binary 
(yes or no) or meaningful quantitative values would be, respectively, crude or arbitrary.  
Nevertheless, the binary classification is helpful for the purposes of clarifying the logic 
being tested through the analysis of a few hypotheses. 
 Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 














Case 1      
Case 2      
. . .      
Case n      
Table 2: Notional Case Study Variable Summary 
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 Assume the following symbols for each of the major variables: 
a = ethno-religious identity-based cleavages 
b = good security operations 
c = good governance  
d = efforts toward political agreement addressing cleavages 
y = counterinsurgent success 
Then assume that the values of all variables are either Yes (condition is present) 
or No (condition is not present).  The following hypotheses (H) may then be specified, 
together with the combination of variable values that would provide supporting evidence 
for them. 
H1: Good governance is not necessary for counterinsurgent success.  This would be 
supported by any result where: c=No, y=Yes. 
 
H2: If ethno-religious cleavages are not present, then good governance and good security 
are sufficient for counterinsurgent success.  This would be supported by: a=No, b=Yes, 
c=Yes, y=Yes. 
 
H3: If ethno-religious cleavages are present, then good governance and good security 
together are not sufficient for counterinsurgent success.  This would be supported by: 
a=Yes, b=Yes, c=Yes, y=No. 
 
Variations and combinations of these hypotheses could also be constructed, but these 
represent the most important hypotheses relevant to main questions of the study in their 
simplest forms. 
To reiterate a point from the previous section, correlations such as the ones 
posited here can only be suggestive of causal relationships.  Alone, they do not provide 
strong evidence of causation.  Accordingly, the framework presented here represents a 
point of departure for the analysis in this study, not a strict filter through which all 
insights from the research will be understood. 
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Metrics and Data Sources  
Measurement of abstract phenomena such as governance, identity, and 
counterinsurgent success is inherently difficult.  While no methodological panacea for 
this challenge exists, it is possible to achieve some degree of reliability in such 
measurement through the collection of perspectives of direct observers of and 
participants in the events being studied.   
This kind of first-hand data is available in a few different forms: government and 
military archival resources such as after-action reports, lessons learned, nd unit histories; 
extensive reporting by journalists of a diverse range of nationalities and perspectives; and 
interviews with military and civilian personnel who have worked in Iraq.  This study 
draws on all three of these.     
Table 1 lists five categories of data demanded by the analytic framework: ethno-
religious composition and political dynamics; types and dynamics of security operations; 
quantity/types of governance-focused initiatives undertaken; outcomes of governanc -
focused initiatives undertaken; and counterinsurgency outcome metrics.   
As discussed in the previous section, the last of these, the dependent variable, is 
perhaps the most important and the most difficult to get right.  The definition of insurget 
defeat offered in the first part of this chapter claims that defeat occurs if “explicit or 
imputed counterinsurgent objectives . . . are either demonstrably met and/or are judged to 
be met by key parties to the conflict.”  So, to some degree, the opinions of the 
counterinsurgent leaders matter as an outcome metric.  But this is not sufficient.  In more 
concrete, objective terms, what counts as “success”?   
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Security is the most obvious candidate metric.  Event H in Figure 1, “stable peace 
prevails,” represents the essence of this metric.  But, to reiterate the earlier point, security 
is both an input and an output of counterinsurgency operations.  Hence, simply using 
security as the dependent variable introduces a serious endogeneity problem into the 
research design.  The hazard here is the potential for mistaking the direction of causation 
between the effectiveness of governance-related activities and the intensity of the 
insurgency.  If success in the counterinsurgency is defined only according to the 
prevailing level of security, and some threshold level of security is necessary to execute 
governance-type measures, then there is some level of violence at which it is impos ible 
to test any hypotheses about the effects of governance on levels of violence.   
One possible response to this is to analyze only cases where the level of violence 
remains below this notional threshold.  But this is impractical for the Iraq cases and 
would also have the drawback of excluding a significant portion of the problem from 
consideration.  Another response would be to treat security as a trailing indicator, i.e. by 
comparing governance-related initiatives in month X to security in month X+1 or X+2. 
This avoids confusion regarding the direction of causation and also probably better 
represents the nature of any expected effects.  Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher 
recommend this approach in their own work on civil conflict:   
. . . we don’t have a way as yet to address the issue of endogeneity of violence and 
control.  Violence is used to generate control, and levels of control affect the intensity of 
the violence.  Contextual qualitative evidence make it possible to disentangle the relation 
between violence and control through sequencing.32 
 
                                                
32 Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher, “Violence and Control in Civil War: An Analysis of the Hamlet 
Evaluation System (HES),” unpublished manuscript presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 27, 2003. 
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Just as security serves as an input to counterinsurgency, so do some other 
candidate metrics that relate to governance.  Metrics such as hours of functioning 
electricity or unemployment rates are sometimes used to measure progrss.  Indeed, for 
some purposes, these are helpful proxies.  But from an analytic perspective, measuring 
success by such metrics is very similar to measuring success by insurgent body counts; 
that is, it assumes a connection between input and output that is plausible but only 
hypothetical.33   
Ultimately, distinguishing between the short-term security provided directly by 
military and police operations from more sustainable, stable security requires eith r 
retrospect through significant passage of time, or the judgment of people intimately 
familiar with the evolving situation.  For the Iraq case studies, this study will emphasize 
the latter. 
Metrics for the other key variables are more conceptually straightforward, though 
they may still be highly subjective.  Composition and dynamics of ethno-religious 
identities may be derived from demographic statistics, local reporting, and participant 
interviews.  It is important to recognize that group loyalties are not uniform across entire 
groups.  As Henry Brady and Cynthia Kaplan point out, the “simple expedient of placing 
people into an ethnic category . . . assumes that ethnic identity is highly salient to group 
members, and it ignores subtle gradations of ethnic identity.” 34  But it is also true that 
civil conflicts, such as insurgencies, tend to prompt greater salience of identities, and 
Brady and Kaplan find that “a highly salient ethnic identity puts in motion psychologica  
                                                
33 See Baker, p. 41. 
34 Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, “Categorically Wrong? Nominal Versus Graded Measures of 
Ethnic Identity,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 35, no. 3 (2000), p. 56. 
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forces that homogenize attitudes within a group.”35  This research attempts to be sensitive 
to the notion of gradation and variation in salience, but, given the data, can only be so in 
a general, qualitative sense. 
Beyond identifying ethno-religious identity groups, the analysis must determin  
whether those identities are the bases of politically salient cleavages such that the 
relationship between the government and one or more of those groups constitutes a major 
grievance among insurgents.  In some cases, such as in parts of Iraq, this judgment may 
be rather self-evident.  Still, there is value in being able to make this judgment somewhat 
more formally.  Henri Tajfel, one of the pioneers of social identity theory, offers a useful 
set of criteria with which to identify distinctly intergroup behavior:   
First, at least two clearly identifiable social categories should be present in the situation 
(e.g., a Hutu and a Tutsi, a Catholic and a Protestant, a Serb and a Croat).  Second, there 
should be little variability of behavior or attitude within each group.  Intergroup behavior 
tends to be uniform (i.e., ‘we’ agree about ‘them’), whereas interpersonal behavior shows 
a range of individual differences.  Third, a member of one group should show little 
variability in his or her perception or treatment of members of the other group (i.e., ‘they’ 
are ‘all alike’).36     
 
These criteria provide some general guidelines for making a judgment on the extent of 
division, or cleavage among ethno-religious groups. 
Finally, metrics for judging the quality of security operations (as an input, or 
independent variable) will take many forms and will be largely informed by the types of 
data and tactics employed by the forces engaged in each of the case studies.  Combat 
operations that eliminate insurgents without creating large collateral damge and 
disruption to civilian populations would be important here, as would the ability of police 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Henri Tajfel, as summarized in Miles Hewstone and Ed Cairns, “Social Psychology and Intergroup 
Conflict,” in Daniel Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and 
Possible Solutions (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001), p. 324. 
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forces to sustain regular operations with minimal amounts of corruption or penetratio  by 
insurgent forces.  Another important factor in classifying this variable is the level of 
resources, especially in terms of manpower, that counterinsurgents bring to bear in a 
given case.  Unfortunately, many of the detailed statistics regarding security operations in 
Iraq remain classified at the time of this writing.  The case studies attempt to mine and 
present what is publically available.  As those data become available in the future, they 
will provide an excellent opportunity for testing and generation of new hypothesis on the 
subject of this research and other related topics. 
  
In summary, the methodological challenges presented by this research are 
formidable.  Even the most careful research design will yield conclusions that are 
tentative and suggestive rather than decisive.  Nevertheless, the importance f the subject 
matter compels the work.  It is worth emphasizing that the methodological challenges 
facing questions such as those posed here have parallels in the operational world.  For 
example, the complexities of constructing a reliable dependent variable for success in 
counterinsurgency are more than academic.  The counterinsurgent must wrestle ith 
similar questions about defining success in order to build a rational, coherent strategy.37  
Arguably, the harder it is to isolate such phenomena in a deliberative study, the harder it 
is likely to be operationally.  In some sense, then, the plausibility of establishing the 
cause and effect relationships at issue here is a significant hypothesis being tested by this 
research.  In this sense, inconclusive results would yield not only inconclusive 
                                                
37 The author was personally involved with such efforts while on the staff of the Strategy, Plans, and 
Assessments directorate of the Multi-National Forces – Iraq headquarters in Baghdad from May-September 
of 2008.  Consensus on an appropriate framework for defining success proved impossible to achieve. 
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conclusions, but also evidence that any policies depending on reliable understandings of 
the dynamics of identity, governance, and counterinsurgency should be undertaken with 
great modesty, indeed.  Or they might even give greater weight to the idea that, to
appropriate the words of analyst Tony Cordesman: “Not every game is worth playing, 
and sometimes the best way to win is not to play at all.”38 
Finally, any study of this kind must grapple with the forces exerted by two 
opposing intellectual poles: the generalizing impulse of the social scientist, ad the 
particularizing impulse of the historian.  By instinct, I am drawn to the historian’s model 
of depicting a problem in its confounding complexity.  But the study’s policy 
implications demand a good measure of social science’s inductive generalization.  The 
approach in this study stakes out a middle ground along this spectrum.  Any particular 
balance will inevitably leave some unsatisfied, but it is my goal to do as little violence as 
possible either to the richness and complexity of the study’s empirical context r to the 
feasibility of applying whatever insights can be uncovered. 
 
                                                
38 Anthony Cordesman, “Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Working Notes, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2005, p. 3. 
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Chapter 4:  Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency Strategy in 
Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam 
 
 This chapter has two related purposes.  The first is to determine what light the 
study’s proposed analytic framework can shed on three of the most important foreign-
supported counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century.  The second is to see what light 
those historical experiences can shed on the study’s proposed analytic framework.  In 
other words, the cases will serve as limited tests of the study’s hypotheses, but also as 
tools for sharpening those hypotheses prior to the collection and analysis of original data.   
The three cases presented here are those of the United Kingdom in Malaya from 
1948-1960, France in Algeria from 1954-1962, and the United States in South Vietnam 
from 1962-1973.  Selection of these cases was guided by several considerations.  First, 
these three cases are among the very largest foreign-supported counterinsrg ncies in 
history in terms of resources and manpower committed.  (Though France was not 
technically a “foreign” power in Algeria, its role there strongly resembl d that of a 
foreign power.)  Second, as a group, these cases exhibit considerable diversity with 
regard to the dynamics of such key variables as the role of identity politics, the types of 
counterinsurgency strategies pursued, and the outcomes of the conflicts.  Third, eac case 
presents the perspectives and operations of a different country in the role of the 
counterinsurgent.  Fourth, the three cases together span a 25-year period whose 
experiences formed the foundation of much of today’s received wisdom regarding 
counterinsurgency.  Fifth, as a result of all these factors, Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam 
are three of the most common sources in academic and policy discourse of “lessons” 
about insurgency and counterinsurgency involving foreign interventions.  And finally, 
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each of these cases features dimensions that make its relationship to the issues under 
examination in this study somewhat more complicated than conventional wisdom might 
suggest. Together, these factors make a strong argument to dedicate the limited space and 
limited objectives of this chapter to an examination of Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam.   
 Each case is presented in seven parts covering the following topics: 1) a general
overview of the context and major events of the conflict; 2) the role of ethno-religious 
identity politics in the conflict; 3) counterinsurgent actions with respect to providing 
security; 4) counterinsurgent actions with respect to improving governance; 5) any efforts 
toward political agreements that address ethno-religious cleavages; 6) an assessment of 




 The Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 gave the world the expression “winning 
hearts and minds.”  Not coincidentally, the counterinsurgency conducted by British and 
Malayan forces and authorities during the Emergency is perhaps the most frequently cited 
model of successful counterinsurgency practice.  The case is especially interest g for the 
purposes of this study, because at first glance its basic facts seem to contradi t one of the 
key hypotheses under examination: it is an insurgency with an important ethnic 
dimension that appears to have been defeated in significant part through the provision of 
good governance. 
 Malaya in 1948 was a collection of small states nominally ruled by ethnic Malay 
sultans, but together administered as a colony by Great Britain.  Though the 
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predominantly Muslim ethnic Malays were native to Malaya and were the country’s 
largest ethnic group, they did not constitute a majority.  At the time of the Emergency, 
the population of 6.3 million was about 44% Malay, 38.5% Chinese, 10.5% Indian, 5.5% 
aboriginal, and 1.5% other.1  During World War II, the Japanese defeat of the British in 
Malaya and Singapore and the country’s subsequent occupation greatly disrupted 
political and economic life there.  One beneficiary of this disruption was the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP).  The MCP was born in 1930, but had struggled to gain support 
prior to the war.  During the war, however, the MCP-based Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA) became one of the primary vehicles for resistance, even 
collaborating with its former British colonial antagonists in fighting the Japanese 
occupation.   
As a result, though the MPAJA was officially disbanded following the war, the 
MCP emerged as an important actor in the somewhat chaotic post-war Malayan political 
scene.  Japanese occupation had not only weakened British political authority on the 
peninsula, but had also stoked ethnic tensions between Malay, Chinese, and Indian 
populations.  Additionally, the war had generated a range of economic dislocations that 
provided ample opportunity for MCP agitation.  In particular, the Communists were 
successful in gaining control of much of the growing labor union movement during the 
mid and late 1940s.  By 1948, the MCP was sponsoring terrorist attacks in a fully fledged 
revolutionary program against the Malayan government.   
                                                
1 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 12, and Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security 
Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 63. 
 80
In June of that year, a state of emergency was declared that was destined to last 
for twelve years.  In his book on the Emergency, former British Secretary for De ense in 
Malaya Robert Thompson divides those years into three phases: a “build-up” on both 
sides (1948-1952); a period which “saw the success of the measures taken and the 
military defeat of the insurgents” (1952-1954); and “mopping up of the remaining 
communist terrorist gangs” (1954-1960).2   
Although the insurgents scored many early successes, they suffered from a few 
key weaknesses that aided the British and Malayan authorities in isolating them.  First, 
active membership in the MCP and its guerrilla and political arms was relatively small.  
Second, the insurgency was almost entirely limited to Malaya’s ethnic Chinese 
population.  In 1950, MCP membership was approximately 12,000-13,000, about 95% of 
whom were Chinese.3  Third, the insurgency was also relatively isolated geographically.  
It gained very little traction in the cities, and received almost all of its support from rural 
and plantation villages on the jungle fringe.  In the end, the insurgents were unable to 
overcome these limitations in the face of a well-coordinated counterinsurgency effort 
whose principal elements were population resettlement, expansion of police and security
forces, targeted improvements in governance and economic development, and the transfer 
of national sovereignty from Britain to a new and independent Federation of Malaya.   
 
 
                                                
2 Robert G. K. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York: F. A. Praeger, 1966), p 16. 
3 Sarkesian, p. 126, and Robert W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A
Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, February 1972), p. 8. 
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Were ethno-religious identity-based cleavages significant? 
There is no question that the politics of ethno-religious identity was an important 
aspect of the Malayan Emergency.  The strong concentration of the insurgency within the 
minority Chinese population imbued the entire movement with an ethnic character.  
Because of the MCP’s initial roots in the Chinese community, and because of unresolved 
questions of minority rights and status following World War II, early conflicts between 
the MCP and the government tended to occur along ethnic fault lines.  This early conflict, 
then, “sealed in the minds of Malays an identity of communism with the Chinese, and, 
therefore, as a threat to both Islam and the Malay community.”4 
 And, indeed, ethno-religious cleavages and grievances in Malaya did have 
substantive roots.  Many laws on citizenship, land ownership, and education were 
discriminatory against the Chinese.  Moreover, many Malayan Chinese were 
unassimilated into Malayan life.  Many were channeled in particular sector  of the 
economy, and many spoke neither Malay nor English.5 
Also, in a study involving interviews with dozens of former Communist guerrillas in 
Malaya, scholar Lucian Pye found racism to be endemic among the insurgents.6  
 At the same time, however, the doctrine and aims of the insurgency had very little 
to do with ethno-religious grievances or protecting Chinese political identity.  The 
Communists’ complaints, like those of their Leninist and Maoist role models, were 
                                                
4 Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of 
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principally about economic injustice.  They railed against labor exploitation, sh rtages 
and high prices of rice, rising cost of living, low wages, and excessive economic 
management from London.  As Richard Stubbs points out, “the MCP propaganda teams 
were skillful at highlighting [wage and labor grievances] and other issues, such a  
corruption, land tenure, and high rents.”7  And, while Lucian Pye found many insurgents 
to be racist, he did not find racism to be a generally important motivation for joining the 
MCP.  Motivations tended to much more personal and materialistic, based on issues like 
standard of living, underemployment, career prospects, and even boredom.8   
  The MCP also made significant efforts, albeit with little success, to broaden its 
appeal to Malay and Indian communities.  One clear symbol of this aspiration is the name 
of the MCP’s military arm, which was chosen expressly to emphasize the cross-
communal nature of the Communist objectives: the Malayan Races’ Liberation Army 
(MRLA).  In 1951, during the course of a thorough rethinking of its strategy, the MCP 
issued a directive admonishing itself for “failing to distinguish between th  ‘big national 
bourgeoisie,’ who were implacably opposed to communism, and the ‘medium national 
bourgeoisie,’ who were often fence-sitters and who could be won over to a broadly based 
united front.”  Another instruction issued in the same time period directed that “Malays 
and Indians were to be more actively recruited and Chinese cadres were ordered to cease 
treating them as inferiors; this was considered a form of ‘nationalist deviation.’”9   
                                                
7 Stubbs, p. 90. 
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By the same token, the Malayan Chinese population was far from united behind 
the Communist insurgents.  One major split within the Chinese population was between 
the so-called “Straits Chinese” who had been in Malaya for generations and were highly 
assimilated, and the recent immigrants who had a wide range of affiliations nd degrees 
of loyalty to Malaya.  Perhaps even more important was the split between the mostly 
urban “towkay” or merchant classes and the mostly rural laborers in agriculture, tin 
mining, and rubber plantations.  The merchants tended to sympathize with the anti-
Communist Kuomintang forces in China and “were basically loyal [to the Malayan 
government] as long as their business interests were protected by the local and colonial 
elites.”10  Chinese businessmen, who together owned mines and plantations generating 
almost half of Malaya’s tin and rubber output,11 had a great deal to lose from the 
instability caused by the insurgency, not to mention from a successful Communist 
takeover. 
Also, many Chinese were undoubtedly fence-sitters, waiting to see which side 
would prevail.  Political activism was not historically a characteristic of the Chinese 
community.  Sun Yat Sen quipped that they were politically “like a plate of loose sand.”12  
One of Britain’s High Commissioners in Malaya, General Sir Geoffrey K. Bourne, 
judged that many Chinese had “a foot in each camp, and that they might just have waited 
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passively for the outcome of the insurrection if they had not been won over to the idea of 
a multiracial Malaya.”13 
Perhaps the most striking evidence of division within the Chinese community is 
the fact that, as of April 1952, 1,250 of 1,942 (64%) civilians killed by the MRLA were 
Chinese.14  This dynamic of the insurgency, probably more than any other, helped 
convince the peasants that, in Sam Sarkesian’s words, “the MCP was engaged in a power 
struggle with the British-Malay government, not necessarily for the bett rment of the 
Chinese but for the privilege of ruling over them.”15 
Overall, for the purposes of this analysis, were ethno-religious cleavages 
significant in the Malayan Emergency?  In the broadest sense, they certainly were since 
they were important to the roots and the development of the insurgency and the 
counterinsurgency.  But the insurgency was not truly based on these cleavages.  The 
MCP attempted to create a class-based Leninist revolution, and then, having failed in that 
goal, to create a protracted Maoist peasant revolution.  It spoke little about Chinese ethnic 
unity, terrorized Chinese populations more than any others, and lamented its inability to 
recruit Malays and Indians to its cause.  Malay-Chinese relations during the Emergency 
meet only one of Henri Tajfel’s criteria mentioned in Chapter 3 for identifyi g distinctly 
intergroup behavior: clearly identifiable social categories were present, but there was 
great variability in both the behavior within the groups, and in each group’s perceptions 
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of the other.16  So, while cleavages certainly existed, their political salience was fairly 
weak in the sense most relevant to this analysis. 
Were good security operations conducted? 
 Security operations conducted by British and Malayan forces were extensive a d, 
over time, generally quite effective.  Measures implemented in the earliest days of the 
Emergency were often blunt, approaching the insurgency more as a criminal problem 
than as a political one.  Laws instituted through the state of Emergency widened th  
authority of police and military forces though a variety of measures, such as registration 
of all adult citizens, temporary abandonment of habeas corpus, right of search without
warrant, heavy sentences for illegal weapons possession, severe sentences for assisting 
the Communist propaganda effort, and expanded rights to impose curfews.17  Another 
key early initiative was a large expansion of police forces.  The number of federal police 
nearly tripled from 1948 to 1952, and the ranks of local “Home Guard” police units 
swelled from 17,000 in 1948 to 152,000 in 1955.18 
 The first couple years of the Emergency were marked by large military 
operations, incompetent police work and a great deal of indiscriminate brutality on the 
part of the government.  Chinese villagers sometimes even commented that the Britis  
were more brutal than the Japanese.19  But British forces soon adapted their operations to 
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the threat, focusing more on intelligence collection and small-unit operations,20 a  
approach that ultimately allowed them both to kill and capture more insurgents, and to 
antagonize the local populations less. 
 Undoubtedly, the centerpiece of the government’s strategy for providing security 
to populations affected by the insurgency was the resettlement of several hundred 
thousand people in protected enclaves which came to be called “New Villages.”  Thi key 
element of the “Briggs Plan” was highly disruptive for its resettled people, but had the 
dual benefit of creating more defensible population centers and of isolating the insurgent  
from much of their support bases for food and other supplies.  As the Briggs Plan author 
and the colonial government’s Director of Operations Lieutenant General Sir Harold 
Briggs argued, resettlement “is not the final objective, but affords only that measure of 
protection and concentration which makes good administration practicable.”21 
 The resettlement program was not immediately or fully successful in providing 
better security to the predominantly Chinese villagers who had been resettled.  But the 
combination of the program with the large expansion in local police forces made 
insurgents’ efforts to intimidate, coerce, indoctrinate and recruit villagers much more 
difficult.  British Brigadier Richard Clutterbuck judged the village policeman to be “the 
decisive character in this drama.”22 
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Was good governance provided? 
 Apart from providing greater security and physically separating the insurgents 
from the civilian population, improving governance was the central goal of the New 
Villages resettlement program.  In one sense, this was a simple goal because governance 
among the rural Chinese at the beginning of the Emergency was so minimal.  In many 
villages on the jungle fringe, Malayan government activity was so sparse that some 
believed control of their areas had been ceded to the MCP following the Japanese 
occupation.23  Seventy percent of the surrendered guerrillas interviewed in Lucian Pye’s 
study “perceived the colonial administration as existing completely apartfrom the 
Chinese community in Malaya.  The government operated in distant and limited spheres, 
and they could not always comprehend how its acts might impinge upon their daily 
lives.”24  Many rural villages were governed de facto by cells of the “Minh Yuen” or the 
MCP’s “People’s Organization.”   
As a result, Briggs believed the essence of the war in Malaya to be (as Richard 
Clutterbuck describes), 
. . . a competition in government.  He aimed not only to resettle the squatters but to give 
them a standard of local government and a degree of prosperity that they would not wish 
to exchange for the barren austerity of life under th  Communists’ parallel hierarchy; in 
other words, to give them something to lose.25 
 
Thus began the campaign, executed in earnest beginning in 1952 under Sir Gerald 
Templer, to win the war by “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”  Richard Stubbs 
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summarizes the criteria that Templer established by which New Villages would be judged 
“properly settled” as follows: 
a modicum of agricultural land and the granting of long-term land titles, an adequate 
water supply, a reasonably well-functioning village committee, a school which could 
accommodate at least a majority of the children, a vill ge community centre, roads of 
passable standards and with side drains, reasonable conditions of sanitation and public 
health, a place of worship, trees along the main street and padang, an effective perimeter 
fence, a flourishing Home Guard, a reasonably friendly feeling toward the Government 
and police, and the beginning of certain activities such as the Scouts, Cubs, and Girl 
Guides.26 
 
The efforts to achieve these standards, while uneven, met with a great deal of success, 
both in improving governance and quality of life and in winning loyalty toward the 
government.  As Riley Sutherland concludes, 
Governmental prestige rose as the public witnessed the amenities of life in the new 
villages with their well-organized after-care program and felt the effects of such new 
developments as irrigation and drainage projects; farm loans and other agricultural 
support measures; regulation of the formerly backward l bor conditions, work hours, and 
money lending practices; the encouragement of consumers and producers cooperatives; 
the growth of labor unions; a greatly improved education system with a concomitant rise 
in student enrollment; the opening up of the diplomatic, military, and civil services to all 
Malayan citizens under liberalized conditions of admission; and the opportunities for 
direct acquaintance with the workings of government through the week-long ‘civics 
courses’ attended by representatives of all racial nd economic communities.27 
 
 In sum, good governance was a very important aspect of the British and 
Malayan counterinsurgency strategy, and the execution of this aspect of the 
strategy was largely effective. 
Were political agreements addressing ethno-religious cleavages pursued? 
 One of the most important developments in Malaya during the Emergency was 
the formation of a political alliance between the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).28  Each of these major political 
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parties was born in large part from ethnic political interests, with the UMNO based in the 
Malay population, and the MCA in the Chinese population.  Nevertheless, a combination 
of genuine inter-ethnic common interests and electoral pragmatism resulted in an alliance 
between the two parties that began in 1952 and proved to be the dominant force in 
Malayan politics in the country’s march toward independence in 1957. 
 Among the key foundations of this alliance was the creation of the MCA, itself, in 
1949.  Prior to that point, disparate elements of the Malayan Chinese community were 
not politically organized, leaving limited formal alternatives to the Communist party for 
Chinese political activism.  But, as noted above, a large number of Malayan Chinese 
were not at all supportive of the Communists.  The MCA served as a focal point for these 
Chinese, who then participated extensively in supporting government policies in the New 
Villages and in building a multi-ethnic national Malayan vision.  
 Another critical factor in the success of the UMNO-MCA alliance was the 
unifying effect of Britain’s commitment to Malayan independence.  Templer’s t nure 
began in 1952 not only with his commitment to improving governance among the 
Chinese villagers, but also with a firm statement from London that “The policy of Her 
Majesty’s Government in Great Britain is that Malaya should in due course become a 
fully self-governing nation.”  Moreover, the British also laid out an explicitly multi-
ethnic vision for the country: “Her Majesty’s Government will not lay aside their
responsibilities in Malaya until they are satisfied that communist terrorism has been 
defeated and that the partnership of all communities which alone can lead to true and 
stable self-Government has been established.”29  As an important early step in reconciling 
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ethnic conflicts, the Malayan government liberalized its citizenship laws in September 
1952, thereby granting citizenship to over a million Chinese.30 
 The combination of these British policies and the success of the UMNO and 
MCA in negotiating a shared approach to national politics and policy not only helped to 
dissipate ethnic tensions, but also undoubtedly sapped support for the MCP and its 
insurgency. 
Was the counterinsurgency successful? 
 By almost any measure, the counterinsurgency in Malaya was successful.  Even 
before the official end of the Emergency in 1960, insurgent attacks had all but 
disappeared, and the MCP had ceased to operate as anything resembling a coherent, 
effective organization.  From its estimated peak strength of 12,000-13,000 members, the 
MCP declined to about 7,000 in 1951 and to 2,000 in 1957.  Similarly, insurgent 
incidents declined from almost 500 per month in 1950-51 to about 100 per month as early 
as 1953.31  “White areas,” villages where sufficient progress had been made in 
eradicating insurgents to suspend the Emergency regulations, spread steadily up the 
peninsula from 1953 onward. 
Evaluation 
 It is no surprise that Malaya is often held up as a model of successful 
counterinsurgency strategy.  All the factors that ostensibly support effective 
counterinsurgency were in place, including those that are the focus of this analysis:  good 
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governance, security operations, and political agreements among competing ethnic 
groups. 
At the same time, however, this multiplicity of positive factors limits the 
interpretive utility of the Malayan case for drawing broader conclusions about 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Success in Malaya was overdetermined, so the effects of any 
one set of factors is somewhat obscured by the presence of others.  Therefore, from an 
analytical perspective, it is difficult to come to any conclusion more refined than the one 
Robert Komer proposes, that “No one element was decisive.  Success was achieved by 
the meshing of many civil-military programs, each of which interacted with the others.”32  
Moreover, several unusual and favorable conditions beyond the factors considered 
formally in this framework made significant contributions to the victory of the British 
and Malayan governments.  Chief among them were the absence of outside support for 
insurgents, the relative geographic isolation of the insurgents, and the boom in tin and 
rubber exports sparked by the Korean War, which buoyed the Malayan economy 
considerably during the most critical years of the Emergency. 
 For the purposes of this analysis, the most provocative aspect of the Malayan case 
is the apparent effectiveness of governance-related counterinsurgency efforts in the New 
Villages in the face of a conflict with significant ethnic dimensions.  But ultimately, 
grievances related to ethno-religious identity were not the source of the Communist 
insurgency and their redress was not its main objective.  To the extent MCP objectives 
addressed group identities, they did so in opposition to British colonial rule, a grievance 
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that was completely co-opted by Britain’s 1952 commitment to grant Malayan 
independence. 
 Overall, to the extent that General Sir Harold Briggs was correct in conceiving of 
the war in Malaya as a “competition in government,” it is clear that the British and 
Malayan governments “outgoverned” the insurgents.  However, given the variety of other 
factors that also contributed to the counterinsurgent victory there, the indispensability of 
this factor cannot be established with great confidence. 
Algeria, 1954-1962 
Overview 
 Algeria won its independence from France in large part by means of an 
insurgency waged over the years 1954-1962.  The Algerian war was not only one of the 
largest and most ferocious of the anti-colonial wars following World War II, it also 
presents particular interpretive challenges to the counterinsurgency analyst due to 
France’s unusual mix of successes and failures. 
 Algeria was first occupied by France in 1830 and had become incorporated as an 
integral part of France in 1848.  In 1954, approximately ten million people lived in 
Algeria.  Almost nine million were indigenous Muslims, ethnically divided between 
Arabs and Berbers.  The remaining million were of European origin, generally known as 
“colons” or “pieds noirs” (“black feet”).  As in so many other cases of European rule 
outside Europe, the French had imported a great deal of modern technology, culture and 
political organization to Algeria, but standards of living, economic privilege and balance 
of political influence heavily favored the European population over indigenous peoples.     
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 Several years of rising frustration with and revolt against French rule culminated 
in 1954 with the formation of the Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation 
Front), or FLN, a revolutionary organization committed to winning Algerian 
independence.  The FLN launched the war in November of that year with coordinated 
attacks on several French targets, accompanied by a formal proclamation of its 
revolutionary goals.   
Though the first wave of attacks achieved little tactical success, the French 
reaction was swift and severe.  Unlike most European conquests, Algeria was technically 
not a colony, but was rather legally part of France, itself.  As a result, French opiion ran 
very strongly against Algerian independence.  As one commentator noted, “Up to 1956, 
the only point on which virtually the whole of France was united was that Algerian 
independence was unthinkable and unmentionable.”33  Another factor shaping the French 
response was the French Army’s catastrophic defeat by anti-colonial insurget forc s at 
Dien Bien Phu and France’s subsequent departure from Indochina only months before the 
FLN’s first attacks.  At the outset of the war, military and political leaders alike were 
determined not to allow another such defeat. 
In the first few years of the conflict, French security forces enjoyed a great deal of 
success in severely restricting the insurgents’ freedom of action.  Two tools that were key 
to French progress were strong control of Algeria’s borders with Tunisia and Morocco 
and the application of a “quadrillage” system, whereby the country was divided into 
something of a checkerboard organized by a combination of fixed military outposts and 
mobile units charged with pursuit of insurgent forces within specific zones.  These 
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setbacks prompted the FLN to shift its focus from the countryside to urban terrorism, 
prompting, in part, what came to be known as the “Battle of Algiers,” from late 1956 
through late 1957.  In this phase of the conflict, too, French forces managed to dismantle 
the FLN’s network, ending in a decisive defeat for the insurgents and the restoration f 
calm to Algiers. 
At the same time, however, the brutality of the war, especially the French Army’s 
use of torture, had begun to turn some international opinion against French rule in 
Algeria.  Most importantly, a gap had opened between the French government on the one 
hand and the military and the Algerian pieds noirs population on the other regarding how 
to address the ongoing insurgency and about the long-term viability of French control of 
Algeria (so-called “l’Algerie Francaise”).  In 1958, this split culminated in a political 
crisis that brought down the French government and brought to power a new regime 
under Charles de Gaulle. 
Initially, the pieds noirs believed that de Gaulle would strongly support l’Algerie 
Francaise, and indeed, de Gaulle did initiate a new, aggressive counterinsurgent proram 
under new leadership.  However, de Gaulle, reflecting the feelings of a growin  portion 
of the French public, proved to be ambivalent on the subject, and by 1959 had begun 
referring to the need for Algerian “self-determination.”  Historian Alistair Horne refers to 
de Gaulle’s first public speech regarding self-determination as “one of the most deci ive 
events of the whole war.”34  From this point forward, what had been a fairly one-sided 
military conflict between French and FLN forces began a transformation int  a political 
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conflict within the French government and military over the proper trajectory of French 
rule in Algeria. 
In the end, this was the conflict that came to define the outcome of the Algerian 
war.  Opposition to de Gaulle among the French authorities in Algeria prompted major 
political unrest among the pieds noirs in 1960, followed by attempted coups in January 
and April of 1961 and by terrorist attacks by French citizens against French citizens in 
both Algeria and France in 1961 and 1962.  Finally, de Gaulle reached an agreement on 
independence with the FLN in March 1962 and the majority of the pieds noirs were 
forced to flee Algeria in June of that year. 
In the eight years of war, casualties totaled 17,456 in the French military, 3,663 
among European civilians, and 30,034 indigenous people were killed by the FLN.  
Estimates of those killed by the French and their supporting forces range from 158,000 to 
one million.  Tens of thousands of Muslims were killed after independence as well, many 
in exchange for their having supported French rule.35  
Were ethno-religious identity-based cleavages significant? 
 Conflict over the politics of ethno-religious identity was central to the Algrian 
war.  As Horne argues, “In order to understand events from 1954 onwards, it is necessary 
to accept the existence of three totally distinct peoples – the French of France, the French 
of Algeria, and the Muslims of Algeria.”36  The opposing claims on each side of the 
conflict were fairly transparently rooted in the political prerogatives of their respective 
ethno-religious groups.  The Algerian French, in sociologist Eric Wolf’s words, “were at 
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one in defense of their privileges which made the lowest French [citizen] the superior of 
any Arab.  Their unity was the product of their common fear of the Muslim majority.”37   
Algerian Muslims, however, were not at all united in opposition to French rule.  
One contemporary analyst estimated that at the beginning of the war, the non-European 
population in Algeria was “20 percent for the insurrection, 20 percent for the 
maintenance of French order, and 60 percent undecided.”38  Before the war, there had 
been a significant “assimilationist” element among Algerian Muslims, which sought to 
draw French and indigenous cultures closer together under French rule.  Neverthel ss,  
pieds noirs’ repeated “inability and unwillingness to grant concessions in time spelled the 
end of the assimilationist cause.”39  
On the other side of the conflict, the insurgent movement was quite explicitly and 
uncompromisingly aimed at Algerian national independence from France, not at any 
lesser goal of political, economic, or social reform.  No better expression can be found of 
this than the FLN’s initial proclamation of November 1954 which states: “GOAL: 
National Independence through . . . restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, 
democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam . . .”40 
And, while many French accused the FLN of Communist sympathies and 
motivations, in fact, communist ideology had very little to do with the motivations of the 
Algerian insurgency. In Horne’s judgment, “Marxist materialism wasat least as alien to 
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the FLN ethos as were other external Arab ideologies . . . The FLN had always been quit  
unyielding in never accepting Communists into their ranks as a ‘block membership.’” 41 
Of course, socio-economic grievances were not absent from the FLN cause.  In 
1955, France’s Governor-General for Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, described the way in 
which these challenges interacted with the grievances related to ethno-religious identity:  
The population growth of an essentially agricultural country with unfertile soil and a 
difficult climate, has produced chronic unemployment, the desertion of the countryside 
for working class suburbs, extreme poverty and despair for a growing mass of individuals 
and families.  While this underprivileged proletariat is increasing in number and growing 
daily more bitter, a small Moslem bourgeoisie, educated through contact with us, is 
vainly seeking a solution not only economic, but above all administrative and political.  
However, they cannot find this solution.  The number of Moslems in the administration is 
still infinitesimal. . . Hence a dual dissatisfaction: the social unrest of the masses and the 
political unrest of the elite.  At the point where they meet, these two forms of unrest 
constitute a very strong explosive force.42  
 
 Another important caveat regarding ethno-religious conflict in Algeria is the large 
number of Algerian Muslims who fought in the war in defense of French rule, generally 
thought to be significantly more than those fighting for the FLN.43  As noted above, 
Muslims were not united.  Nevertheless, the key point is that identity was clearly the 
most important basis for the insurgents’ claims to legitimacy and was the key issu  at 
stake in the war. 
Were good security operations conducted? 
In Malaya, British and Malayan authorities pursued security and improved 
governance very much in parallel.  In Algeria, the French strategy clearly favored 
security over governance.  One of the central elements of this security-oriented strategy 
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was the deployment of large numbers of military forces.  From the beginning of the 
insurgency in 1954, France committed half a million troops to Algeria, in part by 
lengthening mandatory service times and recalling large numbers of reservists.44  These 
troops opposed an FLN insurgent force that was probably less than 30,000, many of 
whom were in Tunisia, not even in Algeria.45  Another key to the French security strategy 
was their system of “quadrillage,” whereby the Algerian countryside was divided up into 
a checkerboard of fixed outposts that delineated various zones of operation.  Over time, 
the quadrillage system of combining garrisoned forces at the outposts and mobile strike 
forces operating from the outposts was quite effective in suppressing insurgent activity 
throughout the countryside. 
 Additionally, French forces succeeded in controlling Algeria’s border with 
Tunisia, where thousands of FLN forces and supporters maintained sanctuary.  By 
September 1957, they completed a formidable physical barrier known as the Morice line, 
which featured electrified fences, minefields and extensive patrolling.  According to 
historian Ian Beckett, “by April 1958, the kill ratio of those trying to infiltrate into 
Algeria from Tunisia was reportedly 85 per cent, after which few attempts were made to 
do so.”46   
 As in Malaya, another important component of the counterinsurgency strategy in 
Algeria was the resettlement (“regroupement”) of large numbers of rural peasants into 
secured villages.  As with Malaya’s “new villages” and South Vietnam’s “strategic 
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hamlets,” the purposes of the resettlements were to protect the population from the 
insurgents and to isolate the insurgents from their support among the population.  By 
1960, something like two million people had been resettled in such villages. 
While the resettlement program enjoyed significant success in isolating FLN 
insurgents, it also generated a great deal of ill will against French for es and French rule.  
Conditions in the villages were generally quite poor.  One journalist, writing in 1958, 
described them this way:  
Crammed together in unbroken wretchedness, fifteen o a tent since 1957, this human 
flotsam lies tangled in an indescribable state. . . At the moment, the whole population is 
fed entirely on semolina.  Each person receives about four ounces of semolina a day . . . 
Milk is given out twice a week: one pint per child . . . No rations of fat have been 
distributed for eight months.  No rations of chick-peas for a year . . . No rations of soap 
for a year . . . 47 
 
In Horne’s estimation, “by uprooting these Algerians from their homes and fields and 
placing them in camps where they led listless and largely unemployed existences, the 
French only created a new area of profound social discontent . . .”48  
 Another double-edged sword in France’s approach to establishing security was is
aggressive, even brutal, law enforcement tactics.  Most infamously, French paratroopers 
murdered and tortured many suspected insurgents during the “Battle of Algiers.”  
According to one estimate, 3,000 of the 24,000 arrested in this phase of the insurgency 
disappeared while they were in detention.49  And throughout the counterinsurgency, 
French security forces indulged in many excesses of indiscriminate violence.   
Such tactics did produce many positive results for the French side, including 
improved intelligence and intimidation of potential insurgent recruits.  But they also 
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sacrificed much good will among the moderate Muslim population in Algeria and among 
many observers outside Algeria, especially among French citizens in France.  Horne 
relates a story that helps to sum up the trade-offs involved in this kind of brutality.  In 
1957, a French officer visiting Orleansville on temporary leave from his job improving 
government services and living conditions in the countryside, encountered a band of 
rampaging paratroopers, wrecking shops and harassing Muslim civilians.  “You band of 
little idiots,” he told them.  “You’re doing exactly what the FLN terrorists count on you 
doing . . . Two months of [my] work . . . are wrecked in one evening like this.”50   
 Nevertheless, in terms of rolling back the FLN’s ability to operate effectively in 
Algeria, French forces were extremely successful.  As of late 1957, after the completion 
of the Morice line and the eradication of FLN cells in Algiers, the insurgency was “on the 
defensive and could not undertake the conquest and control of a part of the territory 
which would have been a logical phase in the evolution of this type of situation and 
which the FLN had dreamed of accomplishing . . .”51  In 1960, one officer reported to his 
commander that “We have pacified the country so well that the [insurgents] have almost
disappeared.  Nowadays, almost no one joins the guerrillas.  It is more practical to stay 
put and campaign for independence in a thousand legal ways.”52 
Was good governance provided? 
As noted, France’s counterinsurgency in Algeria was influenced heavily by its 
army’s recent defeat in Indochina at the hands of Ho Chi Minh’s communist insurgents.  
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In particular, many French officers believed that the principal lesson of that defeat was 
that counterinsurgency strategy should incorporate a better understanding of the 
principles of Maoist people’s wars.  The doctrine that began to develop around this 
understanding, known as “la guerre revolutionnaire,” emphasized the centrality of 
popular support to achieving victory. 
Though not formally adopted into French Army doctrine, this philosophy became 
highly influential during the war in Algeria.  As a result, considerably more attention was 
paid to the quality of governance in Algeria than in Indochina.  As Beckett describes, “. . 
. many French officers interpreted guerre revolutionnaire as a genuine social revolution to 
win the support of the population, and some critics were even to accuse advocates of the 
new doctrine . . . of practicing rural socialism.”53 
However, guerre revolutionnaire also tended to place at least as much emphasis 
on manipulation of perceptions as it did on addressing grievances as a method of winning 
popular support.  As a result, French operations tended to emphasize psychological 
operations and population control.  In his famous exposition of guerre revolutionnaire, 
Modern Warfare, French officer Roger Trinquier says, “We know that it is not at all 
necessary to have the sympathy of a majority of the people in order to rule them.  The 
right organization can turn the trick. . . [popular] support may be spontaneous, although 
that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition.  If it doesn’t exist, it must be 
secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.”54  Trinquier 
was even more blunt at one point in remarks to a French newspaper:  “Call me a fascist if 
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you like, but we must make the population docile and manageable; everybody’s acts must 
be controlled.”55 
In Wolf’s view, 
Assuming Algerians to be like Frenchmen, possessed of identical culture patterns and 
interests, the military technicians visualized their task simply as one in which 
organization reproduces the experimental design of the laboratory and simple 
conditioning provides the experimental subject with a new set of habits, without the 
simultaneous creation of a new cultural order for which these new habits could be 
relevant. . . [W]hat was missing from ‘the theory of revolutionary war’ was any vision of 
real revolution, of a transformation of the environment congruent with new patterns of 
habit.  Under the conditions of colonial warfare . . . the theory was emptied of any 
cultural content to produce simply obedience to naked power imposed from without.56 
  
The French Army’s view of popular support, then, perhaps further reinforced the Army’s 
tendency to privilege security measures over governance improvement in its use of 
counterinsurgency tools. 
 Having said all this, the French counterinsurgency effort did, in fact, include a 
substantial amount of activity dedicated to improving governance in Algeria.  The focal 
points of these efforts were small teams of soldiers working throughout the countryside 
known as the Special Administrative Sections (SAS) (as well as their counterparts in 
larger cities, the Urban Administrative Sections (SAU)).  SAS and SAU units worked 
principally to reform local governments, establish functional medical and educational 
facilities and other local infrastructure, and to train police.   
By 1959, 660 SAS and SAU teams were operating throughout Algeria.  By most 
accounts, the performance of officers on these teams was exceptional, and they scored 
many successes in winning the loyalty of villagers.  In articulating the strategic logic of 
the SAS/SAU program, one officer posited that “if tomorrow the government gives each 
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inhabitant of my village a new house, either he will not occupy it or he will decide it s 
his due.  On the other hand, if, with a few soldiers, I help a peasant to rebuild a roof, he 
will be very grateful to me and through me to France which I represent.”57  One striking 
example of the success of such programs came from the mayor of a town where futur  
counterinsurgency theorist David Galula had led French efforts to improve both security 
and governance: 
We were told, and we believed, that the French were colonialist oppressors.  We have 
seen with our own eyes what you have done for us here.  You never molested us.  None 
of your soldiers ever cast an eye on our women.  Far from stealing from us, they shared 
their food with the poor.  Our sick are taken care of, our children are educated, schools 
and roads are being built.  Recently you had the people elect freely their own leaders and 
we are now planning with you how to improve our life.  If this is colonial oppression, 
then in the name of all the people here I want to thank the French Army for it.  Speaking 
for all of us, I want to tell you that we will help you finish with the criminals who misled 
us.  Just give us the weapons.58 
 
If there is such a thing as winning hearts and minds, this is what it must look like, at east 
at the local level. 
Local efforts of the SAS were complemented by the larger counterinsurgency 
strategies pursued at the national level, most notably the “Constantine Plan” that was 
implemented under General Challe in 1958-1960.  As of 1961, foreign investment was on 
the rise, industrial production was growing 10 percent per year, unemployment was 
down, and foreign trade had more than doubled since 1954.  The number of children in 
school was twenty times greater than in 1954, and the number of workers with social 
security benefits had risen by two-thirds.59 
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 For all of the progress achieved through these initiatives, however, broad popular 
support remained elusive for the French.  Two factors offsetting these efforts were 
described above.  First, the frequent incidence of indiscriminate violence and torture by 
French forces turned off many middle-of-the-road Algerians.  Second, the harshness of 
the resettlement camps convinced many others of France’s hostility toward the interests 
of the Muslim population.  Horne concludes, “Of all the confidence and goodwill that 
may have been gained . . . as much – or more – was lost through . . . intensification of the 
old ‘regroupement’ policy.”60 
But another critical factor that limited the relevance of French efforts t  improve 
governance in Algeria was the lack of connection between those efforts and the larger 
political context of the war.  The real issue at stake in the war was independence, and 
improvements of governance did little to address this issue.  Even Algerians incli ed to 
support continued French rule had to hedge against the possibility that the French 
government would ultimately withdraw from Algeria.  Again, David Galula’s 
experiences speak directly to the key issue here: 
We had every reason to believe that only a minority [of the population] actively 
supported the rebels.  A small amount of co-operation from the majority, and the FLN’s 
fate would have been sealed rapidly.  Yet we could not get it except in a few isolated 
spots. . . Why was the population stubbornly sitting o  the fence?  Very simply because 
the Moslems were no fools.  They realized perfectly well that the ultimate issue depended 
on Paris, not on whatever was said and done in Algeria. . . The Algerian Moslems had 
every incentive to avoid commitment, and who could really blame them? . . . When the 
Moslems found our pressure too strong, they bowed to it but carefully took out a counter 
insurance policy with the rebels; the obscure farmer kept paying his dues to the 
nationalist movement; the more exposed mayor or coun ilman betrayed us.61 
 
 Perhaps most important of all, the political system the French were fighting to 
preserve showed hardly any sign of accommodating the aspirations of Algerian Muslims 
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to play a greater role in their own government.  As Horne concludes about France’s 
vision for improving Algeria,  
once one has scraped away the thick gravy layers of propaganda, one finds little serious 
discussion of social aims of the future Algerian society . . . a profound revolution had 
taken place in the traditional conservative consciousness of agrarian Algeria, lying deeper 
than the devoted French SAS administrators could gauge, let alone reverse.62 
 
On balance, then, did French counterinsurgents provide good governance to the 
people of Algeria or not?  Economic reforms were extensive and effective, and SAS units 
contributed greatly to improved standards of living and governance in many parts of the 
country.  But at the same time, population resettlement was highly disruptive and harshly
administered and French security measures often terrorized large numbers of innocent 
people.  Good governance was certainly part of the French counterinsurgency strateg .  
But its implementation was inconsistent enough, and overshadowed enough by evidence 
of ill will on the part of French forces, that it does not seem fair to conclude 
unambiguously that the French provided good governance in Algeria. 
Were political agreements addressing ethno-religious cleavages pursued? 
As implied by the preceding discussion, cross-ethnic political compromise was 
almost entirely absent from the French strategy in Algeria.  Many recognized the 
explosive potential of Muslim disenfranchisement, but the pieds noirs’ sense of 
entitlement always stymied any serious efforts to address this issue.  Democratic reforms 
were attempted shortly after WWII in order to provide greater voice to the Muslim 
population in Algeria, but the resulting elections were rigged and had very little effect 
other than to highlight the system’s inequalities.   
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Another major reform effort was adopted by the French legislature in January 
1958, the “loi-cadre,” which aimed to introduce a greater degree of federalism and 
regional autonomy to Algeria’s political system.  But implementation of the loi cadre fell 
victim to the political turmoil in France that culminated in the fall of the Fourth Republic 
in May 1958.  As one of its principal proponents, Governor-General Robert Lacoste later 
concluded, “If [loi-cadre] had gone through, . . . I do believe that all but a small fraction 
of the pieds noirs . . . could have stayed. . . Maybe the rebellion would have continued, 
but with less force.  Who can say what might have happened, because it was never 
tried?”63 
Ultimately, any political agreement between Europeans and Muslims would have 
required a much greater degree of willingness between hardliners on each side of the 
conflict to compromise than was ever in evidence.  As Horne puts it, “the basic fact was 
that, whereas integration, if honourably entered into, might have worked happily in 1936 
and less probably in 1945, by 1958 it had become at best a romantic delusion, at worst a 
confidence trick.”64 
Was the counterinsurgency successful? 
In the end, was France’s counterinsurgency in Algeria a success or a failure?  In 
spite of a conclusion to the war that appears to be a resounding French defeat, the answer 
is not straightforward.  On purely military grounds, in fact, the French were clarly 
victorious.  The French army scored repeated victories over the FLN, severely restricting 
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its freedom of action both as a guerrilla force in the Algerian countryside, and as terrorist 
cells in the cities.  By 1959, in Galula’s estimation, French 
. . . strength was such that the war had been won for all practical purposes . . . I realize 
this sounds odd when one looks at the situation of Algeria today.  Yet if experts . . . took 
the trouble of comparing our results in the first six years of the war – from the end of 
1954 to the end of 1960 – with the British achievements in Malaya – a successful 
counterinsurgency in their judgment and mine – during the same lapse of time, they 
would perhaps see my point.65 
 
And, as Galula’s comparison to Malaya implies, this military victory was not merely a 
matter of killing and capturing insurgents – it had a significant effect on popular support 
for the FLN.  Due to its major setbacks in 1957, as Horne points out, “the FLN also lost 
important ground in the struggle for the souls of the uncommitted ‘third force’ Muslims, 
now giving increased indication of war weariness.”66 
 Why, then, was the FLN ultimately successful?  How did it achieve its main 
objective of Algerian independence in only eight years in the face of such effetive 
military resistance?  It was divisions within the French government that proved decisive.  
Wolf sums it up this way:  “victory came to the [FLN] less through its own brave and 
desperate struggle during seven and one-half years of war than through the strains which 
the war had produced in the foundations of the French polity.”67  Part of this strain may 
be fairly credited to the FLN’s persistence, even in the face of consistent political and 
military setbacks.  The ability of the insurgents to maintain a destabilizing influence on 
Algeria undoubtedly contributed to the French public’s exhaustion with the war.  But 
more important than this factor was the political conflict created by the hard line pieds 
noirs in Algeria.  It was their machinations that brought down one French government 
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and staged two more attempted coups.  And it was the Paris terrorist attacks in 1962 
conducted by the pieds noirs extremist group, the “Secret Army Organization” (OAS), 
that finished off any lingering desire among the French people to maintain their 
sovereignty over Algeria.  In the referendum of that year on the formal agreements to 
grant Algerian independence, over ninety percent of French voters voted ‘oui’. 
 Hence, it is difficult to define the French counterinsurgency as either a succes  or 
a failure.  The ultimate ascendance of the insurgents defies the notion of a French 
success, but the most important causes of that outcome lie very near, if not outside, the 
hazy boundaries of what can reasonably be considered “counterinsurgency.”   
Evaluation 
The Algerian case presents a difficult challenge for this study’s analytic 
framework.  In essence, the values for two of the framework’s five variables remain 
ambiguous.  It seems clear that identity-based cleavages were highly significant in the 
Algerian war, and that political agreements to address these cleavages were not seriously 
pursued.  It is also clear that French security operations were quite effectiv  in degrading 
and otherwise suppressing the capabilities of the FLN insurgents.  However, summary 
assessments of French attempts to improve governance in Algeria and of the success of 
its counterinsurgency efforts in general yield ambiguous results. 
At a minimum, we can observe that French counterinsurgency operations enjoyed 
a great deal of success in pacifying much of Algeria from 1954-1960 in spite of a very 
mixed record in its efforts to improve governance.  It is certainly plausible to place art 
of the blame for France’s eventual defeat on the weaknesses of its governance-rel ted 
activities.  But those weaknesses are not at all the most obvious explanation for that 
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defeat.  If French forces had displaced fewer people in their resettlement programs, had 
administered those resettlement camps more humanely, had conducted SAS operations 
even more broadly and effectively, and had killed fewer innocent Algerians, would the 
outcome of the war have been different?  It is impossible to know, but given the French 
government’s low threshold for tolerating persistent conflict in Algeria and the 
intransigence of the pieds noirs leadership toward political compromise, it i difficult to 
see how better performance in any dimension of the counterinsurgency operations, 
governance-related or otherwise, would have tipped the scales.  
 Rather, it appears that a strong sense of “us” and “them,” that is, of ethno-
religious identities in conflict, was at the heart of the Algerian war.  In the words of 
Germaine Tillion, a French ethnologist with extensive experience in Algeria b fore and 
during the war, the “’hysteria of the two populations constituted an almost total obscle 
to any solution,’ and nothing could be achieved without first lowering the temperature of 
hatred and terror.”68  In such an environment, regardless of whether the 
counterinsurgency is seen as a success or a failure, the contributions that improved 
governance could make to victory were severely constrained.  
South Vietnam, 1962-1973 
Overview 
 Counterinsurgency in American history is frequently viewed through the lens of 
the United States’ involvement in the Second Indochina War (hereafter referred to as the 
Vietnam War).  Given the scale, duration, and traumatic outcome of American 
involvement in Vietnam, this focus is neither surprising nor wholly inappropriate.  
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Nevertheless, rooms full of books and articles claiming to identify the lessons of Vietnam 
have yet to yield any consensus about the nature of that war or a generally accepted 
reckoning of counterinsurgent performance there.  With an eye toward this interpretive 
nettle, the following discussion attempts to draw out what can be learned about this 
study’s analytic framework and hypotheses from the American experience in Vi tnam. 
 The insurgency facing the government of South Vietnam (GVN) from its creation 
in 1955 to its conquest in 1975 was a continuation of the Communist, avowedly Maoist 
revolution that had ended French colonial rule and culminated in the partition of North 
and South Vietnam.  By 1961, Communist insurgents in the south had taken on the 
identity of a unified National Liberation Front (NLF), comprising a political arm, the 
People’s Revolutionary Party, and a military arm, the Viet Cong (VC).  Over tim  the 
insurgency would also consist of regular and irregular units of the North Vietnamese 
Army itself (NVA).  VC and NVA forces in South Vietnam were numerous – by one 
account, insurgent numbers grew from 35,000 in 1961 to roughly 400,000 in 1967.69  
Their goal was the overthrow of the GVN and the unification of South Vietnam under the 
Communist regime in Hanoi. 
America’s efforts to oppose the insurgency were marked by gradual escalation 
from 1950, with the establishment of a four-man Military Assistance Advisory Group to a 
peak of over half a million committed troops in 1969.  The last American combat forces 
left Vietnam in 1973.  The U.S.’s role as a major partner to the South Vietnamese 
government can be dated to February 1962, when the Military Assistance Command – 
Vietnam (MACV) was stood up in Saigon.  By that point, the insurgency was quickly 
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gaining ground thanks to a combination of strong political and military organization, 
strong support from North Vietnam, and weak and corrupt leadership at multiple levels of 
the South Vietnamese government. 
In 1965, the GVN’s declining fortunes prompted U.S. President Lyndon B. 
Johnson to deploy several divisions of ground forces to Vietnam and to initiate a massive 
bombing campaign against VC and North Vietnamese targets.  U.S. intervention staved 
off the immediate risk of defeat and was effective in causing a great deal of damage to 
insurgent forces.70  But the insurgency remained resilient, a result made plain by the 
enormous nationwide VC and NVA attack during the Tet holiday of 1968.  The Tet 
Offensive was decisively turned back by South Vietnamese and American forces, but 
proved to be a signal event for American involvement in demonstrating the tenacity of 
the insurgency in the face of waning political commitment in the U.S. 
 The years following the Tet Offensive saw some improvements in the 
responsiveness of the GVN and the professionalism of its army, and the VC and NVA 
struggled to maintain the foothold they had gained in the country.  At the same time, 
however, American policy shifted to emphasize withdrawal, and the GVN was not ble to 
strengthen its position fast enough to resist the combined opposition of the indigenous 
insurgents and their North Vietnamese allies.  South Vietnam fell to its Communist 
adversaries in 1975.   
Were ethno-religious identity-based cleavages significant? 
South Vietnam was not an ethnically or religiously homogeneous country.  
Outside of the majority Vietnamese population, ethnic Chinese, Khmer, and Montagnard 
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minorities made up 10-15% of the population.71  More politically salient were 
distinctions between the majority Buddhists and Catholics, who made up about 10% of 
the population.72  Partly due to its ties to South Vietnam’s Catholic first president, Ngo 
Dinh Diem, the Catholic community exerted political influence beyond its size.  This 
dynamic did create some tension between Catholic and Buddhist communities.  As 
Robert Thompson describes, discrimination against Buddhists “stemmed partly from the 
fact that the Catholics generally were better educated and therefore able to tak  greater 
material advantage of their opportunities, and partly from the fact that the Catholics were 
more committed as a whole to the war against the Viet Cong.”73   
 However, in spite of some highly-charged religious conflicts during Diem’s rule, 
the religious divisions in South Vietnamese society were relatively mild and did not 
usually define political allegiances.  Douglas Blaufarb argues that “The religion of the 
majority, Hinayana Buddhism, was never a strongly organized church.  Certain religious 
sects . . . showed persistent vitality but involved only small minorities.  Only two 
nationwide institutions persisted with approximately their former vitality:  the family and 
the village.”74 
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 Most important, although some relationships can be drawn between ethno-
religious divisions and some political leanings during the war,75 those divisions were not 
the basis of the insurgents’ grievances, and ethno-religious identities were not th bases 
that either side usually claimed for the legitimacy of its cause.  Insurgents and 
counterinsurgents in Vietnam were far more similar than they were different. 
Instead, grievances arose principally from the socio-economic disruption in 
traditional peasant communities introduced by the newly independent GVN.  Following 
the split between North and South Vietnam, the tension between the educated, urban elite 
and the peasantry was further exacerbated when President Diem abolished political
autonomy at the village level.  Blaufarb contends that the result of this move “was to 
bring into direct contact the two cultures of modern, educated elite and traditional peas nt 
life which had grown worlds apart, and to charge the elite with managing a newtyp  of 
society for which the peasants were entirely unprepared, one which provided services but 
also placed new and stricter demands on the villages.”76   
More will be said about the nature of insurgent grievances in the governance 
section below.  But for the purposes of assessing the role of identities in shaping t e 
Vietnam War, Sam Sarkesian’s assessment is directly on point: 
An important characteristic of the revolution was the fact that the two major protagonists . 
. . were of the same ethnic group but represented different political systems. . . The lack 
of clear delineation between the protagonists and supporters focused attention on the 
effectiveness of one or the other system.  This effectiveness was judged on the measure of 
security and the social and economic benefits they could afford the peasants.77 
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Overall, then, ethno-religious identity-based cleavages were not a significant fa tor in the 
Vietnam War. 
Were good security operations conducted? 
Deterioration in security of the South Vietnamese population in the early 1960s 
was severe, and to a significant extent was the main impetus for the earliest scala ions in 
American involvement.  By one estimate, 80 percent of the countryside in 1961 was 
controlled by the VC. The visiting Arthur Schlesinger lamented that “The guerrillas now 
control almost all of the southern delta – so much so that I could find no American who 
would drive me outside Saigon in his car even by day without a military convoy.”78 
 Early campaigns against the VC by South Vietnam’s Army (Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN) were largely ineffective, and even counterproductive 
because of the ARVN’s lack of professionalism and frequently indiscriminate use of 
firepower.79  Under the tutelage of their American advisors, ARVN commanders focused 
on large-scale operations with battalion and brigade sized units, and VC strength 
continued to grow.  A British observer and veteran of the Malayan Emergency saw three 
causes for the failure to improve population security: 
Ineffective registration and control of the population have allowed Viet Cong 
commanders and units to keep in touch freely through public channels; commanders have 
been reluctant to send small numbers of soldiers against large guerrilla units; and massive 
airmobile operations against big Viet Cong units have left few men available for 
harassment patrols.80 
 
In 1962, GVN launched the strategic hamlets program, an attempt, partly modeled 
on the New Villages of the Malayan Emergency, to greatly enhance security in the 
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villages throughout the countryside through a combination of physical measures, 
increased investment in local security forces and improved communications networks 
linking the hamlets.  Intended to be the centerpiece of the counterinsurgency, the strategic 
hamlet program was beset from the beginning by problems of both design and execution.  
For example, as in Algeria, large-scale population resettlement proved to be extremely 
unpopular with peasants who had multi-generation ties to the land where they lived and 
worked.   
Additionally, the program’s security measures were often poorly resourced and 
implemented.  Richard Clutterbuck summarizes the program’s meager results: “With 
little to stop them but a perimeter fence patrolled by part-time armed villagers and with 
their own agents already inside, the Viet Cong were able to overrun large numbers of 
these hamlets; and this had a disastrous effect on public confidence.”81  Douglas Blaufarb 
continues: 
What happened in hamlet after hamlet was that the population was hastily organized to 
construct defenses and man them, and promises of reimbursement were made for support 
of all the varied types required, but all too often hese promises went unfulfilled, 
sometimes because of outright embezzlement, more often for reasons of disorganization.82 
 
The GVN abandoned the strategic hamlet program in early 1964.  It was succeeded by a 
series of new programs, none of which made a great deal of progress in securing villages 
against VC incursions. 
The introduction of American ground forces in 1965 was a major milestone in 
South Vietnam’s struggle to provide security.  But the Americans’ impact on security was 
decidedly mixed.  U.S. forces were crucial in rolling back and preventing major 
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movements of VC and NVA conventional forces that were threatening to take control of 
major parts of the country.  But American combat operations were governed by a strategy 
dedicated to the attrition of Communist forces through “search and destroy” missions.  
They did not focus on securing populated areas.  The MACV commander from 1964-
1968, General William Westmoreland, saw the war in primarily conventional terms, and 
therefore did not see great value in focusing military resources on population security.  
His attitude is nicely summarized by the one-word answer he once gave to a reporter’s 
question about the key to defeating the insurgency: “Firepower.”83  This emphasis on 
large-scale operations and the heavy use of artillery and aerial bombardment also resulted 
in a large number of casualties among non-combatants,84 di placing over a million people 
from their homes85 and further degrading security among the people where the 
insurgency was being fought. 
Many Americans recognized the problems with this strategy from the beginnin , 
however.86  Over time, policy slowly shifted to accommodate greater emphasis on 
providing security.  The Marine Corps’s Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program was 
an early example of this recognition.  CAPs were small teams, composed of twelve 
Marines and 24 Popular Force (PF) militia men, who lived and worked in villages for 
months at a time.  Though the CAP program enjoyed some success, it was never 
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implemented on a large scale, staying confined to the Marines and their area of
operations. 
 It was not until 1967 that “pacification” was given significant focus and resources 
by American leadership in Washington and Saigon through the creation of the Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development Support (CORDS) program.  
The pacification campaign that CORDS was to lead aimed to improve both security and 
governance in South Vietnam, but it was predicated on the primacy of security.  As 
historian Richard Hunt describes, “After a modicum of security was established, . . . the 
Americans believed, the process of development could begin – electing local offici s, 
stimulating rural economic growth, and opening roads.”87  The so-called “accelerated 
pacification campaign” that began in late 1968 featured ambitious goals, aiming to secure
over a thousand contested hamlets.88  And it entailed major changes in resource 
allocations to match those ambitious goals.   
 According to data compiled by Pentagon analysts, only 0.5 percent of American military 
operations and 5 percent of U.S. expenditures in South Vietnam supported pacification 
before the accelerated campaign.  During the campaign, it was estimated that half of all 
American ground operations supported pacification, f r the first time focusing the U.S. 
Army’s efforts on the struggle for control of the pople.89 
 
One key focus of the pacification campaign was to bolster the Regional Forces
and Popular Forces (RF/PF), local militias whose mission was to operate in their hom  
provinces and districts to provide local security.90  The RF/PF grew by 73 percent from 
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1966 to 1972.91  Closely related to this effort was a large expansion in the military 
advisory program.  CORDS more than doubled the number of advisors to local security 
forces from 1967 to 1968 alone.92  A third prominent piece of the pacification program 
was a concerted effort to attack the VC “infrastructure” by improving intelligence on, and 
attempting to neutralize, VC administrative, political, and propaganda capabilities.  This 
“Phoenix Program” suffered from abuses, bad intelligence, and public controversy.  But 
it also scored some significant successes against the VC infrastructure, an impact since 
acknowledged by North Vietnamese officials.93 
The pacification campaign initiated in 1968 was certainly not an unambiguous 
success, but it did yield remarkable gains.  By the end of 1969, the percentage of the 
South Vietnamese population that the U.S. and GVN considered to be “relatively secure” 
rose above 93 percent.  The population living in areas considered to be controlled by the 
insurgents fell below three percent.94  In Hunt’s judgment, “When viewed in the longer 
perspective, the [accelerated pacification campaign] marked the start of a period, roughly 
1969 to early 1972, of uninterrupted gains in population security throughout South 
Vietnam and further erosion of the Viet Cong.”95  This phase of the war presents a 
marked contrast with the years immediately preceding it, where population security was 
largely neglected, or worse. 
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Was good governance provided? 
Counterinsurgent efforts to improve governance in Vietnam followed a similar 
path as those to improve security of the population.  Programs such as the strategic 
hamlets, CAPs, and CORDS generally married a variety of socio-economic initiatives to 
the improvements in security that were their focus.  Some senior U.S. officials believed 
that such initiatives were the key to victory in Vietnam.  For example, Assistant Secretary 
of State Roger Hilsman issued a paper in February 1962 titled “A Strategic Concept for 
South Vietnam,” which called for an emphasis on political, economic, and social 
measures to defeat the insurgency.96   
But in the first several years of the war, attempts to implement such measures 
were generally weak and ineffectual.  The Diem regime was highly corrupt and did little 
to address popular grievances.  In fact, reform programs the GVN did pursue tended to 
reinforce peasant grievances rather than alleviate them.  In D. Michael S f r’s 
estimation, the “VC addressed peasants’ problems directly: landlessness, high rents, 
indebtedness, and high taxes,” while the GVN’s efforts to tackle these issues were really 
aimed at “solidification of support among landlords.”97  Such policies served as 
confirmation of the VC’s philosophy and message about the class-based repression 
practiced by the GVN.  Jeffrey Race, who conducted extensive interviews with peasants 
and participants on both sides of the conflict in Long An province, concluded that “the 
incentives for living in the strategic hamlets were not relevant to the reasons for 
assistance to the revolutionary movement . . . the program devoted its resources to a 
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physical reinforcement of the existing social system and of those who held power under it 
. . .”98 
Partly as a result of these dynamics, many South Vietnamese people really did 
prefer the political leadership of the insurgents to that of the government.  The insurgents 
understood the people’s needs better than the government, or at least were more willing 
to address them.  Race argues that “a basic fallacy underlay the government’s 
development programs in Long An: that people ‘supported communism’ because they 
were poor, and therefore that reducing their poverty would reduce the appeal of 
revolution.  Thus this approach viewed the problem as incremental rather than 
distributive.”99  Perhaps the most important illustration of this phenomenon was the 
different attitudes toward land reform that prevailed on each side of the conflict during 
the early years.  In his interviews, Race found that “government officials uniformly 
dismissed the significance of land ownership as an issue in the conflict, while former 
members of the revolutionary movement uniformly emphasized its importance.”100  The 
VC, in fact, carried out land reform during the early 1960s in areas where they had 
established sufficient control.101   
Thus the insurgents had the upper hand in the battle for the sympathies of the 
peasant population.  The Americans’ tendency toward liberal use of firepower and loose 
rules of engagement did little to mitigate this VC advantage.  In addition to causing the 
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extensive collateral damage noted above, the attrition-based strategy diverted money, 
manpower, and management focus away from the socio-economic competition underway 
between the VC and the GVN.  In the first several years of the U.S. intervention, this was 
not simply a matter of neglect, but rather of deliberate strategy.  One U.S. general 
described the problem this way: 
I had two rules.  One is that you would try to get a very close meshing of pacification . . . 
and military operations.  The other rule is the military operations would be given first 
priority in every case.  That doesn’t mean you wouldn’t do pacification, but this gets at 
what you might call winning the hearts and minds of the people.  I’m all for that.  It’s a 
nice concept, but in fighting the Viet Cong and the NVA, if you don’t break their military 
machine you might as well forget winning the hearts nd minds of the people.102  
 
However, as described in the section above on security, these priorities in the U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy underwent a transformation beginning around 1967-1968.  
Three key factors help account for the Americans’ subsequent focus on governance as  
key instrument of counterinsurgency.  First, U.S. leaders in Washington, including 
President Johnson, had become convinced by events and expert advice that a greater 
focus on the people was warranted.   Defense Secretary Robert McNamara summarized 
his view of the problem in 1966: 
By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the GVN when it comes will not stay 
but that the VC will; that cooperation with the GVN will be punished by the VC; that the 
GVN is really indifferent to the people’s welfare; that the low-level GVN are tools of the 
local rich; and that the GVN is ridden with corruption.  Success in pacification depends on 
the interrelated functions of providing physical security, destroying the VC apparatus, 
motivating the people to cooperate, and establishing responsive local government.103 
 
This growing appreciation in Washington for the importance of improving 
governance in Vietnam led to the second key development in the changing strategy: the 
creation of CORDS.  According to CORDS’s founder Robert Komer, prior to CORDS, “. 
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. . counterinsurgency (or pacification) fell between stools.  It was everybody’s business 
and nobody’s.  The absence of a single major agency or directing machinery charged 
with it contributed greatly to the prolonged failure to press it on a large scal.”104  
CORDS established that agency and “directing machinery” and facilitated the allocation 
of greater resources to the pacification campaign. 
The third key factor was the replacement in 1968 of General Westmoreland with 
General Creighton Abrams as MACV commander.  Abrams recognized many of the 
problems with the attrition strategy and the conventional military orientato  that had 
prevailed under Westmoreland, and he put the full weight of his command behind the 
new pacification campaign.  The extent to which Abrams deserves credit for departing 
from previous practice remains a matter of scholarly debate.  But at a minimu , General 
William Rosson, who took over as Abrams’s deputy in 1969 after a year’s absence from 
Vietnam, remarked that “Abrams (with [Ambassador Ellsworth] Bunker) had made [the 
strategy] ‘clear and hold’ instead of ‘search and destroy.’”105 
 In addition to building up and advising local security forces, a central focus of the 
pacification campaign was supporting the so-called “revolutionary development” (RD) 
cadres throughout South Vietnam.  The RD cadres were charged with a wide variety of 
tasks, including to  
restore local elected government, assist in community self-help or government-subsidized 
development projects (such as repairing roads, buildings, and bridges), provide medical 
treatment to the ill, and aid farmers in getting credit.  Teams would also issue 
identification cards to citizens, recruit people for the armed forces, organize and train self-
defense groups, uncover and arrest members of the Viet Cong, and conduct political 
rallies.106 
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In order to support these activities, CORDS created and managed a similarly dive se 
array of U.S. programs, such as public administration, economic stabilization, education, 
public health, census taking, civil engineering, and construction.107   
Perhaps the most important single element of the counterinsurgency directed at 
improving governance was one undertaken entirely by the GVN, itself:  land reform.  As 
noted above, land ownership and landlord-tenant relationships were highly salient issues 
for Vietnamese peasants and were often their chief grievances against the government.  A 
1966 study that surveyed South Vietnamese farmers about their needs and concerns 
reported that “It had been presumed that villagers would stress . . . public works including 
schools.  Instead, the desire to own land was at the top of the list. . . [E]ven peace and 
security were far down the list behind the desire to own land.”108 
 Hunt explains why this was such a potent issue for the Vietnamese peasants.  
During the reign of the French,  
wealthy urban entrepreneurs had slowly bought up tracts of farmland traditionally 
belonging to established villages and hamlets and hd allowed farmers to till the land in 
exchange for the payment of a fixed percentage of the crop in rent.  The result was that 
large numbers of Vietnamese . . . were either landless or tenants. . . Often officials and 
soldiers returning to villages liberated from the Vi t Cong were accompanied by 
landlords, who reclaimed their property and collected back rents.  In some cases 
government officials themselves were landlords.  Such practices led many peasants to 
identify the Saigon regime with exploitation . . .109 
 
In March 1970, the GVN finally enacted comprehensive land reform in the form 
of legislation known as “Land to the Tiller.”  The new law granted ownership of land to 
all current tenant cultivators and compensated the existing owners for the expropriation.  
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Notably, the land grant was made without discrimination with regard to who had 
supported the government in the past.110  Even those tenant farmers with historical VC 
sympathies were granted their land.  While the Land to the Tiller legislation was not as 
revolutionary as it would have been ten years earlier, it still had a significant positive 
effect on the popularity of the government.  In 1972, a study funded by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development surveyed peasants and conditions in the South Vietnames 
countryside.  It concluded that “The Land to the Tiller Program is a splendid means to 
pacification. . . It is helping turn a once-disaffected, politically neutral mass of potential 
and sometimes actual revolutionaries . . . into middle class farmers in support of the 
regime.”111 
 In conjunction with the other reforms under way and the improving security in the 
villages, economic activity and prosperity improved significantly in the early 1970s.  
Roads and canals re-opened, investment increased, and agricultural production boomed.  
Annual rice production, for example, increased nearly 40 percent from 1968 to 1972.112  
 In the end, then, did the U.S. and its Vietnamese allies provide good governance 
to the people of South Vietnam?  In the first years of the war, it is clear that on b lance 
they did not.  Corruption, incompetence, the use of excessive force, and neglect of 
peasant interests were rife and overwhelmed efforts to provide good governance.  The 
judgment is much less clear in the war’s later years, around 1968 and after.  None of the 
earlier problems disappeared altogether, but in those years, security and good governance 
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were central components of the U.S. and GVN counterinsurgency strategies, and their 
implementation was somewhat successful. 
Were political agreements addressing ethno-religious cleavages pursued? 
Because the war in Vietnam did not center on conflict between ethno-religious 
groups, no political agreements focused on such groups were pursued, or were likely to 
be very relevant if they had been. 
Was the counterinsurgency successful? 
As in Algeria, an evaluation of the outcome of counterinsurgency in Vietnam is 
more complicated than conventional wisdom would suggest.  The departure of American 
forces from Vietnam under the cloud of domestic political disillusionment and the 
ultimate collapse of South Vietnam to the Communists in the North belie an assessment 
of success in the counterinsurgency.  And yet by many measures, the counterinsurg ncy 
conducted by the U.S. and the GVN did succeed in marginalizing its VC enemies. 
For analytic purposes, it is useful to separate the U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
into two halves, roughly divided between the periods before and after the 1968 Tet 
Offensive.  Though Tet is remembered perhaps most of all as the beginning of the end of 
American involvement, it also represented an enormous blow to the VC and their 
insurgent strategy, one from which it never fully recovered.  In his study of the role of 
legitimacy in insurgencies, Timothy Lomperis considers the Vietnam War as two 
separate “half cases,” arguing that “after Tet, the political issues fueling the insurgency 
were abandoned in favor of a purely military solution.  Hence legitimacy as an 
explanatory variable works only until Tet . . .”113 
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There is little doubt that counterinsurgency up to the point of Tet was a failure.  
The sheer size and level of activity of the VC that allowed them to mount the offensive 
gives some testimony to the failure of their opponents.  But also, at the political level, 
Jeffrey Race’s detailed study of the Long An province makes clear that the VC was 
ascendant, if not in control there.  He claims that as of 1968, the insurgency “had all but 
extinguished the government presence in the province and that it had the ability, based on 
internal forces, to smash the remaining government units at will.”114 
But this condition did not last.  The year 1968 marked, in addition to the Tet 
Offensive, the earliest effects of a new emphasis on pacification from Washington and 
Saigon, a change in the strategic perspective at the top of the American command, and 
the beginnings of serious efforts at political reform from the GVN.  In the years 
following, VC influenced waned, and the counterinsurgents made steady gains in 
securing the South Vietnamese population.   
The famed American advisor, John Paul Vann, who spent most of 1962-1964 and 
1966-1972 in Vietnam in various roles both military and civilian and from the level of a 
lieutenant colonel to a two-star general equivalent, wrote in a letter home in December 
1969, “For the first time in my involvement here, I am not interested in visiting either 
Washington or Paris, because all of my previous visits have been with the intention of 
attempting to influence or change the policies for Vietnam.  Now I am satisfied with the 
policies.”115 
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Robert Komer, the founder and first director of CORDS wrote years later that “in 
no important field did GVN performance improve so much as in pacification. . . Indeed, 
it is on the role which the 1968-1971 pacification program played in the turnaround of 
the war during 1968-1971 that the case for a counterinsurgency-oriented strategy must 
chiefly rest.”  In support of this argument, he cites both inputs and outputs of the 
pacification campaign:  
GVN/U.S. resources devoted to pacification rose from under $600 million in CY1966 to 
around $1.5 billion at the CY1970 peak. . . in March 1968, only 59 percent of the 
population . . . was regarded as even ‘relatively scure.’  By end-1971, this had risen to 
over 96 percent . . . by [1975] the indigenous Viet Cong insurgency had largely petered 
out.  Pacification had not failed; indeed, it had become a qualified success at long last.116 
 
Komer’s successor at CORDS, William Colby, also believed that the pacification 
program had been a qualified success, citing the steep decline of insurgent attacks and the 
shift in strategy toward conventional warfare conducted by the NVA.117 
 It is, of course, reasonable to discount the perspectives and conclusions of 
participants in the counterinsurgency who may have an interest in interpreting the 
outcomes of those efforts as successful.  But these perspectives can also be found in more 
scholarly treatments of this period from sources with direct experience in thevents, and 
from critics of the general policy pursued by the U.S. in Vietnam.  In an interview that 
Race conducted with a former Communist Party member in 1970, he heard the following 
assessment of local developments: 
. . . a number of changes in the government approach . . . had begun to make themselves 
felt around May of 1969.  One of these changes had been a partial reconstitution of the 
government’s village apparatus.  A second had been the psychological impact of the 
government’s land-reform proposals, widely propagandized at the time.  A third important 
change had been the considerable expansion of the Popular Force and People’s Self-
Defense Force organizations.  The combined effect of these changes was to make it much 
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more difficult for revolutionary operatives to penetrate populated areas to gather food, 
intelligence, and recruits.118 
 
Blaufarb, another critic of the U.S.’s Vietnam policy, describes the developments in the 
years following Tet this way: 
The evidence is impressive that a completely changed situation prevailed in the rural 
areas and that the insurgency in the countryside – th  people’s war – was effectively 
contained.  This was certainly the impression of observers on the scene based on 
indicators evident to all. . . Moreover, similar evidence confirms that these gains were 
firmly established and that the situation did not significantly change until shortly before 
the sudden collapse of 1975.119 
 
Even Robert Thompson, advisor to both Presidents Diem and Nixon, and long a critic of 
U.S. Vietnam policy concluded flatly: “The VC side of it is over.  The people have
rejected the VC.”120 
Perhaps even more revealing is the view of trends in counterinsurgency from the 
North Vietnamese Communists, themselves.  Hunt reports that at the beginning of 1971, 
“. . . viewing with alarm the progress of pacification and Vietnamization and the 
declining military fortunes of communist forces, the leadership in Hanoi decided on a 
massive offensive to win the war militarily.”121  The manner of the war’s continuation 
and its ultimate resolution clearly reflected this judgment and generally took on the 
character of a conventional interstate war between North and South Vietnam. 
Evaluation 
Considering the American involvement in the Vietnam War from 1962-1973 as 
two separate cases presents an interesting contrast in the variables of this tudy’s analytic 
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framework.  First, ethno-religious identities, and therefore any related political 
agreements, were not very salient issues in Vietnam.  Second, prior to 1968, it seems 
clear that security operations were generally poor and efforts to improve governance were 
neglected, poorly executed, or both.  And the counterinsurgency was fairly clearly
unsuccessful.  After 1968, the security and governance-related operations both improved 
significantly, and the fortunes of the counterinsurgency clearly followed.  To claim
outright, as some do, that the counterinsurgency was a success may take this analysis a 
step too far.  But such a categorical judgment is not necessary to recognize the clear 
correlation between positive trends in the independent variables of security and 
governance and positive trends in the dependent variable of counterinsurgent success. 
At one level, this is simply a vindication of the conventional wisdom that security 
and governance are the keys to successful counterinsurgency strategy.  But it also 
highlights one of the central challenges of this analysis – to tease apart the rela iv  
contributions of security and governance.  Here we must return to the basic model 
outlined in Chapter 3, depicting the linkages operating between inputs of good 
governance and outputs related to sustainable peace.  There it was asserted that 
understanding the dynamics of cause and effect depends on an appreciation for local 
dynamics.  Jeffrey Race’s study of the Long An province took just this approach.  One 
key point from his study was that the VC absolutely conceived of the war as a 
competition of government between themselves and the South Vietnamese officials, not 
only a competition of control.   
By developing policies more congenial to the interests of these classes than were the 
policies of the government, the Party ensured that when the conflict crossed into the 
military phase the majority of the population would choose to fight against the 
government in defense of its own interests . . . The Party’s demonstrated organizational 
 130
superiority in Long An came about through the development of social policies leading to 
superior motivation.122   
 
The GVN, by contrast, conceived of the insurgency more in terms of criminal behavior in 
its earliest days, and therefore did not develop a strong governance program to compete 
with the VC.  
And it appears that it was precisely this dynamic that was reversed in many places 
in South Vietnam during the years after the Tet Offensive.  Samuel Popkin was aother 
scholar who conducted extensive interviews among the South Vietnamese peasants 
during the war.  After a series of interviews in 1969, he concluded that “The increase in 
GVN control results in large measure from a drastic decline in the appeal to pesants of 
life in areas controlled by the Viet Cong, and from the grave danger of fighting for 
them.”123 
So, while separating the causal effects of security and governance remains 
difficult, the dynamics of these variables as observed in Vietnam provide some evidence 
that improvements in governance can yield large benefits in security, not just the other 
way around. 
Summary Analysis 
 The summary analysis will proceed in two parts, corresponding to the two 
purposes for this chapter outlined at its beginning: first, to assess the study’s hypotheses 
using the cases presented here; second, to consider what refinements and augmentations 
to the study framework these cases might suggest. 
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Applying the Framework to the Cases 
 Table 3 below summarizes the codings applied in the preceding case studies for 
each of the framework’s key variables.  As indicated in Chapter 3, binary codings of 
these factors are crude and meant to be useful as points of analytic departure rather than 



















Malaya Ambiguous Yes Yes Yes Yes 










No Yes Yes No Ambiguous 
Table 3: Case Study Variable Summary for Malaya, Algeria, South Vietnam 
 Given these values, what do the cases say about the initial hypotheses advanced in 
Chapter 3? 
H1: Good governance is not necessary for counterinsurgent success.  
Would be supported by: c=No, y=Yes. 
 
 None of the cases here strongly supports this hypothesis.  The Algerian case, 
however, does provide some provocative evidence in this direction.  As indicated, the 
quality of French attempts to improve Algerian governance and the campaign’s overall 
success are difficult to classify.  But the French achieved a great deal of success in 
defeating the FLN’s challenge to its rule in spite of a checkered record of governance.  
Perhaps the key counterfactual question is what would have happened if French 
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governance improvements had been no better (or even worse), but if the pieds noirs had 
pursued more extensive efforts to expand Muslim Algerian political participation nd 
autonomy?  If such compromises short of granting independence had been negotiated, it 
is possible that the counterinsurgency would be generally remembered as a success, even 
in spite of its brutality, the harshness of its regroupement camps, and its mixed record of 
improving standards of living.  From this perspective, the Algerian case supports the 
plausibility of hypothesis H1, but does not confirm it. 
H2: If ethno-religious cleavages are not present, then good governance 
and good security are sufficient for counterinsurgent success.  Would be 
supported by: a=No, b=Yes, c=Yes, y=Yes. 
 
 Both the Malayan and post-Tet Vietnam cases provide some qualified evidence in 
support of this hypothesis.  For the Malayan case to support the hypothesis, we must 
accept that ethno-religious cleavages were not a major factor in that conflict.  Su h a 
judgment is certainly defensible on the grounds that the ethno-religious dimension of the 
Malayan Communists’ insurgency was a default condition, not a primary source of 
grievance.  The MCP neither wanted its movement to be ethnically-based nor exploited 
its ethnic dimensions beyond a tactical level.  Given this judgment, the Malayan case fits 
the pattern suggested by hypothesis H2. 
Still, the key counterfactual question in applying the Malayan case to this 
hypothesis is what would have happened if the UMNO-MCA alliance had failed or never 
come about?  In order for the Malayan case to support hypothesis H2, the successful 
multi-ethnic power sharing alliance must be judged as unnecessary to the 
counterinsurgent success.  Such a judgment is plausible, but certainly not a foregone 
conclusion. 
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 Hypothesis H2 is also supported by the record of counterinsurgency in the later 
years of the Vietnam War, when U.S. and GVN focus on security and governance in the 
South Vietnamese countryside made great strides in marginalizing Viet Cong influence 
and capability.  The great qualification for this case, of course, is that the GVN ultimate y 
lost its war against Communism, making whatever “counterinsurgent success” it can 
claim somewhat Pyrrhic. 
 In a sense, hypothesis H2 is a modified statement of the conventional wisdom of 
traditional counterinsurgency strategy – that the key to victory is to focus on providing 
security and a better life for the civilian population.  So in this sense, we should not be 
surprised to see some supporting evidence about this from some of the major 
counterinsurgencies of the past century.  Indeed, these cases were important sou ces of 
the conventional wisdom in the first place.  But what is most striking about this evidence 
is not its clear alignment with the traditional hypothesis about counterinsurgency, but 
rather its tentativeness and ambiguity.  If these cases do not clearly replicate the logic of 
conventional wisdom, which cases will?   
Two broad explanations might account for this ambiguity.  First, it might come 
from limitations of the analysis, itself.  Second, the phenomena under examination might 
actually be much harder to generalize about than we are conditioned to assume by 
mainstream policy literature and discourse.   
Certainly, the analysis has its limitations.  The brevity and small number of cases
considered here are among them.  The simplicity of the analytic framework is another.  
But, as outlined in Chapter 3, the framework has offsetting benefits such as analytic 
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tractability and the fact that its simplifications match those that frequently serve as 
decision variables in strategic decision making.   
 The second explanation for the ambiguity is also important.  One lesson of these 
case studies is that easy generalizations about cause and effect in counterinsurgencies 
should be treated with suspicion.  With regard to these cases, conventional wisdom 
asserts that 1) improving the quality of governance was vital to Britain’s victory over 
communist insurgents in Malaya; 2) France was defeated by Algerian insurge ts because 
it surrendered its perceived legitimacy through the practice of torture; and 3) the United 
States lost its war against communist insurgents in South Vietnam because it 
fundamentally misunderstood the type of war it was fighting.  The facts of these cases 
suggest that such conclusions are only partial truths, and, as such, can be quite 
misleading.  The analytic framework applied here highlights the fact that both success in 
Malaya and failure in pre-Tet Vietnam were overdetermined, while the outcomes in 
Algeria and post-Tet Vietnam provide evidence of both success and failure. 
Beyond the hazards of conventional wisdom, what about the study’s hypothesized 
role of identity politics in subverting the contributions that traditional tools of 
counterinsurgency do make?   
H3: If ethno-religious cleavages are present, then good governance and 
good security together are not sufficient for counterinsurgent success.  
Would be supported by: a=Yes, b=Yes, c=Yes, y=No. 
 
And the other overarching hypothesis stated at the beginning of Chapter 3 is also relevant
here:  
In the presence of major ethno-religious cleavages, good governance will 
contribute much less to counterinsurgent success than will efforts toward 
reaching political agreements that directly address those cleavages. 
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 Unfortunately, the Malayan, Algerian, and Vietnamese cases do little to resolve 
this question.  Of the two cases where ethno-religious cleavages mattered at all, in only 
one did they constitute a defining motivation for the insurgency – Algeria.  In that case, it 
is fair to conclude that those cleavages did subvert the effectiveness of the traditional 
tools of counterinsurgency.  In particular, the insurgency drew much of its appeal and its 
claims to legitimacy from its support for independence from French rule, an issue which 
created a stark fault line between large numbers of Algeria’s Muslim Arabs and Berbers 
on one side and its largely Christian Europeans on the other.  Population security and 
improved governance by the existing regime did not directly address these concerns.   
The trouble is, however, French methods of prosecuting the war through 
providing security and improving governance often subverted their own effectiveness.  
Consequently, it is impossible to be sure how much of the ultimate French failure was an
irreducible product of intractable ethnic conflict and how much could have been avoided 
by better application of the principles of providing good governance.  Still, as was 
suggested earlier, the balance of evidence suggests that even much better French 
performance in this regard would have been unlikely to be decisive.  If this is true, then 
the Algerian case could be seen as providing some evidence to support the above 
hypothesis.  But more evidence and analysis is clearly required. 
Applying the Cases to the Framework 
 What analytical lessons can be drawn from these case studies to help in refining 
or augmenting the study framework? 
 One very simple yet important point is that the cases support the framework’s 
treatment of security and governance as complexly interacting but separabl f ctors.  
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Each case offers evidence that the factors are mutually reinforcing and that details of their 
interaction at local levels can help in explaining those dynamics.  A second and directly 
related point is to emphasize the limitations of observing and analyzing such phenomena 
at the national level.  These limitations validate an analytic approach that adds a “micro-
level” focus other types of analysis. 
From a substantive perspective one important insight for the subsequent analysis 
concerns treatment of the “identity-based cleavages” variable, and is raised by the 
Malayan case.  That case makes clear that the depth and political salience of thno-
religious conflict, together with prospects for harmonization or compromise thereof, may 
not be obvious at the outset of a conflict.  Ethno-religious conflict did not turn out to 
define the Malayan war.  But perhaps this was not the only possible path the war could 
have taken.  For example, one can read the strong performance of the UMNO-MCA 
alliance as evidence that ethno-religious divisions were never a crucial element of the 
conflict, that they were surmountable from the beginning.  But was this predictable, much 
less inevitable?  As Donald Horowitz describes, there was a considerable amount of 
chance involved in the circumstances that led to the alliance’s success.124  On the other 
hand, the British were committed from the outset to a multi-ethnic nation.  So perhaps the 
prospects for defusing ethnic conflict were predictable, since in some sense, the Britis  
did predict at least the feasibility of that outcome.  Did the British understand the ethnic 
dynamics correctly, did their strategy change the dynamics for the beter, or were they 
just lucky?  Put another way, was the success of the UMNO-MCA alliance a cause of the 
                                                
124 Horowitz, p. 402. 
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counterinsurgent success, or was it the result of underlying conditions that would have 
allowed for counterinsurgent success independent of the alliance? 
Interestingly, the same questions are relevant to Iraq.  Like the British in Malaya, 
the Americans in Iraq were committed from the outset to a multi-ethnic nation.  But 
unlike the British, they have not fully realized that goal – at least not yet.  Did they 
understand the dynamics incorrectly, did their strategy change the dynamics for the 
worse, or were they just unlucky?   
Quite possibly, the answers to these questions all flow directly from the answer to 
this question: how severe were the ethno-religious cleavages at the beginning of the 
conflict?  The argument was made in Chapter 2 that, though group loyalties are not fix d, 
they are likely to be very difficult to influence over the relatively short timeframes faced 
by counterinsurgents.  If this is true, then the severity of cleavages at the beginning of the 
conflict is likely to be highly influential in shaping outcomes.  Accordingly, gauging that 
severity would be a first-order priority for strategy development.  The need to be 
particularly sensitive to this question is one lesson learned for the rest of the empirical 
work.  Some recent work by Kalyvas and Kocher, cited earlier, expresses skeptici m for 
the notion that the “depth” of ethnic cleavages is determinative in civil wars.125  
However, the point made here is slightly different; deep cleavages need not compelthe 
onset of ethnic civil wars in order for them to raise their likelihoods and - more important 
for the counterinsurgent who must fight the wars, not predict them – substantively shape 
their dynamics.126 
                                                
125 Kalyvas and Kocher. 
126 This is consistent with a point Kalyvas makes elsewhere.  See Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence 
in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 75. 
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Counterinsurgency experiences in Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam also suggest the 
possible utility of an additional framework for addressing the issues of this study, one 
that treats the role of ethno-religious identity implicitly rather than explicitly.  A theme 
that recurs in the scholarship about Vietnam in particular is that peasant grievances there 
were not so much driven by their level of poverty or their absolute standard of living as 
by the distribution of wealth and power in their communities.  Clearly, this distinction is 
critical to any counterinsurgency strategy designed to address popular grievances.  Ra  
explains this logic as it operated in Long An province in the early and mid-1960s:  
Economic development would go on regardless of who on, although it might be delayed 
while deciding who would win.  Thus it was simply not an issue in the struggle. . . 
Government programs were focused largely on providing a general increment of wealth or 
income, whereas what attracted people to the revolutionary movement was that it 
represented a new society in which there would be an individual redistribution of values, 
including power and status as well as material possessions. . . Those unsympathetic to the 
government were glad to have dispensaries, roads, loans and farmers’ associations, but 
they went right ahead and cooperated with the revolutionary movement, for the same 
groups were still going to be at the bottom no matter how much assistance the government 
provided.127 
 
Race argues that one of the reasons the VC were so effective in the first half of t e war 
was that they recognized this redistributive imperative.  Of course redistribution of 
wealth would come naturally to Communist insurgents, central as it is to their political 
philosophy.  But Race points out another important distinction in this regard – that 
participants in the insurgency, themselves, distinguished between “policies redistributive 
of wealth and income” and “policies redistributive of power and status.”128  Or, to put it 
another way, grievances about distribution had both economic and political dimensions, 
and they were separable. 
 Blaufarb makes a similar point in his analysis of Vietnam, arguing that  
                                                
127 Race, p. 176 (emphasis in original). 
128 Ibid., p. 165. 
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the critical aspect of rural development aid for counterinsurgency purposes was the 
process by which decisions were made and the aid distributed. . . Grievance processes are 
[more important] than the more common emphases on education, health services, roads, 
and the like, although the latter should not be ignored.  In all these matters, the process . . . 
is more important than the material details.  It must be a process in which the beneficiaries 
are confirmed in their essential goal of achieving greater control over what is done for 
them and to them by the power structure.129 
 
The decision “processes” to which Blaufarb refers must by definition reflect th  
distribution of “power and status” that Race’s interview respondents found to be more 
important than the distribution of material goods and services. 
 In Blaufarb’s view, it was limitations in the reform of distribution of political 
power where the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency ultimately fell short.  Importantly, 
he separates this phenomenon from the distributive problems of wealth, which were quite 
extensively addressed by the U.S.-GVN pacification campaign and the Land to the Tiller 
legislation. 
In the end, the peasant was left to his own resources, with no organization to speak for 
him above the village level.  The government thus failed – despite the economic and 
development benefits of its programs, despite the increased security in the countryside – 
to create among the peasantry a strong, positive motivati n to engage in the struggle on 
the official side. . . The programmatic aspects of pacification in Vietnam were therefore a 
substantial success, but they were unable to come t grips with the most deep-seated 
problems in rural life in Vietnam.  These could only have been solved by providing the 
villagers with political levers linked to the national political process.130 
  
 What emerges from this analysis is a new pair of hypotheses, that among the 
factors that win the loyalty of a population and establish legitimacy, distributional effects 
may be more important than absolute effects, and political effects may be more important 
than economic effects.  This latter observation echoes Horowitz’s caution cited in 
Chapter 2, that while political power is often an instrument for determining allocation of 
material benefits, “power may also be the benefit. . . Broad matters of group status 
                                                
129 Blaufarb, pp. 289, 309-310. 
130 Ibid., pp. 272, 277. 
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regularly have equal or superior standing to the narrow allocative decisions ofte taken to 
be the uniform stuff of everyday politics.”131 
 Table 4 below presents a graphical representation of these hypotheses together 
with some examples of the kinds of government measures that might fit into each of the 
four categories implied by the interaction of the hypotheses. 
  ECONOMIC  
MEASURES & EFFECTS 
POLITICAL 




Examples: direct aid, job creation, 
economic growth, public works 
 









Examples: allocation of public 
resources, tax policy, land 
ownership 
 
Hypothesized Effectiveness:  
moderately effective 
Examples: constitutional structure 
(national and local level), 
representation in decision-making 
processes 
Hypothesized Effectiveness:  
most effective 
Table 4: An Alternative Assessment Framework for Effectiveness of Governance 
Measures & Effects in Counterinsurgency 
 
Note that this framework is silent on the role of group identities and ethnic and 
religious conflict.  But ethnic and religious identities can be related to the framework in at 
least two important ways.  First, such affiliations may define the key groups among 
which wealth and political power is distributed.  In more homogenous societies, the most 
important groups might be defined by class or alignment with other interests.  Second, 
perhaps the presence of ethnic or religious conflict could accentuate the relativ  
importance of political power over economic power, in the spirit of Horowitz’s 
comments above.   
                                                
131 Horowitz, p. 187 (emphasis in original). 
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So, for example, despite the GVN’s failings in establishing equitable political 
processes between federal and local governments, it was able to score a major victory 
against the VC through land reform, a fundamentally economic redistributive measure.  
Would such an initiative have had such an effect in an ethnically divided society?  In 
Algeria, where ethno-religious conflict was at the center of the insurgency, strong 
economic growth and job creation seemed not to matter a great deal, and it is hard to 
imagine as strong an effect of land reform on the fortunes of the FLN as the effect the VC 
experienced.132 
 The framework derived from these insights could benefit from greater theore ical 
scrutiny, but may offer promising opportunities for further research.  
 
In conclusion, the Malayan, Algerian, and Vietnamese cases examined here 
suggest the following insights regarding the study’s hypotheses: 
• Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam provide some evidence to support the 
conventional wisdom that providing good governance is an effective strategy for 
counterinsurgents. 
• However, all three cases suggest that the efficacy of governance-based strategies is 
more ambiguous and complicated than is usually assumed. 
• The Algerian case provides some qualified support for the hypothesis that the politics 
of ethnic identity can subvert the effectiveness of governance-based stratgies. 
                                                
132 Melnik, pp. 232-233. 
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From a methodological stand-point, one of the key lessons of these cases is the need to 
examine the dynamics of legitimacy in counterinsurgency at more local levels, a task 





Chapter 5: Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency in Iraq 
 
This chapter presents an overview of identity politics in Iraq and how those 
politics have been manifest in the insurgency and counterinsurgency conducted there 
following the American-led Coalition invasion of 2003.  It provides a national-level 
background for, and introduction to, the local case studies in the two chapters that follow. 
It is organized into three sections on the following topics: 1) identity politics and eth o-
religious conflict in Iraq; 2) insurgency and counterinsurgency; and 3) local case study 
selection. 
Identity Politics and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq 
Demographics, Geography, and a History of Cleavages 
Figure 2: Map of Iraqi Ethno-religious Groups1 
              In the Bible’s Book of Genesis, 
humanity’s great ethnic and linguistic 
diversity is explained as a divine retribution 
for mankind’s hubristic attempt to build the 
Tower of Babel and thus seek worldly glory 
in place of fealty to God.2  Iraq is the modern 
home of that ancient story, which lends a 
sense of poetic depth to its recent strife.  As 
the world has learned in the years since 2003, 
                                                
1 Central Intelligence Agency, January 2003.  Available at: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_ethno_2003.jpg (accessed July 26, 2009). 
2 Bible, Book of Genesis, 11:1-9. 
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the politics of ethno-religious identity in Iraq are complex and volatile.  While Iraq’s 
sectarian cleavages have only recently gained geopolitical significance on a global scale, 
they have been central, enduring features of Iraqi politics since the state was carved out 
of the defunct Ottoman Empire under a British mandate in 1920.   
The most significant of these cleavages are those between Sunni Arab and Shi’a 
Arab populations and between Arab and Kurdish ethnic populations.  These cleavages 
create three major Iraqi communities around which much commentary on Iraqi politics 
revolves: Sunni Arabs, constituting approximately 20% of the population; Shi’a Arabs, 
constituting approximately 50-55% of the population; and the mostly Sunni but generally 
more secular Kurds, constituting approximately 18-20% of the population.  Most of the 
remaining several percent of Iraqis are Turkmen, Christian Arabs (many of whom are 
also known as Chaldeans or Assyrians), and Yezidis.3  
As shown in the map above, large areas of Iraq are relatively homogeneous with 
respect to the country’s three major ethno-religious communities, with Kurds dominating 
the northeast, Shi’a Arabs dominating the southeast and Sunni Arabs dominating the 
north-central and western Euphrates river valley areas.  However, significant parts of the 
country are heterogeneous, including some of the major population centers, such as 
Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and the central provinces of Diyala and Babil.    
Iraq’s starkest and most persistent ethnic conflict has been between Arabs and 
Kurds.  The Kurdish people, sometimes referred to as the world’s largest nation with ut a 
                                                
3 CIA World Factbook, 2008, CIA map referenced in note 1 above, and Jasim Muhammad Tuzlu, “The 
Demographic Map, Elections, and Forecast Figures of Social Components,” FBIS Report in Arabic 
(GMP20041210000187), December 8, 2004. 
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state,4 are spread mainly across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria and have long harbored 
designs to establish an independent Kurdish state.  As minorities in their home states, 
however, their ambitions have always been thwarted by more powerful forces.   
Iraqi Kurds’ efforts to free themselves from Baghdad’s rule date from the 
beginning of Iraq’s statehood under the British mandate,5 nd Kurds and Arabs in Iraq 
have clashed repeatedly over the decades since then.  These fights were not only political, 
but military as well, with large-scale armed hostilities breaking out between Kurdish 
guerrillas and Iraqi government forces in 1930, 1943-45, throughout most of the 1960s, 
1974-5, and 1988-90.  The last of these conflicts is the most infamous, featuring Saddam 
Hussein’s “al Anfal” campaign in which eighty percent of Kurdish villages w re 
destroyed and probably more than 100,000 Kurds were killed, many of them women and 
children, and some by chemical weapons.6 
On at least two occasions, Baghdad actually made short-lived commitments in 
recognition of a legitimate Kurdish nationalism, if not quite independence.  The 
Declaration of 29 June 1966 and the Manifesto of 11 March 1970 essentially “recognized 
the ‘legitimacy of the Kurdish nationality’, and promised Kurdish linguistic rights, 
Kurdish participation in government, and Kurdish administrators for the Kurdish area.”7  
In short order, however, Baghdad reneged on these commitments, proving either unable 
                                                
4 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2004), p. 44. 
5 Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 33-38. 
6 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 245, and 
Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created  War Without End (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 26-27. 
7 Marion Forouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 3rd Edition 
(London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 104, 131. 
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or unwilling to implement them. In effect, then, Arabs and Kurds have never truly 
accepted the others’ claims to legitimate control over Iraqi Kurdistan.  Kurds, though 
often suffering from internal political conflicts, have generally operated under the 
premise that legitimacy flows first from Kurdish ethnic identity.  One particularly 
compelling piece of evidence of this can be found in a referendum conducted in the 
Kurdish areas during the first post-Saddam Iraqi elections in January 2005.  The 
referendum asked for a yes or no vote on whether the Kurds preferred independence for 
Iraqi Kurdistan.  Of the two million who voted, 98 percent said yes.8 
 The history of cleavages between Iraq’s Sunni Arab and Shi’a Arab populations is 
more complex and varied than the history of Arab-Kurd conflict.  Prior to 2003, Iraq – 
and before Iraq its three constituent Ottoman provinces (“vilayets”) – was alys ruled 
by groups dominated by the Sunni Arab minority.  This practice dates almost to the 
beginning of Ottoman rule in the early sixteenth century9 and was replicated by the 
British when they took over in the aftermath of World War I.10 
 To varying degrees over time, this Sunni Arab rule tended to be chauvinistic and 
discriminatory.  Under Saddam Hussein, that discrimination included mass murder of his 
opponents.  To be sure, regimes throughout Iraq’s modern history made attempts to build 
an Iraqi national identity that transcended ethnicity and religion.  In the early days of the 
monarchy, the 1920s and 1930s, Iraqi and British leaders tried to build on tribes and 
theirs sheikhs as non-sectarian bases for the legitimacy of their rule.  In 1958, the 
                                                
8 Galbraith, p. 171. 
9 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), p. 6. 
10 Tripp, p. 31. 
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monarchy was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by a group of reformist military 
officers.  They established a constitutional republic for the first time in Iraq’s history.  
The new regime’s prime minister, Abd al-Karim Qasim, himself the product of mixed 
Sunni-Shi’a parentage, pursued a secular reform agenda, emphasizing the need forsocio-
economic changes.  Then with the rise of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq in the 1960s, the 
government submerged the concept of Iraqi nationalism beneath calls for a secular Pan-
Arab identity. 
 These different visions of cross-sectarian political identity advanced by the Iraqi 
government sometimes served to moderate Sunni-Shi’a cleavages, but they fell far short 
of eliminating them.  The simple fact that Sunnis dominated the senior ranks of the 
government and the military in spite of being less than half as numerous as Shi’a was 
perceived as a persistent injustice.  As one Shi’a student put it in 1931, “[Have] the Shi’is 
sacrificed their men, orphaned their children and widowed their wives in order to set up 
governmental chairs for the Sunnis on the skulls of their martyrs?”11  The most 
straightforward means of redressing this Shi’a grievance – free elections – remained 
unavailable to the Iraqi people.  Moreover, for many Iraqi Shi’a, the strong secularism of 
first Qasim and then the Ba’ath party represented a threat to Shi’ism, itself.  Th  1960s 
saw a religious revival among Shi’a youth, and, as historian Phebe Marr explains, “the 
Shi’a also used the period of upheaval and declining central control to develop a new 
religious and communal identity at odds with the secular nationalism of the central 
                                                
11 Quoted in Lukitz, p. 62. 
148 
 
government and to strengthen Shi’i groups, like the [Shi’a Islamist political party of] 
Da’wa and the clergy.”12    
 The brutal reign of Saddam Hussein did nothing to alleviate the sense of 
grievance among Iraqi Shi’a.  From the early days of his regime, Saddam kept a tight rein 
on popular Shi’a clerics who openly opposed his rule, which included the execution of 
revered Da’wa party founder Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al Sadr in 1980, as well as 
restricted public recognition of Shi’a religious holidays and pilgrimages.  After Iraq’s 
eviction from Kuwait in 1991, many Shi’a groups in southern Iraq revolted in an attempt 
to overthrow Saddam.  The revolts were viciously suppressed, and Saddam’s economic 
and military retribution for the uprising continued for years, resulting in massive 
suffering and dislocation among the overwhelmingly Shi’a population of the south.   
In sum, Iraq’s modern history has seen persistent and relatively deep identity-
based cleavages among its major ethno-religious populations.  Most important, Iraqi 
politics was sufficiently sensitive to such cleavages that when the opportunity arrived in 
2003 to build a plural democracy, the basis for cross-ethnic, cross-sectarian cooperati n 
was relatively weak.  As analyst Andreas Wimmer put it, “As at independence, no trans-
ethnic networks of civil society organizations exist[ed] that could provide altern tive 
channels for the aggregation of interests.”13 
The Limitations of Ethno-religious Cleavages in Explaining Iraqi Politics 
While identity-based cleavages have clearly been a major feature of Iraqi history, 
it is important to note that these divides have not always and everywhere dominated 
                                                
12 Marr, pp. 103, 138. 
13 Andreas Wimmer, “Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq,” Survival, vol. 45, no. 4 (Winter 
2003-4), p. 119. 
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Iraq’s political dynamics.  As noted, much of Iraq’s population lives in heterogeneous 
cities, which has resulted in development of some deep cross-sectarian culturalties 
through intermarriage, education, and commerce.  And by the same token, political 
conflicts have often formed along fault lines other than those of ethnicity and sect.  As in 
many other states, politically salient identities have also included those generated by 
tribal, class-based, urban, rural, and nationalist affiliations. 
 In particular, tribes – extended kinship networks – have been and continue to be 
an important building block of Iraqi society.  While many Iraqi tribes are ethnically and 
religiously homogeneous, they are not uniformly so, and those identities coexist with 
ones defined according to the tribe itself.  The political relevance of tribesand the sheikhs 
who lead them has waxed and waned over the decades.  After a steep decline in power 
during the nineteenth century, tribal leaders regained some of their influence nder 
British rule, which tended to use the sheikhs as proxies for government authority and 
legitimacy.  For two decades following the revolution in 1958, Iraqi leaders sought t 
marginalize tribal elements, which they viewed as “premodern”14 and as “remnants of 
colonialism.”15   
But under the stress of the Iran-Iraq war, the Persian Gulf war, and their 
aftermaths, Saddam Hussein revived Baghdad’s courting of tribal leaders as extensions of 
government authority.  In exchange for loyalty and providing local security and 
intelligence, Saddam provided many tribal leaders with land, weapons, and money.16  
                                                
14 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 162. 
15 Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies, 1991-1996,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 29, no. 1 (February 1997), p. 1. 
16 Ibid., pp. 1-31, Marr, p. 262, Tripp, pp. 265-266.  
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This support during the 1980s and 1990s rejuvenated tribal identities as an important 
feature of Iraq’s 21st century political landscape.  
Even so, many Iraqis continue to view tribalism as a relic of more primitive times.  
As one local religious leader in Amarah told a British official of the Coalition Pr visional 
Authority (CPA) in 2003, “We are modern people.  We reject the tribes.”17  This speaks 
to another politically salient division in Iraqi society, that between urban and rural (often 
tribal) communities.  As scholar Hosham Dawod points out, “. . . it is not very long since 
Iraqi society, like all Arab societies, was divided into three interdependent yet strongly 
antagonistic groups: nomads, agriculturalists and town-dwellers.”18  While nomads are 
mostly gone in Iraq, the “town-and-country” distinction remains relevant to some degree 
in a society where modern, secular, highly educated, technologically driven, urban 
communities coexist with uneducated, agricultural ones.19  And these communities 
certainly cut across ethno-religious lines.  For example, Charles Tripp describes different 
communities of Iraq’s Shi’a Arabs during the 1980s like this:  “The rural Shi’a, whose 
social world was still largely influenced by considerations of particular kinship, family 
and clan codes of honour and behaviour, differed markedly from the various established 
groups of urban Shi’a, whether these comprised the clerics, the lay professionals or the 
urban poor.”20  
                                                
17 Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes (And Other Occupational Hzards of a Year in Iraq) (Orlando, 
FL: Harcourt Inc., 2006), p. 99. 
18 Hosham Dawod, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: the Case of Iraq,” in 
Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle 
East (London: Saqi Books, 2003), p. 113. 
19 See Lukitz, p. 58, and Faleh Abdul-Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction 
of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998,” in Abdul-Jabar and Dawod, eds., p. 73. 
20 Tripp, p. 246. 
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 Another important political identity in Iraq has been affiliation with socio-
economic class.  In discussing social fault lines in Iraq since the 1958 revolution, 
historians Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett argue that, “the fundame t l 
division . . . was not ‘religious’ or ‘sectarian,’ but socio-economic, between the haves, 
and the have-nots . . .”  This division had a sectarian color to it because of the largely 
rural, largely impoverished, and largely Shi’a population in the South.  But the Shi’a 
were not necessarily poor primarily because they were Shi’a, but because the tribal 
estates where they lived had been “appropriated by powerful tribal leaders, nd the 
tribesmen had been left either entirely without land or with insufficient land for their 
subsistence.”21 
 Finally, nationalism represents a politically salient identity thatcuts across ethno-
religious identities in Iraq.  Iraqi leaders over the years have certainly made vigorous 
attempts to establish and appeal to a transcendent national political identity.  The Sunni-
Shi’a alliance during the Revolt of 1920 against British occupation is often remember d 
as the first instance of Iraqi national identity formation, though the alliance was only 
tactical and short-lived.22  Since then, leaders from King Faisal to Saddam Hussein have 
sought to rally Iraqis behind the notion of a common shared identity.  At different times,
this process has taken different forms.  In the early years of Ba’ath party rule, Iraqi 
nationalism was subordinated to a Pan-Arab vision of political identity, an ethnic, secular 
tack that was especially unwelcome to Iraq’s Kurds and to its deeply religious 
communities of many sects.  During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein launched an 
                                                
21 Forouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, pp. 190-200. 
22 Ibid., p. 10, Lukitz, p. 61, Tripp, p. 44, Thair Karim, “Tribes and Nationalism: Tribal Political Cult re 
and Behaviour in Iraq, 1914-20,” in Abdul-Jabar and Dawod, eds., p. 283. 
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aggressive propaganda campaign to buttress Iraqi patriotism which emphasized Iraq’s 
heritage of Babylonian civilization, the Abbasid caliphate and the Arab identity of its 
Shi’a population as distinct from Persian Shi’a identity. 
Ultimately, however, these nationalist projects have largely failed to overcom  the 
various forms of factionalism in Iraqi politics described in this chapter.  Charles T ipp 
summarizes this failure: 
. . . neither the state as an abstraction, nor the groups or individuals who have 
commanded it, have managed to ensure that the multiple histories of the Iraqis are 
subsumed into a single narrative of state power . . . Authoritarianism and skill at 
exploiting the fracture lines within the population, as well as restrictive understandings 
of political trust, have kept hierarchies of status and privilege intact.  This has subverted 
the very idea of national community in whose name successive governments have 
claimed to act.23 
 
Perhaps it is most accurate to say that Iraqi nationalism is a real and a politic lly salient 
identity, but only one among several competing identities.  In historian Juan Cole’s view, 
“Iraqi nationalism exists as a complicated social and psychological phenomenon, 
coexisting with what Anthony Smith has called subnationalisms.”24  Also, many different 
Iraqis may claim strong nationalist feelings and identity, and yet among them have a wide 
variety of understandings of what the Iraqi “nation” is, generating what Reidar Visser 
calls “battles for sectarian hegemony within a single national framework.”25 
Summary of Identity Politics in Iraq 
 In summary, what general premises can be established regarding identity politics 
in Iraq?  First and perhaps most important, group loyalties clearly matter a gr at deal in 
                                                
23 Tripp, pp. 4-5. 
24 Juan R.I. Cole, “The Rise of Religious and Ethnic Mass Politics in Iraq,” in David Little and Donald K.
Swearer, eds., Religion and Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), p. 43. 
25 Reidar Visser, “Introduction,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield,” eds., An Iraq of Its Regions: 
Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 21.
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determining perceptions of legitimacy.  In part due to the artificiality of Iraq’s creation, 
and in part due to its history of serial minority dictatorship, a Western-style mod l of the 
social contract between citizens and the state has never really taken root.  Legitimacy has 
continued to be based in groups and institutions external to the state, a problem the 
British confronted – and in time helped reinforce – from the beginning of their mandate 
in Iraq.  As historian Toby Dodge describes, “at the heart of British thinking was a 
dichotomy between the explanatory weight to assign to individuals as independent agents 
and that to assign to social structure and ‘traditional’ institutions and practices.”26  In 
opting to use tribal structures as proxies of governance, the British resolved that 
dichotomy in favor of “traditional” institutions and helped perpetuate the importance of 
non-state, group-based political legitimacy, a legacy which was adopted in different ways 
by subsequent indigenous rulers and which still echoes in Iraqi politics today.  Again,
Charles Tripp summarizes the consequences of this phenomenon succinctly: 
. . . many Iraqis have tried to champion . . . the idea of politics as civility, advocating a 
framework of laws and a shared space for political a tivity.  A minority view in Iraq’s 
political history, this tendency has generally been overwhelmed by people organized 
according to very different notions of trust, where th  community is not one of citizens, 
but of family and clan members, fellow tribesmen or c nspirators.27 
 
 The second premise Iraq’s history yields is that group loyalties and cleavag s 
based on ethno-religious identity in particular have been among the most important 
foundations for political organization and competition.   
Third, however, is that other cleavages and sources of legitimacy apart from 
ethno-religious ones have been important, too; politically salient identities hav  included 
those generated by tribal, class-based, urban, rural, and nationalist affiliations.  In his 
                                                
26 Dodge, p. 2. 
27 Tripp, p. 2. 
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landmark study of Iraqi social history, historian Hanna Batatu refers to these complex 
interactions as overlapping identities.28   
For the purposes of this study, then, it would be inappropriate to assume that one 
particular cleavage or identity is most important in any given instance.  While we can be 
confident that ethno-religious identities will be relevant at some level, we cannot,  priori, 
be sure how, and therefore should not project conflicting interests or motivations on 
populations without empirical verification.  This understanding will help frame the cas s 
studies in the following chapters. 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
The Insurgencies 
 Political violence in Iraq in the years since the American-led Coalition invasion of 
2003 has been complex and diverse in its origins and dynamics.  A comprehensive 
taxonomy and description of this violence is beyond the scope of this study, but a few 
general words about insurgency in Iraq are necessary to provide proper context fr the 
case studies that follow.  These comments, as well as the case studies, are focused mainly 
on the war as it evolved up until 2006, when al Qaeda in Iraq’s bombing of the al 
Askariya Mosque in Samarra initiated a shift in the nature of the violence in Iraq.  While 
much debate in 2006 surrounded whether Iraq was in the midst of a “civil war,” few 
contested that the nature of the war had undergone a transformation in the wake of the 
Samarra bombing.  In April of that year, U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and 
Coalition forces commander General George Casey acknowledged that “the principal 
                                                
28 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 
1978), quoted in Lukitz, p. 153. 
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threat to stability is shifting from an insurgency grounded in rejection of the new political 
order to sectarian violence grounded in mutual fears and recriminations.”29   
The definition of insurgency introduced in Chapter 3 was: “an indigenous military 
or paramilitary challenge to the sovereignty of a constituted government over all or part 
of its territory.”  By this definition, three principal, different insurgencies can be 
identified in the years following 2003:  Sunni “rejectionists,” Salafi jihadists, and Shi’a 
militias affiliated with Moqtada al-Sadr.30 
“Rejectionists” were a diverse compilation of groups themselves, but were 
generally drawn from the ranks of those elements of society whose access to power was 
destroyed by the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime:  dedicated Ba’athists, loyal 
former regime soldiers, and members of the tribes most favored by Saddam’s 
government.  These groups also appealed to a broader set of Sunni Arabs – those who did 
not necessarily support Saddam but after nearly a century of draconian minority rule over 
Iraq feared political marginalization of Sunnis, if not outright repression, at the hands of 
their ethnic and sectarian rivals.  Another common bond among the Sunni rejectionists 
was a strong distaste for both the fact and the principle of occupation.  Hatred of th  U.S. 
military presence contributed to at least tactical cooperation among secular nationalists, 
tribal sheikhs, and Islamists alike.  As one former Ba’ath official said, “the circumstances 
                                                
29 Zalmay Khalilzad and George W. Casey Jr., “A Path to Success in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 
2006. 
30 Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) during this period used a somewhat different taxonomy, but one that 
is consistent with this one.  They grouped Sunni rejectionists and Sadrist militias under a single heading of 
“rejectionists,” but also split out “Saddamists” or “Former Regime Loyalists,” which this taxonomy groups 
under “Sunni rejectionists.”  See Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, February 2006), p. 23.  For other alternative taxonomies of the insurgents in Iraq, 
see Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2008), pp. 22-23, and Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “Ethnic 




have obliged all forces to be united with each other to guarantee the liberation of Iraq.  
The Islamist organizations are fighting side by side with progressive and secular forces, 
which is very important and necessary to kick out the imperialist occupation.”31 
On the far end of the spectrum of Islamist insurgents in Iraq were the Salafi 
jihadist32 groups, including, but not limited to, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  These insurgents 
were also composed overwhelmingly of Sunni Arabs and cooperated extensively with the 
rejectionists in the first several years of the conflict.  However, their strategic objectives 
differed considerably from the rejectionists.  The jihadists were interested not in 
reinstating a pre-war status quo, but rather in advancing a particular fundamentalist 
interpretation of Koran-inspired good living and in creating a new caliphate of holy rule 
in a swath of historically Muslim territory stretching from North Africa to South Asia.33   
The Shi’a insurgency prior to 2006 was very different from the Sunni insurgency.  
Perhaps most importantly, it was not as large or intense.  Much of the violence that 
occurred in predominantly Shi’a areas during those years was more a result of internal 
fighting among various Shi’a militia than of an organized insurgency against Coalition 
forces or the new Iraqi government.  Most Shi’a did not share the Sunnis’ sense of 
disenfranchisement and fear of marginalization.  To the contrary, the Coalition invasio  
in 2003 handed Iraq’s Shi’a their best opportunity in all of the country’s checkered 
                                                
31 Quoted in Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), pp. 185-186. 
32 “Jihadist” is controversial as a descriptive term for violent Islamic extremists, but that controversy i  
immaterial to this analysis, so the term is used here as a matter of convenience.  See Words That Work and 
Words That Don’t: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication, Counterterrorism Communications 
Center, vol. 2, issue 10 (March 14, 2008). 
33 Commander Randall Peck, et al, Voices of the Enemy: Quotations from Al-Qaida and Associated 
Movements (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2007). 
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history to take political advantage of their majority status.  To some extent, this large 
stake in the successful development of a new Iraqi state has served as a disincentive 
among Shi’a communities to pursue insurgency in response to political frustrations. 
A major exception to this generalization, of course, has been the persistence of 
Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army (“Jaysh al-Madhi” or JAM).  Sadr has led 
opposition to Coalition rule since the early days after the invasion, and JAM even fought 
some pitched battles with U.S. forces in 2004.  Sadr strikes some of the same notes as 
Sunni insurgents, especially those having to do with the illegitimacy of the occupier, and 
the need to establish a regime that is more in tune to Islamic values.  But there the 
similarities end.  Sadr’s vision of Iraqi nationalism resembles an Arab version of Iranian 
theocracy (“vilayet al-faqih” or rule by clerics) more than it does either Ba’athist 
totalitarianism or a Salafist caliphate.  Additionally, Sadr’s social support is based 
primarily in the impoverished, uneducated segments of Iraq’s Shi’a communities.  As a 
result, in many ways, the Sadrist insurgency has been a populist one, giving it a socio-
economic flavor quite distinct from its more strident religious focus.  Harangues against 
Coalition and government failures to provide basic services, together with Hizbollah-
style grass-roots campaigns to provide such services outside the government, became 
central features of the Sadrist movement.34 
 The variation in motivations evident across these different insurgent groups 
provides one rationale for an analytical approach focused on local rather than national 
case studies.  In particular, motivations and grievances based on ethno-religious 
                                                
34 Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Sadr, A Question Mark Etched in Black,” Washington Post, 
September 11, 2006, p. 10, Ahmed Hashim, “Iraq’s Chaos: Why the Insurgency Won’t Go Away,” Boston 
Review, May 2005, Hashim (2006), pp. 255-264. 
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cleavages are intermingled with other motivations and grievances, such as those related 
to the quality of governance.  For the rejectionists, the key grievance appears to be a 
combination of sectarian disenfranchisement, fear of sectarian retribution, mixed in with 
some sectarian chauvinism.  In one Sunni tribal leader’s view, Shi’a “cannot take ch rge 
of Iraq in the same manner as the Sunnis.  The [Shi’a] are backwards.  They are barbarian 
savages, they do not know true religion, theirs is twisted, it is not the true religion of 
Muhammad.”35 
At the same time, however, some evidence also suggests that Sunni popular 
support for Coalition forces was significantly affected by the Coalition’s general failures 
to return Iraqi society and infrastructure to working order, that is, failures of governance.  
For example, one Sunni Arab commented that “if the Americans came and developed our 
general services, brought work for our people, and transferred their technology to use, 
then we would not have been so disappointed.  But it is not acceptable to us as human 
beings that after one year, America is still not able to bring us electricity.”36  Another 
commented that “the mind of the Iraqi is on electricity.  He wants to find a generator to 
get a little electricity in his house so that he can drink cold water.”37 
By contrast, jihadist insurgents have seemed fairly unconcerned with prosaic 
issues such as drinking water and electricity.  The Salafist strain of Islam subscribed to by 
these insurgents is mostly silent on the nuts and bolts of governance, even to the point of 
                                                
35 Hashim (2006), pp. 71-72. 
36 Hashim (2005), p. 2. 
37 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2005), p. 217. 
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rejecting the legitimacy of political parties.38  For example, in internal discussions, the al 
Qaeda’s theorist Abu Badr Naji unabashedly downplayed the importance of governance 
for the movement’s doctrine:  “It is not a prerequisite that the mujahid movement has to 
be prepared especially for agriculture, trade, and industry . . . As for the one who 
manages the techniques in each ministry, he can be a paid employee who has no interest 
in policy and is not a member of the movement or the party.”39  This focus on religious 
precepts at the expense of political and economic ones manifest itself in Falujah in 2004 
where, while controlling the city for several months, insurgents governed principally by 
policing moral behavior rather than by organizing and executing municipal services.40 
On the surface, then, the pattern of different insurgent motivations in Iraq 
conforms to an identity-based interpretation of insurgency.  Sunni insurgents, who saw 
Sunni Arabs as a group to be gravely disadvantaged by the new political order, were 
likely to define their goals in terms of re-establishing sectarian primacy or simply 
defending themselves against sectarian reprisals.  Shi’a insurgents, in the midst of long-
awaited political ascendance for Shi’a Arab group interests, seemed at least as much 
concerned with the nature and quality of governance being executed by the Coalition and 
the new Iraqi government as by any sectarian grievances.  The cases studi  in the 
following two chapters are first steps in a full accounting of whether these superficial 
                                                
38 Understanding Islamism, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, March 2, 
2005, p. 12, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis Group, Middle East 
Report No. 50, February 15, 2006, pp. 15-19, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, Assessing Iraq’s Sunni 
Arab Insurgency Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #50, December 2005, p. 33, 
Hashim (2006), pp. 121-124. 
39 Quoted in Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan: For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the 
beginning,” The New Yorker, September 11, 2006. 
40 In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, p. 16. 
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dynamics were strongly representative of what was really happening in the first few years 
of the Iraqi insurgency. 
Counterinsurgency 
Like the insurgencies in Iraq, the U.S.-led counterinsurgency defies 
generalization.  Its dynamics varied greatly over geography, organization, and especially 
over time.  Some of this variation was a consequence of the United States’ lack of 
preparation for counterinsurgency and the subsequent decentralized improvisation 
practiced by tactical commanders throughout the country.  Variation also came over time 
through organizational learning and a growing willingness of senior political leaders to 
acknowledge an operational environment that differed starkly from expectations.   
As a result of this variation, it is difficult to discern a clear national pattern in how 
the U.S. addressed the factors of interest in this study: governance and identitypolitics.  
Consider, for example, the following two statements from senior officials in the CPA 
regarding the relative importance of economic and political factors in stabilizing the 
country.  CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer believed that “if we don’t get heir economy 
right, no matter how fancy our political transformation, it won’t work.”41  Meanwhile, 
CPA’s Governance Coordinator in Anbar province concluded that “a good political 
settlement without economic aid can still lead to stability, while no level of 
macroeconomic support can produce stability absent a viable political process.”42  With 
                                                
41 Quoted in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New 
York: Knopf, 2006), p. 62. 
42 Keith Mines, “Economic Tools in Counterinsurgency and Post-conflict Stabilization: Lessons Learned 




no clear priority between these two sets of policy levers, U.S. strategy pushed forward 
opportunistically and incoherently on all fronts.   
During this time, U.S. policy drew criticism both for emphasizing the role of 
ethno-religious identity too much and not enough.  Representative of the former critics 
was Baghdad University professor Saad Jawad, who complained that “We never saw 
each other as Sunnis or Shiites first.  We were Iraqis first.  But the Americans changed all 
that.  They made a point of categorizing people as Sunni or Shiite or Kurd.”43  
Representative of the latter camp was democracy scholar and CPA advisor Larry 
Diamond, who argued that “‘good governance’ will have little meaning in Iraq if political 
order is not restored and preserved, through means that will need to be more politicalthan 
military.  The overriding initial task must be to fashion a political bargain in which all 
major Iraqi groups feel they have a stake in the country’s political future.”44 
Not until November 2005 did the U.S. articulate a comprehensive statement of its 
national-level plan, the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI).45  The NSVI 
defined three “tracks” for U.S. efforts – political, security, and economic – that together 
attempted to address both the politics of ethno-religious conflict and improvements in the 
quality of governance.  By this point, however, over two years of conflict had already 
passed.  And less than three months after the new strategy’s publication, the Askariya 
Mosque bombing set the war off in a new and perilous direction. 
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 Up to this point it is probably fair to say that the U.S.-led counterinsurgency had 
produced mixed results, but overall was not successful.  The proceeding discussion 
outlines the counterinsurgency through the lens of this study’s analytic framework, 
addressing security, governance, political agreements, and outcomes as distinct variables.  
 Security 
Like people throughout history who have been caught in the midst of 
insurgencies, Iraqis were concerned most of all with security for themselves and their 
families.  When asked what Iraqis wanted from their government, one woman replied, 
“We want security and we want stability.  Anybody who comes along is fine as long as 
he brings security and stability.”46  As noted above, the U.S. military’s early security 
operations in Iraq were relatively decentralized and therefore diverse.  In g neral, 
however, commanders were slow to conceive of their situation in terms of 
counterinsurgency.  As a result, “security” operations tended to resemble the aggressive, 
large-scale, violent combat operations for which most units were trained.  Very oft n, the 
result was the use of excessive, even indiscriminate force.  For example, troops in 
Baghdad frequently returned insurgent mortar fire with artillery barrages that were more 
likely to destroy homes and kill innocent civilians than to find their targets.47  U.S. forces 
also conducted wide sweeps of suspicious neighborhoods featuring arrests of all military-
                                                
46 Shadid, p. 149. 
47 Sean Rayment, “U.S. Tactics Condemned by British Officers,” The Daily Telegraph, April 11, 2004, 
quoted in Jim Baker, “Systems Thinking in Counterinsurgencies,” Parameters, Winter 2006-07, p. 32.  
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age males.  One brigade commander in the 4th Infantry Division declared that his forces 
were there to “kill the enemy, not to win their hearts or minds.”48   
As a result of these tactics, stories abound of neutral or friendly Iraqis turning to 
sympathy for the insurgents after harrowing or brutal experiences with brusque, hair-
trigger, culturally insensitive U.S. forces.49  A retired U.S. Army officer summed up the 
problem this way: 
Most of the generals and politicians did not think through the consequences of 
compelling American soldiers with no knowledge of Arabic or Arab culture to implement 
intrusive measures inside an Islamic society.  We arr sted people in front of their 
families, dragging them away in handcuffs with bags over their heads, and then provided 
no information to the families of those we incarcerat d.  In the end, our soldiers killed, 
maimed and incarcerated thousands of Arabs, 90 percent of whom were not the enemy.  
But they are now.50 
 
 The Coalition’s security operations also suffered from some important early 
strategic errors.  For example, the U.S. war plan assumed that most key government 
services, including the police, would be quickly re-established in the wake of regime 
change, and therefore made no provision for general post-combat security operations.51  
In the face of widespread looting and collapsing civil order that immediately followed 
Saddam Hussein’s removal, Coalition forces were slow to respond.  Even as the severity
and importance of the breakdown of law and order began to dawn on Coalition leaders, 
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the size of the invasion force was too small to re-establish and maintain security 
throughout the country. 
 Then, as the security situation continued to unravel, the CPA exacerbated its 
problems by abruptly disbanding the Iraqi Army and ordering comprehensive de-
Ba’athification throughout the Iraqi government.  In almost a single stroke, the Coalition 
had alienated many thousands of Iraqis who possessed most of the country’s technical 
capability for re-establishing security and the functioning of government and had created 
many thousands of unemployed, armed, military-trained young males. 
 From the perspective of “winning hearts and minds,” clearly the Coalition got off 
to a poor start from the strategic to the tactical level.  At the same time, an important 
caveat applies to this judgment, at least to the tactical criticisms regardin  excessive 
force.  In some instances, as is often the case in counterinsurgencies, no good alternatives 
to aggressive tactics were available to U.S. forces due to the persistence or brutality of 
insurgent forces and by ineffectual attempts to put a more friendly face on the 
counterinsurgency.  For example, in the spring of 2004, the 1st Division of the U.S. 
Marine Corps relieved an Army unit in Anbar province and attempted to implement a 
policy more geared to winning hearts and minds than the policy that had been in place 
previously.  Among other reforms, the Marines began patrolling the cities on foot rather 
than in armored vehicles.  This policy was quickly reversed when the Marines found that 
conditions were too violent and the people in the cities too unresponsive to their efforts 
for the new policy to be worth the additional risk being taken.52   
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165 
 
Also, U.S. forces did demonstrate the ability to learn from their mistakes over 
time, and in many places they backed away from the more damaging security practices 
that prevailed in the early days of the counterinsurgency.  Major General Peter Chiarelli, 
as commander of the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad during 2004 and 2005, for 
example, became a particularly vocal champion of focusing military operations at least as 
much on securing the civilian population as on killing and capturing insurgents.53  By the 
end of 2005, many military and civilian leaders had picked up on the importance of this 
shifting emphasis.  The NSVI codified the change in labeling its security track as a 
“clear, hold, and build” strategy.54  By 2007, under the command of General David 
Petraeus, population security was to become the central mission of Coalition forces in 
Iraq. 
 Governance 
The Coalition’s goals for providing good governance in Iraq were nothing if not 
ambitious.  The CPA set out to establish new, modern governance practices in a 
staggering array of domains, from health care to jurisprudence to stock trading.  Billions 
of dollars were poured into reconstruction efforts aimed not only at repairing war 
damage, but at improving the fraying infrastructure of a poorly managed country crippled 
by years of economic sanctions.  Indeed, since the CPA effectively was the Iraqi 
government from May 2003 to June 2004, its commitment to improving governance in 
Iraq was deep.  In the judgment of Coalition leaders, the legitimacy of the mission 
depended on delivering on the promises of improved lives for the Iraqi people. 
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This commitment to improving governance across a wide range of domains was 
sustained when the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi government in June 2004.  
The centerpiece of U.S. efforts was the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), 
which allocated over $18 billion to improve Iraq’s quality of life and functionality s a 
state.  Budgeted project categories were: security and law enforcement, justice, public 
safety infrastructure, civil society, electric sector, oil infrastructure, water resources, 
sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, road and bridge construction, health care, 
private sector employment development, education, refugees, human rights, democracy, 
and governance.55  Beginning in late 2005, the U.S. added to this effort several Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to oversee programs and assist local leaders at provincial 
levels to build provincial capacity, foster economic development, strengthen rule of law, 
and promote reconciliation.56 
Also, at more tactical levels, good governance was a central part of the military’s 
efforts to shift toward a more population-centric approach to combating the insurge cy.  
Soldiers and Marines became heavily involved not only in security operations but in 
reconstruction projects, local politics, and re-establishing functional essential service 
systems such as sewage, water, electricity, and trash (“SWET”).  Localcommanders were 
allocated discretionary funds from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) to spend on local projects that promised to build good will, solve acute 
community problems, provide quick employment, and the like.  For the most part, these 
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types of operations had not been part of the military’s original mission or their train ng, 
but conducting them was simply a pragmatic response to the environment in which they 
found themselves.  As one company commander in Baghdad during 2003-2004 put it, 
“Electricity, sewage, and security were the top three concerns of the citizens [in my area 
of operations] and thus the top priorities for my unit.”57 
 Despite the enormous effort applied to improve governance in Iraq, its 
effectiveness in resolving the sources of conflict seems to have been hampered by two 
key factors.  The first was one of the classic conundrums of counterinsurgency discussed 
in Chapter 3: while stable security may be well served by good governance, good 
governance is difficult to achieve without some initial semblance of security.  In some 
instances this dilemma led to an impasse between the military and civilian agencies, each 
of whom tended to see their own success as dependent on the prior success of the other.58 
The second obstacle to the effectiveness of Coalition governance efforts, which is 
central to this study, was the politics of identity.  In some instances, Coalition projects 
went unappreciated simply by virtue of their association with the Coalition.  CPA official 
Rory Stewart explained the challenges of governance efforts based on his experience in 
southern Iraq: 
Many of our most expensive ventures, though beneficial, won us no thanks: water 
purification projects cost millions but were mostly underground and produced water that, 
although safer, looked the same as the old water.  We were blamed for the disrepair of 
schools that Saddam had taken the credit for building, and got no credit for refurbishing 
them; no one saw the equipment we bought for ministry offices or thanked us for 
providing a municipal rubbish dump.  Even the most popular projects – large bridges, 
rural regeneration grants, or mass employment schemes – seemed to have little influence 
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on whether people voted for armed militias. . . Iraqis were reluctant to trust us or work 
with us and because of this lack of cooperation, the Coalition achieved little of what it 
hoped and it received almost no credit for its efforts.  Despite thousands of troops and 
tens of millions invested in essential services, depit  a number of impressive 
reconstruction projects, despite ambitious programs in police training and in developing 
“good governance and civil society,” the Coalition had only a minimal political impact in 
southern Iraq. . . the invasion was crippled not by what we did but by who we were.59 
 
This problem was echoed throughout the country as well.  A Marine civil affairs officer 
with seven months of experience in Ramadi lamented that “goodwill physical 
infrastructure projects, while generating some positive public sentiment, ar  poor 
measures of success against the insurgency.”60 
And being an occupying power was far from the only identity-related challenge to 
the Coalition’s governance efforts.  Distribution of the benefits offered up by the 
Coalition also posed a political minefield.  For example, as the CPA official Stewart 
noted, “jobs given to the wrong people would be worse than no jobs at all.”61  Depending 
on the location and the context, various social groups, including ethnic and religious 
groups, felt entitled to preferential treatment and were aggrieved if such treatment was 
not forthcoming. 
So good governance was certainly a central element of the Coalition’s approach, 
and this aspect of the counterinsurgency was generally not starved for resources or 
leadership attention.  But at least in the first few years of the counterinsurge cy, these 
efforts gained only uneven traction. 
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Political Agreements Addressing Ethno-religious Cleavages 
As noted above, when it comes to the politics of ethno-religious cleavages in Iraq, 
the Coalition has been accused of being both too sensitive to this issue and not sensitive 
enough.  The former charge is based in part on the Coalition’s insistence on ethno-
religious balance in formation of the Iraqi Governing Council, its management of other 
transitional political processes, and its supposed accommodation of strongly ethno-
sectarian parties during the drafting of the constitution during 2005.  According to this
logic the Coalition’s influence contributed to the unnecessary “Lebanon-ization” of Iraqi 
politics, whereby key positions of power are allocated to pre-determined ethno-sectarian 
groups. 
The opposing viewpoint is that accommodation of ethno-sectarian interests and 
allocation of power along these lines is a natural and necessary prerequisite for tability 
in Iraq, and that the Coalition’s attempts to impose excessive unity and centralization on 
the Iraqi polity have exacerbated civil conflict.62 
Both arguments are supported by ample evidence, largely because Coalition 
policy essentially amounted to attempts to compromise between competing centrifugal 
and centripetal political forces.  However, given that as of this writing, the viability of 
unified, democratic, pluralist Iraqi state remains an unresolved question, it is difficult to 
assess the validity of these opposing arguments.  Ultimately, they rest on quite different 
assumptions about the depth or the importance of the prevailing ethno-religious cleavages 
in Iraq.  And, as the first section of this chapter tried to demonstrate, any meaingful 
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macro assessment of that question is exceedingly difficult in Iraq, given its great social 
complexity and the long historical suppression of inter-ethnic dynamics at the hands of 
serial dictatorships. 
The Coalition’s (and many Iraqis’) attempt to compromise between 
accommodating and overcoming Iraq’s ethno-religious cleavages were centered around 
implementing federalism, whereby many powers would be decentralized and other 
centralized powers would be shared among competing factions.  CPA democracy advisor
Larry Diamond summarized both the need and the challenge for this approach: 
From an analytic perspective, and from my experience studying divided countries around 
the world, federalism made eminent sense.  Indeed, it was hard to see how Iraq’s deep 
regional, ethnic, and sectarian divisions could be managed in a democracy without 
constitutional guarantees of autonomy.  Yet Iraq had always been highly centralized, and 
for many Iraqis, the unitary state was a bedrock principle of their nationalist identity.63 
 
Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein had been talking about federalism at least since 1992, 
when both the Kurdish parliament and the dissident Iraqi National Congress endorsed it 
as the most promising basis for a future democracy in Iraq.64  In 2002, the Democratic 
Principles Working Group of the State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project d bated 
many alternative forms and degrees of decentralization, but agreed that feder lism should 
become “a cornerstone of the new Iraqi body politic.”65  The Bush administration then 
adopted the mantra of federalism during the CPA’s reign.  
Overshadowing all of the policy and academic debates on federalism at that time 
was the long-standing de facto autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Whatever structural 
                                                
63 Diamond, p. 163. 
64 Kanan Makiya, “A Model for Post-Saddam Iraq,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 3 (July 2003), pp. 
5-12. 
65 U.S. Department of State, Future of Iraq Project, Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group 
Report, “Final Report on the Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” November 2002, p. 91.   
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solution was to prevail would need to account for the decentralized authority the Kurds 
had already claimed for themselves.  And so, when Iraq adopted its constitution in 2005, 
Kurdish autonomy was enshrined in the form of a powerful “regional” government, 
which would have the authority to raise its own “internal security” forces and would h ld 
legal primacy over the federal government on any issue not enumerated in the 
constitution as an exclusively federal power.  The constitution’s division of power 
between the federal government and the provinces – as opposed to regions – was much 
murkier, with language allowing for conflicting interpretations of what te provinces 
could and could not do.66 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the constitution’s formulation of 
federalism was not its recognition of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but its 
provision that any province or combination of provinces would also be allowed to form 
regional governments that would enjoy the same status as the KRG.  For many, especially 
Sunni Arabs, this looked like a formula for disintegration, not decentralization.  Even 
supporters of decentralization found this medicine too strong.  Influential Iraqi dissident 
Kanan Makiya saw the constitution as “unwittingly paving the way for a civil war that 
will cost hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives.”67  Federalism scholar Donald Horowitz 
complained that “the Iraqi state created by this constitution is probably the weakest 
federation in the world.”68   
                                                
66 Iraqi Constitution, especially Article 121 on regional powers and Articles 115 and 122 on provincial 
powers.  
67 Kanan Makiya, “Present at the Disintegration,” New York Times, December 11, 2005. 
68 Donald Horowitz, “The Sunni Moment,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2005. 
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As of this writing, however, nothing like the radical decentralization feared by 
many has occurred.  A smaller-scale version of Makiya’s feared civil war did occur, but it 
was precipitated by terrorist incitement and militia adventurism, not by constitutionally-
sanctioned changes in Iraq’s political structures.  Instead, practically all of the structural 
questions on left hanging by Iraq’s constitution in 2005 remain in limbo.  In particular, no 
new regions have been formed, according to ethno-religious logic or otherwise.  Also, the 
constitution established a key executive power-sharing mechanism in the form of a 
transitional tripartite “presidency council,” composed of a president and two vice 
presidents.  Though allocation of the three positions by ethno-religious group is not 
specified in the constitution, the positions have been filled by one Kurd (President Jalal 
Talabani), one Shi’a Arab (Vice President Adel Abdul al Mahdi), and one Sunni Arab 
(Vice President Tariq al Hashimi).  This presidency council, which has effectively 
provided veto power to representatives each of Iraq’s major ethno-sectarian communities, 
is scheduled to expire with the parliamentary elections in 2010, after which the 
presidency will be filled by a single person.   
 In sum, Coalition and Iraqi officials have certainly pursued political agreements 
aimed at addressing ethno-religious cleavages.  As described, the Iraqi constituti , itself, 
written and approved in 2005, contains some major elements of such agreements.  At the 
same time, however, these agreements have proved highly controversial.  They may or 
may not prove to be durable over time, but it is clear that the agreements embodied in the 
constitution did not succeed in ending the insurgency in Iraq.  If anything, perceived 
inequalities in the constitution may have contributed to the sharp worsening of violence 
in 2006.  After all, the constitution was narrowly ratified in an October 2005 referendum 
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in which perhaps as many as 90% of Sunni Arabs voted against it.69  As for how this 
record relates this study’s variables, a clearer picture of how ethno-religi us political 
agreements affected the insurgency requires a more granular look at local case studie . 
 Counterinsurgency Outcomes 
As with each of the variables described in the preceding sections, measurements 
of counterinsurgency outcomes in Iraq during the period considered here tell an 
incomplete story if looked at in aggregate.  National averages hide large variations across 
locales.  What will be important for this analysis are the measures of counterinsurgency 
outcomes at local levels in the case studies. 
 Nevertheless, a few general observations on counterinsurgency outcomes over the 
years 2003-2006 may be made.  By the most obvious measure – violence levels – the 
counterinsurgency would have to be judged unsuccessful over this timeframe.  As shown 
in Figure 3, the average number of weekly attacks on Coalition and Iraqi security forces 
almost tripled from early 2004 to the beginning of 2006.  Coalition and Iraqi security 
force casualties followed a similar trend.70  
Public opinion polls also show a deteriorating condition with respect to 
counterinsurgent success in defeating the insurgents.  One national poll asked 
respondents to say “whether you feel that the security has gotten better, worse or stayed 
the same over the last three months.”  In April 2005, 13% of respondents answered 
“worse” or “much worse.”  When the same question was asked in March 2006, “worse”  
                                                
69 Diamond, p. 350. 
70 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 




Figure 3: DoD Estimates of Insurgent Attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Security 
Forces 
 
and “much worse” comprised 55% of the answers.71  Between March 2005 and March 
2006, the portion of Iraqis who expressed no confidence or “not very much” confidence 
in their federal and provincial governments to improve the situation in the country 
doubled from around 15% to around 33%.72  The popularity of Coalition forces was even 
less impressive.  From February 2004 to March 2007, the percent of Iraqis who opposed 
the presence of Coalition forces rose from 51% to 78%.  Over the same time period, 
Iraqis claiming they believed that attacks on Coalition forces were “acceptabl ” rose from 
                                                
71 Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, International Republican Institute, April 11-20 205, p. 12, and Survey of 
Iraqi Public Opinion, International Republican Institute, March 23-31 2006. 




17% to 51%.73  In the aggregate, it is clear in this period that Coalition forces did not 
succeed in winning Iraqi hearts and minds.   
By late in 2006, even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s assessment of 
progress was downbeat.  In November, he wrote to the president that “Clearly, what U.S. 
forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”74  The next 
month, the Iraq Study Group, a blue-ribbon panel of elder statesmen, began their highly 
anticipated report with the words: “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.”75 
 The period from 2003-2006 was not without its accomplishments, of course.  
Most prominently, two rounds of relatively safe elections and the writing and ratification 
of the constitution in 2005 stand as significant achievements for the Iraqi government ad 
its Coalition partners.  But from the perspective of counterinsurgency strategy, it is clear 
that at the national level, these achievements were not sufficient for succes . 
Local Case Study Selection 
A common theme of first-hand accounts of counterinsurgency in Iraq has been the 
primacy of local conditions in explaining the course of events.  Rory Stewart found that 
. . . what mattered most were local details, daily encounters with men of which we knew 
little and of whom Iraqis knew little more. . . We prefer the universal and the theoretical: 
the historical analogy and the statistics.  But politics is local, the catastrophe of Iraq is 
discovered best through individual interactions.76 
 
Stathis Kalyvas’s and Matthew Kocher’s analysis of Iraq also leads them to conclude that 
the dynamics of violence are mainly locally-driven, and to recommend that “scholars and 
                                                
73 Gary Langer, “Security Gains Reverse Iraq’s Spiral Though Serious Problems Remain,” ABC 
News/BBC/NHK/ARD National Survey of Iraq, March 17, 2008, pp. 30, 33.   
74 Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “Rumsfeld’s Memo on Iraq Proposed Major Change,” New York 
Times, December 3, 2006. 
75 James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton, et al, The Iraq Study Group Report, December 2006, p. 6. 
76 Stewart, pp. 46, 405. 
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policy makers should pay less attention to supposedly intractable cleavages nd more to 
the internal dynamics of violent conflict.”77   
The preceding overview of governance, identity, and counterinsurgency in Iraq 
provides further impetus for focusing analysis at more local levels.  The answers to most 
questions of interest at the national level appear to be “it varies,” or “it depen s.”  As 
summarized in Table 5, the settings for three of this study’s five framework variables are 
ambiguous when considered at the national level.  Ethno-religious cleavages were 
certainly present and salient.  And the counterinsurgency as of early 2006 was clearly not 
successful.  But the quality of security and governance operations was highly variable 
across time and geography.  And while high-profile ethno-religious political agreements 
were reached, they seem to have locked-in perceived grievances rather than settle them.  
The resulting picture is not very useful analytically. 
 Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
















Yes Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous No 
Table 5: Case Study Variable Summary for Iraq 
Accordingly, the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 provide a first step in extending 
this analytic framework to local levels.  The two cases considered are the experiences of 
the U.S. Army’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division in and around Ramadi 
from September 2004 to July 2005 and the experiences of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment in and around Tal Afar from April 2005 to February 2006.   
                                                
77 Kalyvas and Kocher, pp. 209-210, 216. 
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Of all the potential case studies to choose from, why do these two rise to the top?  
Together, six factors constitute the rationale for this selection. 
1. The choice to examine two cases rather than three or ten is driven by time constraints.  
More cases are always desirable, but trading depth for breadth would defeat the 
purpose of this analysis, so two comparative cases will suffice to shed light on the
research’s main hypothesis. 
2. A superficial examination of these two cases suggests that they share a positive value 
on the framework’s key conditional variable – the significance of ethno-religious 
cleavages – while having differing values for the dependent variable of 
counterinsurgent “success.”  Closer examination may or may not bear out these 
impressions, but this combination is analytically desirable in seeking to explain which 
of the other variables (security, governance, political agreements) may help to explain 
the differing outcomes.  Note that this choice violates a typical rule of thumb for case 
selection – avoiding selection based on the value of the dependent variable.  
However, this research does not purport to be drawing a random or representative 
sample from the full population of cases, nor will it draw deterministic conclusions 
based on the results of these case studies.  As a result, for the purposes of this 
research, the need to observe variation in the dependent variable trumps the usual 
rationales for avoiding selection on the dependent variable. 
3. There is value in comparing cases from similar time frames. 
4. There is value in comparing cases with similar insurgent threats.   
5. The time frame covered by these cases – late 2004 to early 2006 – has some 
analytically useful properties.  The Iraqi government became sovereign in Ju e 2004, 
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so this period avoids crossing over the transition of control between Coalition and 
Iraqi authority.  At the same time, this period precedes a couple of key environmental 
shifts: the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing and the 2007 “surge” of 
increased U.S. forces and changed tactics.  So during this time, the insurgency in the 
western and northern parts of Iraq was somewhat mature.  And most of the large set-
piece battles, such as those in Najaf, Sadr City, and the first assault on Fallujah were 
past, and U.S. operations had settled into a focus on counterinsurgency. 
6. Ramadi has an additional attractive property, which is that it underwent a famous 
reversal of fortunes in late 2006 and 2007 in the form of the so-called Tribal 
Awakening.  This research will not include a separate case study on this development, 
but a simple comparison between the 2004-2005 case and the subsequent dramatic 




Chapter 6: Ramadi (September 2004 – July 2005) 
 
 This chapter presents a case study of U.S. operations in and around the city of 
Ramadi from September 2004 – July 2005.  Its focus is on the operations of the U.S. 
Army’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (2/2ID) and its 
subordinate units during that time period.  Like the cases in Chapter 4, but in expanded 
form, the cases in this chapter and the next are presented in seven parts covering the 
following topics: 1) an overview of the background and major events of the case; 2) the 
role of ethnic and religious identity politics in the case; 3) counterinsurgent actions with 
respect to providing security; 4) counterinsurgent actions with respect to imprving 
governance; 5) any efforts toward political agreements that address ethno-r ligious 
cleavages; 6) an assessment of the outcome of the counterinsurgency; and 7) a 
concluding discussion and evaluation of the case in the context of this study’s questions 
and analytic framework. 
Case Background 
Ramadi and the Insurgency 
Ramadi is the capital and the largest city of Iraq’s western Anbar province.  It is 
located in the upper Euphrates river valley, situated mostly on the southern banks of the 
river, about 70 miles west of Baghdad.  In 2004, the World Food Program estimated its 
population to be 456,853,1 though the total likely declined from that level during the 
course of the violence that occurred during the time period of this case study.  Ramadi’s 
population is ethnically and religiously homogeneous, with Sunni Muslim Arabs 
comprising more than 90% of the population.   
                                                
1 Baseline Food Security Analysis in Iraq (World Food Program, September 2004), p. 78. 
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Founded in 1869, the city sits along the primary road and rail lines connecting 
Baghdad and the heart of Iraq with Jordan and points westward.  This location has long 
given Ramadi an important commercial role, in both legitimate and illicit economic 
activity, and it also became a major transit point for foreign insurgents entering Iraq to 
fight U.S. and Iraqi security forces. 
In part due to its role as a hub for international trade and transit, Ramadi has been 
a somewhat more cosmopolitan and secular city than its Anbar neighbors, such as 
Fallujah.  It is the home of Anbar University, and has been a relatively liberal center for 
intellectual and cultural life.2  Ramadi witnessed large scale demonstrations against 
Saddam Hussein in 1995, a phenomenon virtually unheard of in the Sunni Arab portions 
of Iraq. 
At the same time, however, Ramadi was also home to many Ba’ath party officials, 
and the local and provincial government hierarchies in Ramadi were closely tied to
Saddam Hussein’s regime.  The city served as the hub of Saddam’s turbulent but largely 
successful program of co-opting the support of Anbar’s tribal leaders,3 and was also 
home to the Iraqi Army’s combat engineers,4 its special forces,5 and a large number of 
active and retired senior officers.  Consequently, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s 
(CPA) Orders number 1 and 2, banishing all Ba’ath party officials from office and 
disbanding the Iraqi Army, hit Ramadi especially hard.  Formerly powerful people in 
                                                
2 Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler and Command Sergeant Major Dennis P. Bergmann, Jr., “Task Force 
Rock Operating Guidance,” undated annotated briefing, p. 8, Interview 19 (MAJ Greg Sierra). 
3 Interview 7 (Capt Sean Kuehl). 
4 Interview 29 (COL Gary Patton). 




Ramadi had both the motivation and the tactical and technical expertise to mount an 
effective military opposition to the U.S. presence. 
 
Figure 4: Ramadi and Surrounding Area6 
 The insurgency in Ramadi was multi-faceted and evolved over time, but generally 
comprised three overlapping groups.  One U.S. battalion staff described the groups this 
way, using the labels most commonly used by the local population (and written in 
inimitable Powerpoint syntax):7  
• Resistance – fighters who are resisting occupation by a foreign army;they fight U.S. 
and this is seen as an honorable endeavor; no central control of resistance groups. 
• Terrorists – foreigners who are not from Ramadi, Al Anbar, or Iraq.  There are locls
who support Islamic extremist (global Salafi jihad / Wahabbist) groups. 
                                                
6 Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler and Command Sergeant Major Dennis P. Bergmann, Jr., “Task Force 
Rock Introduction to Ar Ramadi: Its People and the En my,” undated briefing, p. 3. 
7 Gubler and Bergmann, “Task Force Rock Operating Guidance,” p. 5. 
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• Criminals – primary motivation is money, organized crime support both Terrorists 
and Resistance fighters. 
The staff also estimated that 25% of “resistance” fighters worked with the “terrorists.”  
According to a civilian analyst working in Anbar during this period who conducted 
extensive interviews with insurgency supporters, “people always distinguished between 
the foreign jihadists and the Sunni nationalists, even though they tolerated the common 
cause that had been made between them.”8  However, the relative importance of the 
“resistance” and the “terrorists” shifted over time; specifically, a Q eda in Iraq (AQI) 
and its Islamic extremist compatriots gradually evolved from being the less important 
insurgent element of the two, to being the clearly predominant one.9 
By September 2004, Ramadi was one of the hot spots of the insurgency, forming 
the southwestern corner of the so-called “Sunni Triangle” that extended to Baghdad in 
the east and Tikrit in the north.  Though Fallujah was considered the center of the 
insurgency in Anbar, Ramadi was not far behind it in operational and strategic 
significance and in the intensity of combat.  To cite just one indicator of this intensity, the 
brigade that 2/2ID replaced (the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, or 
1/1ID) suffered more than 500 casualties, including 50 fatalities, during its tour from 
September 2003 to September 2004.10  More than half of those casualties were suffered 
in just the six months prior to 2/2ID’s arrival by the Marine battalion operating under 
                                                
8 Interview 1 (Andrea Jackson). 
9 Interview 6 (Cpl Peder Ell), Interview 23 (Carter Malkasian), Interview 36 (anonymous Army officer). 
10 Seth Robson, “2nd BCT Settles Into Iraqi Home,” European Stars and Stripes, September 11, 2004. 
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1/1ID that alone had responsibility for the city of Ramadi (2nd Battalion, 4th Marine 
Regiment).11 
The Counterinsurgents 
During the period of this case study, the U.S.’s operational military headquarters 
in Iraq was known as Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).  Operations in Anbar province 
were overseen by Marine headquarters units, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) 
and 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) until March 2005, then subsequently the 2nd 
Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) and 2nd Marine Division (2 MARDIV).12   
2/2ID, somewhat unusually, was an Army brigade operating under a Marine 
division-level headquarters.  The brigade commanded 5,560 soldiers, marines, airmen, 
and sailors.  Its main combat forces were three organic infantry battalions, one attached 
Marine infantry battalion, and an artillery battalion.13 
2/2ID arrived in Ramadi at the end of August 2004 and officially took over 
responsibility for the “battlespace” known as “AO [Area of Operations] Topeka” from 
1/1ID on September 12. AO Topeka covered approximately 6,500 square kilometers of 
Ramadi and its surroundings, up to Lake Thar Thar in the north, Fallujah in the east, Hit 
in the west, and Lake Razazah in the south.14   
                                                
11 F.J. Bing West, “Iraqification, Part II,” Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2004, p. 10. 
12 First Marine Expeditionary Force, http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/div/history.asp (accessed July 26, 2009). 
13 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, After Action Review: Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06, 




Figure 5: 2/2ID Unit Insignia15  
The brigade deployed to Iraq (via Kuwait) directly from its 
home near the Korean Peninsula’s demilitarized zone, where its 
mission and training had been entirely focused on deterring and 
waging high-intensity conventional war against North Korea’s armed 
forces.  Apropos of this long-standing mission, the brigade’s 
nickname was “Strike Force” and its motto was “Kill the Enemy!” (see Figure 5). 
  Like so many other Army units deploying to Iraq in the same period, 2/2ID had to 
prepare to deploy and re-orient its training and operating mindset on short notice, having 
received its deployment orders less than three months prior to its departure from Korea.   
After 11 months in Iraq, 2/2ID was relieved in place at the end of July 2005 by 
the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, from the Pennsylvania National 
Guard.   
What Happened (September 2004 – July 2005) 
 Anbar province, after initially seeming ready to cooperate with Coalition forces 
immediately following the 2003 invasion, rapidly evolved into the main home of the 
Sunni insurgency.  In the early days, U.S. forces in Ramadi, especially the Marine Corps, 
believed in the promise of showing a friendly face to the local population as a means of 
winning its loyalty.16  As one reporter described, “Commanders worked to instill 
sympathy for the local population through sensitivity training and exhortations fr m 
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higher officers.  Marines were ordered to show friendliness through ‘wave tactics,’ 
including waving at people on the street.”17   
These attitudes proved short-lived, however, as attacks against U.S. forces quickly 
escalated in frequency and sophistication.  In one particularly well-publicized and deeply 
felt incident in April 2004, a dozen Marines were killed in a single ambush in the city.  
Naturally, this environment hardened the attitudes of many U.S. forces, even those whose 
original intent had been to do what was necessary to win the hearts and minds of Ramadi 
residents.  In the words of one Marine non-commissioned officer (NCO) who was 
deployed in Ramadi in the spring and summer of 2004, “My whole opinion of the people 
here has changed.  There aren't any good people.”18  U S. forces developed a strong sense 
that the general population was largely complicit in many insurgent attacks again t the 
U.S.  Another Marine NCO relates the story of a rocket-propelled grenade att ck on his 
platoon. 
When the Marines responded, the attacker fled, but they found that he had established a 
comfortable and obvious position to lie in wait.  There, in an alleyway beside the shops 
was a seat and ammunition for the grenade launcher--along with a pitcher of water and a 
half-eaten bowl of grapes. . . ‘You could tell the guy had been hanging out all day.  It was 
out in the open.  Every single one of the guys in the shops could tell the guy was set up to 
attack us.’19   
  
By the summer of 2004, U.S. forces were taking measures to reduce their 
disruptive effects on normal life in Ramadi, based on the premise that U.S. presence was 
an irritant and stoked some of the violence in the city.  The Marine battalion there ceased 
patrolling the city almost entirely and instead set up observation posts throughout the 
                                                





city.  But the change generated little improvement in the violence.20  Indeed, the security 
situation had deteriorated to the point that the U.S. was not confident it would be able to 
hold the planned January elections safely in the city.21   
This period also witnessed the disintegration of what semblance of governmental 
authority had remained in the city.  In August and September alone, Anbar’s governor 
resigned after his sons were kidnapped and his own life was threatened,22 th  eputy 
governor was kidnapped and murdered,23 and Ramadi’s police chief was arrested by U.S. 
forces for having begun working with the insurgency.  By late September, Anbar’s 
beleaguered acting governor, who doubled as Ramadi’s acting mayor, could only lament 
that “We do not know who the attackers are or who is backing them.  Are they backed 
from outside?  Nobody knows.”24 
This was the environment in which 2/2ID took command of Ramadi in 
September.  Commanders were determined not to let Ramadi “become another Fallujah,” 
where insurgents operated with impunity.  Accordingly, 2/2ID took an aggressive early 
approach, launching three separate brigade-level offensive operations in its first three 
weeks in command.25  These operations, according to a brigade press release, were 
                                                
20 Anne Barnard, “US Forces, Hit By Raids, Fault Their Iraqi Allies,” Boston Globe, August 1, 2004, p. 1, 
Hess, “Ramadi Posts Seen As ‘Symbol of Occupation’”. 
21 John F. Burns and Erik Eckholm, “In Western Iraq, Fundamentalists Hold U.S. at Bay,” New York Times, 
August 29, 2004, p. 1. 
22 “Highlights: Iraqi Press 2 Aug 04,” August 2, 2004, FBIS Report GMP20040802000241, “Highlights: 
Iraqi Press 29 Aug 04,” August 29, 2004, FBIS Report GMP20040829000187. 
23 Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqi City On Edge Of Chaos,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2004, p. 1. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Seth Robson, “2nd BCT Hopes to Keep Ramadi From Turning Into Another Fallujah,” Pacific Stars and 
Stripes, September 20, 2004. 
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designed to “deny anti-U.S. forces safe haven, round up suspected anti-U.S. leaders and 
exploit weapons caches used against legitimate forces in the area.”26  The tactics 
employed were mainly large-scale cordon-and-search operations. 
 These operations produced some results in terms of detained suspects and 
confiscated weapons, and yet seemed to have little effect on the level or int nsity of 
attacks against U.S. forces.  On a day-to-day basis, U.S. forces in Ramadi had their hands 
full simply securing the city’s main east-west road, known to the U.S. as RouteMichigan, 
and maintaining safe resupply of their own bases.27   
By late October, 2/2ID had already suffered 12 soldiers killed in action,28 a d the 
leader of Anbar’s dominant Dulaym tribe declared that “the city is chaotic.  There’s no 
presence of the Allawi [federal] government.”  A Marine civil affairs NCO said: “We hit 
the deck one and a half months ago, and the area has changed for the downhill very 
quickly.”29 
 In the face of this deteriorating situation, 2/2ID commander Colonel Gary Patton, 
decided to realign his forces.  Up until that point, only one of the brigade’s four attached 
infantry battalions, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (2/5 Marines) was based 
inside Ramadi.  The other battalions were based in the areas immediately surrounding the 
city, including two full battalions in Ramadi’s eastern suburbs.  With approval from the 
                                                
26 Seth Robson, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Roundup Has Yielded 75 Suspect in Iraq,” Pacific Stars and 
Stripes, October 8, 2004. 
27 Interview 27 (Capt Eric Dougherty), Interview 29 (COL Gary Patton). 
28 Joseph Giordono, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Soldiers Round Up Suspected Insurgents in Iraq,” Pacific 
Stars and Stripes, October 24, 2004. 
29 Edward Wong, “Provincial Capital Near Falluja Is Rapidly Slipping Into Chaos,” New York Times, 
October 28, 2004, p. 1. 
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divisional headquarters, Patton moved one of those two battalions, 1st Battalion, 503rd 
Infantry (1/503rd), from the east into the city, effectively doubling the number of U.S. 
combat forces inside Ramadi.   
 Before the increased troop levels could show much of an effect on security in 
Ramadi, however, operations in the city were overshadowed by the preparation and 
execution of the Coalition’s major November assault on nearby Fallujah.  Ramadi saw an 
uptick in attacks as insurgents pulling back from Fallujah sought refuge or transit here.  
U.S. operations focused on shielding the city from these collateral effects, with only 
partial success.  An Al Jazirah reporter described the situation in Ramadi on November 
17 this way:   
U.S. forces closed off the city’s main entrances, preventing anyone from entering or 
departing the city.  Life inside the city has complete y stopped, and shops are closed.  For 
several weeks now, students have not gone to schools and colleges.  Electricity has been 
out for eight days.  The U.S. forces entered the city from the western side trying to reach 
the eastern neighborhoods; they, however, were confronted by the fierce resistance of 
gunmen.  Eyewitnesses said that fires blazed in several parts of the city due to the 
shootout, and warplanes are flying over.30 
 
 In the aftermath of the so-called “second battle of Fallujah,” security conditions 
actually improved in Ramadi, and in December and January, the city began to show some 
signs of a return to normal life.  By this time, the focus of U.S. operations had shifted to 
ensuring the relatively peaceful implementation of national elections at theend of 
January 2005.  Much had been staked strategically on the elections as evidence of Iraq’s 
democratic transition, and the participation of Anbar province’s Sunni Arab population 
seemed particularly important.  "From a symbolic and a political standpoint, conducting a 
                                                
30 “Al Jazirah Interviews Journalist on Situation in Al-Ramadi,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, 
November 17, 2004, FBIS Report GMP20041117000050. 
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successful election in Ramadi, the provincial capital, is critical," remarked Brigadier 
General Joseph Dunford, the assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division.31   
Ultimately, election day in Ramadi produced both good and bad news for the U.S.  
No major attacks occurred, which was both a surprise and a major victory for the security 
forces in the city.  Turnout, however, was extremely paltry.  Province-wide, turnout was 
only 2%, and early unofficial figures in Ramadi showed that only 1,700 of the city’s 
400,000 residents voted.32  Intimidation by insurgents was a major factor in the low 
turnout, as was grave suspicion of the legitimacy and reliability of the process.  Even the 
Ramadi director of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq resigned, togther with 
his staff, a few days before the elections due to death threats.33 
In the wake of the elections, the U.S. launched a new offensive throughout the 
upper Euphrates river valley, known as Operation River Blitz.  In Ramadi, this effort was 
marked by the establishment of checkpoints at the main entrances to the city, as well as a 
curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.34  The checkpoints helped to limit insurgents’ freedom of 
movement,35 though they were also manpower intensive36 and drew some complaints 
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from local residents for impeding commerce and daily life.37  By April, 2/2ID was 
claiming some success for these measures, crediting them with “a drastic ecline in the 
amount of insurgent activity.”38   
The late winter and spring of 2005 also saw a growing role for Iraqi security 
forces in Ramadi.  Up to this point, those efforts to shift responsibility for security to 
local forces had been almost entirely fruitless.  The local police force mostly 
disintegrated in the fall, the Iraqi Army was not present, and a unit of the Iraqi National 
Guard, recruited largely from the local population, had been disbanded in November due 
to its being completely ineffectual and compromised by the insurgents.  But by the
spring, some Iraqi Army units had deployed to Ramadi.  In most cases, these units were a 
double-edged sword in terms of working with the local population.  Most of the Army 
units were majority Shi’a Arab.  Most of the soldiers were not happy to be in Anbar, and 
many Ramadi residents resented their presence, even interpreting it as a validation of 
their suspicions about American complicity in a Shi’a takeover of Iraq.  These conc rns 
were exacerbated further with the appointment in 2005 of Bayan Jabr Sulagh as the 
Minister of the Interior.  Jabr was widely thought to be affiliated with the sectarian Badr 
Corps militia and soon gained a reputation for using elements of the national police to 
conduct ethnic cleansing.39  
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On the other hand, many of the Iraqi Army units, especially over time, proved 
capable of professionalism and avoidance of overtly sectarian behavior.40  And their 
effectiveness in understanding the local environment, developing intelligence, and 
identifying insurgents was naturally far superior to that of the Americans.41  
 Importantly, the early months of 2005 also brought the first signs of an emerging 
rift between Ramadi’s tribal leaders and the Islamist insurgents operating in he area, 
especially AQI.  Some of the earliest evidence of a split came in the execution of seven 
foreign AQI members in retaliation for the assassination of a Dulaimi clan leader and 
Iraqi National Guard commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sulaiman Ahmed Dulaimi.42  This 
was near the same time that reports surfaced of U.S. military officials as well as the Iraqi 
Defense Minister holding secret meetings with elements of the insurgency.43  Unnamed 
sources told Al Jazirah that as a result of some of these meetings, “a military unit will be 
formed in the city of Al-Ramadi to preserve security.  The unit will consist of former 
Iraqi army personnel and commanders and will not take orders from the U.S. forces or 
the Iraqi Defense Ministry . . .”44  At the same time, U.S. forces in the far western deserts 
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of Anbar had just begun working with the Albu Mahal Desert Protectors, a tribally-based 
militia formed to combat AQI.45 
Notwithstanding these developments, however, the U.S. faced a major obstacle in 
attempting to exploit the emerging hostility between groups of erstwhile insurgent allies – 
namely, its own policy.  As a rule, the U.S. remained extremely leery of creating local 
militias with no formal ties to the Iraqi government.  After all, this was essentially the 
model that was attempted in handing off authority to the “Fallujah Brigade” in April 
2004, an experiment generally viewed inside and outside the Coalition as a disastrous 
failure.46  Instead, the U.S. was still hoping to marry up the local legitimacy enjoyed by 
Anbar’s tribal leaders with the formal institutions of the Iraqi government, in particular 
the Iraqi Army.  Bing West, a writer, former Marine, and former Pentagon official who 
spent many months in Anbar province during this period provides a stark illustration of 
this policy in action: 
The sheikhs offered a deal in March of 2005.  They wanted arms and ammunition, plus 
vehicles.  They would protect their turfs with a tribal force of roughly 5,000 men.  They 
would agree to boundaries and point out the takfiris [Islamic extremists].  That would 
stop the IED attacks along the main roads.  [Assistant commander of 1 MARDIV, 
Brigadier General Joseph] Dunford refused.  You have n elected national government, 
he said, with a new army.  Send your tribal sons to [the Army training center in] Taji. . . 
Asked if he could promise they would return to their tribal areas, Dunford said no.  There 
was an elected government and no need for another militia.  The days of the tribes were 
over.47   
 
Dunford went on to explain, “In the spring of 2005, I met with dozens of sheikhs.  They 
were shaken up by what we had done in Fallujah.  They said they’d fight on our side, but 
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refused to go through the government in Baghdad.  In 2005, we weren’t willing to accept 
that deal.”48 
 In part because of this gap between the tribes and the U.S., relationships between 
U.S. forces and the local population in Ramadi continued to develop slowly.  2/2ID did 
begin to make progress in identifying some local leaders in and around the city who were 
willing to work with them in trying to re-establish governance in the city, and the U.S.’s 
local intelligence networks slowly expanded.49  At the same time, though, the local 
population continued to bristle at the restrictions imposed by U.S. forces.  And AQI 
attacks and intimidation continued to undermine efforts to stabilize the city.  In May, the 
new Anbar governor was kidnapped in Ramadi and found dead a few weeks later.50 AQI 
also aggressively targeted the growing number of sheikhs who appeared willing to 
challenge its strong influence.  A new city council was just being stood up as 2/2ID 
prepared to depart the country in July 2005. 
 Unclassified statistics on overall attack trends in Ramadi during this period are 
not yet available.  Anecdotal evidence is mixed, with some participants identifying 
reduced violence between the beginning and the end of 2/2ID’s tour and some identifying 
roughly similar levels at the beginning and end of the period.  Estimates of casualties 
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suffered by 2-2ID and its subordinate units range from 68 to 98 killed in action with 
approximately 700 more wounded.51 
 What does seem clear, however, is a sharp deterioration in security in Ramadi 
subsequent to 2/2ID’s departure. A few journalistic accounts chart the city’s downward 
spiral.  From August 2005:  
Insurgents in Anbar province, the center of guerrilla esistance in Iraq, are fighting the 
U.S. military to a standstill.  After repeated major offensives in Fallujah and Ramadi, . . . 
many U.S. officers and enlisted men have stopped talking about winning a military 
victory in Iraq's Sunni Muslim heartland. . . Today, the street [in Ramadi] is pocked with 
holes left by bombs intended for U.S. convoys, storefr nts are ripped by shrapnel, bullet 
holes tattoo walls, buildings have been blown to rubble by U.S. missile strikes and 
insurgent mortar volleys, and roofs are caved in by U.S. bombing. At the main U.S. base 
in Ramadi, artillery booms every night, sending more shells to pound insurgent positions 
in and around the city.52 
 
From October 2005:  
[In Ramadi,] Sunni Arab insurgents are waging their fi rcest war against American 
troops, attacking with relative impunity just blocks from Marine-controlled territory. 
Every day, the Americans fight to hold their turf in a war against an enemy who seems to 
be everywhere but is not often seen.  The cost has been high: in the last six weeks, 21 
Americans have been killed here, far more than in any other city in Iraq and double the 
number of deaths in Baghdad, a city with a population 15 times as large. . . more than two 
years after the American invasion, this city of 400,000 people is just barely within 
American control. The deputy governor of Anbar was shot to death on Tuesday; the day 
before, the governor's car was fired on. There is no police force. A Baghdad cellphone 
company has refused to put up towers here. American bases are regularly pelted with 
rockets and mortar shells, and when troops here get out of their vehicles to patrol, they 
are almost always running.53 
 
From December 2005:  
It is clear that the U.S. forces are not present inside the city . . . there are no Iraqi forces 
either.  Gunmen have assumed full control of the city.  There is intensive shelling of the 
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governorate building, the citizenship affairs building, which the U.S. forces use as their 
headquarters, and the main headquarters west of thecity . . .54 
 
It was only in late 2006 that Ramadi became the focal point of the Tribal Awakening that 
transformed the counterinsurgency in Anbar. 
Were ethno-religious identity-based cleavages significant? 
 Having experienced many generations in power, Iraq’s Sunni Arab community 
has come to view political power as an important element of its identity.  As one recent
study of Anbar’s tribes reported,  
The modern Sunni Arabs of Iraq take a great deal of pride in their religious and political 
history.  They tend to regard themselves as the descendents and heirs to a long history of 
intellectual development, wealth, and political rule over the massive Islamic empire.  
They regard other ethnic and religious groups through t the history of Iraq as less 
worthy of political power and influence.55 
 
One commonly noted manifestation of this sense of political identity is that so many 
Sunni Arab Iraqis dispute the generally accepted population estimates that show Shi’a 
Arabs with a clear majority of Iraq’s population.  This view is not limited to the poor and 
uneducated, but is shared by many Sunnis who are wealthy, educated, well-traveled, and 
even pro-Western.56 
Given this context, it is difficult to overstate the sense of disenfranchisement felt 
by many Sunni Arabs following the U.S. invasion in 2003.  Even Sunni opponents of 
Saddam Hussein who welcomed the invasion and the change of regime were extremely 
upset by the influence granted to Shi’a exiles – pro-Western and pro-Iranian alike – in the 
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Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and subsequently the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).57  
Beyond the chagrin of coming up short in the division of spoils, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs found 
the new political arrangement to be unnatural and a transgression of cultural norms.  As 
noted in Chapter 5, a Sunni tribal leader captured this feeling well in his assertion that, 
Shi’a “cannot take charge of Iraq in the same manner as the Sunnis.  The [Shi’a] are 
backwards.  They are barbarian savages, they do not know true religion, theirs is twisted, 
it is not the true religion of Muhammad.”58 
In Ramadi, this sense of sectarian disenfranchisement was not the only driver of 
the insurgency, of course, but it was clearly one of the most important factors.  While 
Ramadi, itself, is very homogeneous, one of its people’s primary grievances was a view 
of the new Iraqi federal government as a sectarian Shi’a force, with the Iraqi Army and 
the Coalition serving as agents of that sectarian force.  As a home to many Ba’ thists and 
military officers, Ramadi in particular struggled to come to terms with the idea of an Iraq 
where its influence was weak.   
The prominent counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, who was a brigade 
operations officer in AO Topeka during 2003-2004, just prior to 2/2ID’s deployment 
recalled: 
As the task force proceeded through its year in Al Anbar, we came to realize that a very 
high percentage of the population – almost exclusively Sunni in our AO – did support the 
objectives of the insurgency, which was a restoratin of Sunni ascendancy over the Shi’a.  
The Sunnis saw the American occupation as propping up the Shi’a and therefore targeted 
us.  We couldn’t win this fight at the local level.  Success demanded national-level 
reconciliation between the Sunnis and the Shi’a . . .59 
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And according to Lieutenant Colonel Justin Gubler, battalion commander of the 1/503rd 
Infantry, 
Ramadi residents’ biggest fear was being repressed and abused by the Shi’a government, 
and that was the biggest obstacle toward their working with us.  We heard that from the 
sheikhs and from professionals and from former military officers.  We were the ones that 
installed the Shi’a government, which they knew would mistreat them the way the Ba’ath 
party mistreated the Shi’a.60   
 
Gubler’s executive officer, Major Greg Sierra, said simply, “the Sunnis just weren’t 
ready to play in the new Iraq – they hadn’t accepted that things were going to be 
different.”61 
One especially commonly cited Sunni complaint was a belief that Iraq was being 
handed over to Iran.  Just prior to the national elections in January 2005, the 1st Marine 
Division’s commander, Major General Richard Natonski, was touring polling stations.  A 
group of Iraqi men gathered to describe their views to the general.  One man told him 
“the election will only create a Shiite Muslim-dominated government in Baghdad that 
will ignore Sunni Muslim cities like Ramadi.”62  On election day, a professor told an 
American reporter that he was boycotting the election because he believed that it would 
be manipulated by pro-Iranian Shiite politicians.  “Iraq will become part of Iran after this.  
I want no part of it.”63  Another Ramadi resident pleaded with a Marine intelligence 
officer at one point, “don’t leave us with this Iranian army.”64  Shortly after the elections, 
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insurgent leaders told U.S. representatives in secret meetings that they saw the Shi’a-
dominated government as being controlled by Iran and that their “aim was to establish a 
political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis.”65 
It is telling that Ramadi remained among the most obstinate of the Sunni-
dominated areas in coming to terms with participation in the national government.  In the 
fall of 2005, the U.S. headquarters in Baghdad was claiming progress in bringing Sunnis 
into the political process.  They cited public opinion survey results from June 2005 
showing that majorities of Sunnis in most areas, including approximately 80% of Sunnis 
in Baghdad, believed that boycotting the January elections had been a “bad idea.”  But in 
Ramadi, only 40% believed the boycott had been a bad idea, while 46% still described 
the boycott as a “good idea.”66 
Other evidence of significant sectarian cleavages can be found in the reactions of 
Ramadi residents in the first half of 2005 to the increased deployment of largely Shi’a 
security forces to the area.  One Shi’a Iraqi soldier in Ramadi commented, “Of course 
they don't like us.  They don't like people from the south, so when we search them, they 
make faces at us.”  Another called Ramadi hostile territory, complaining that "it is a 
problem that we are Shiite.  [The local people] think we are all spies."  Naturally, 
insurgents exploited these tensions to maximum effect, distributing literatur  nd graffiti 
referring to the Shi’a Army units as “rapists,” “Jews” and “dogs of the Americans.”67 
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 For all the importance of sectarian Sunni identity in Ramadi, it is important to 
note that the salience of this identity was to some degree eclipsed by tribal identities.  
These identities overlapped heavily due to the city’s homogeneity, but political 
identification and loyalties in Ramadi did tend to adhere more to tribal hierarchies than to 
religious ones, per se.  As one intelligence officer described it, “the tribal identity 
trumped everything.  It gives the leaders legitimacy.”68  The strength of tribal identities 
and loyalties tended to be more pronounced in the surrounding areas than in the city, 
itself, where tribes were intermixed.69 
 It is also important to note the weakness of Iraqi national identity that migh
otherwise have mitigated some of the divisive effects of strong tribal and sectarian 
identification.  Several interviewees noted the absence of any Iraqi nationalism in 
Ramadi, except of the sort tied to Saddam Hussein’s regime.  For example, Colonel 
David Clark, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (1/506th), 
commented that “The Iraqis that we knew and worked with were three or four things 
before they were Iraqis – clan, tribe, religion, all before they were Iraqis.  Those interests 
came first, all above the national interest.”70   
In sum, it is clear that despite the absence of much sectarian violence in Ramadi, 
conflict between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a Arabs was quite central to the origins and 
evolution of the insurgency there.  
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Were good security operations conducted? 
 Evaluating the quality of U.S. security operations during this period is not simple.  
The record is mixed and complex.  Several interviewees felt that a “conventional” 
mindset prevailed in the brigade for too long.  This mindset manifested itself in 2/2ID’s 
planning and operations in an emphasis on targeting of insurgents rather than population 
security.  “We were too kinetic, too focused on offensive operations,” said one officer.  
“There was a tendency toward focusing on raids, killing and capturing bad guys, etc.”71  
A reporter embedded with the brigade commented that “U.S. forces were still in Cold 
War mode – they were all about fighting and killing. . . there were a lot of raids, 
detentions and the like that alienated the populace.”72   
 This view, though not universal among the interviewees, was held up and down 
the chain of command.  Marine Corporal Peder Ell did not see great value in large 
offensive sweep operations, saying, “we’d pick up bad guys and disrupt their operations, 
but it only worked for a while.  They would just come back in after the operation had 
ended.”73  Colonel Patton, the brigade commander, agreed:  “We did a lot of those 
brigade-level and battalion-level ops and it never got us much of anything important.  
They were fruitless, and they pissed people off.”74  Besides alienating the local 
population, operations that involved raiding a lot of houses, arresting a lot of people, and 
taking away people’s guns, also served to confirm some Anbaris’ suspicions that the U.S. 
                                                
71 Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer). 
72 Interview 4 (Seth Robson). 
73 Interview 6 (Cpl Peder Ell). 
74 Interview 29 (COL Gary Patton). 
201 
 
was making war on the whole community of Sunnis on behalf of the sectarian federal
government.75 
 According to 2/2ID’s artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel John 
Fant, “It took us a long time to understand that this was not a brigade fight, it was a 
platoon and squad fight.  I think our conventional training clouded our approach to the 
problem. . . The brigade’s role should be political and resource provision. . .”76  Yet these 
brigade roles were not consistently pursued.  Another officer summarized the probl m 
this way: 
What I ranked as important were developing governance and developing the Iraqi police 
and military.  If you just looked at our resource allocation, though, you might assume that 
the main priority was killing bad guys.  There was a lot of variation across different 
operating units and staff in terms of their relative focus on governance vs. kinetic 
operations.  I don’t think we ever had a common picture across the AO of the center of 
gravity, whether it was the population or the enemy.77   
 
Two other officers interviewed questioned the brigade leadership’s appreciation for the 
importance of cultivating relationships with local leaders.  One recalled an incident early 
in the brigade’s deployment in which Colonel Patton cancelled consecutive meetings 
with a local leader who had had a relationship with the previous brigade commander, and 
then sent a lieutenant colonel to meet with him.  In a culture that places a high value on 
seniority and respect, this officer believed, this approach “was an affront to [the leader] 
that set the tone for the whole time we were there.”  Like other interviewees, h  attributed 
such mistakes in part to a “conventional mindset.”78  Another interviewee believed that 
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the brigade commander “did not embrace his role as the person to lead engagement with 
the local leaders” until the latter half of the brigade’s deployment.79   
 On the other hand, the brigade’s focus on conventional combat operations was at 
least partly a result of the level of threat it faced nearly immediately upon its arrival in 
Ramadi.  The fall of 2004 was “brutal, just really violent,” said one officer.80  In the 
words of Colonel Clark, the 1/506th commander, “We were up to our eyeballs fighting 
those guys, so we weren’t able to concentrate on the political and social and economic 
aspects.”81  In this environment, traditional counterinsurgency approaches had difficulty 
taking root.  Another officer offered this example: 
In the fall, we planned to set up a ‘place of hope’ in one neighborhood, where we were 
going to try to concentrate some security and reconstruction efforts.  It was essentially an 
ink spot approach, classic clear, hold, and build.  We wrote the plan, but then as we were 
getting ready to execute the plan, one of our battalions got engaged in pretty heavy 
fighting and the decision got made that we’re not goin  to implement the ‘place of hope’.  
And I felt like this was a turning point when we turned away from the idea of focusing on 
securing the population.82 
 
The serious challenges posed by the high threat level led some interviewees to r j ct the 
charge that the brigade had been “too kinetic.”83 
 Another major limitation 2/2ID faced in establishing security for Ramadi’s 
population was its relatively small number of troops.  AO Topeka had over half a million 
people, and 2/2ID totaled only around 5,500 personnel.  And, as with any modern 
military unit, a substantial number of those personnel were engaged in support functions 
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and were not combat troops.  Colonel Patton estimated that even after he moved an 
additional battalion into the city – a choice he called one of the best decisions he made 
during the deployment – there were only about 1,800 U.S. combat forces in Ramadi 
proper.84  This means the U.S. had approximately one soldier in the city for every 222 
residents, a ratio more than four times smaller than the ratio the 2006 counterinsurgency 
field manual identifies as a “minimum force density” for effective counteri su gency.85  
Representative of the many comments from interviewees on the subject of troop numbers 
is this assessment from a 2/5 Marines company commander, Captain Eric Dougherty:   
The biggest problem was that we were so undermanned, that we couldn’t give the people 
confidence that we’d be around.  As soon as you’re gone, the people could count on the 
insurgents to show up and intimidate them or punish them in retribution for their 
cooperation with the Coalition.  That puts the population in a precarious position – they 
were waiting to see who would win before they picked a side.86 
 
The natural solution to the problem of inadequate forces is augmentation with 
indigenous forces.  And, indeed, the development of Iraqi security forces was a key 
component of 2/2ID’s operations.  However, this proved to be problematic on two related 
levels.  First, for most or all of 2/2ID’s tenure in Ramadi, Iraqi security forces there were 
totally inadequate to the task of providing security.  In the first half of the brigade’s 
deployment, Iraqi security forces were virtually non-existent.  The police force was 
heavily infiltrated, unreliable, ill-equipped, and eventually quit en masse.87  A local Iraqi 
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National Guard brigade was entirely ineffective, partly due to a lack of training, but also 
due to systematic insurgents’ intimidation of Guard soldiers’ families.  U.S. forces 
disbanded the brigade altogether in the fall of 2004.88  There was some improvement over 
time, especially among Iraqi Army units deployed to Ramadi from other parts of Iraq 
during the spring of 2005.89  But these units remained a weak supplement to the U.S. 
combat forces in the area. 
 The second related problem was that Coalition policy at the strategic level 
emphasized the importance of transition of authority and control to Iraqi forces, not 
population security.  In the words of the Corps commander who took charge at MNC-I in 
January 2005, Lieutenant General John Vines, the goal was “rapid progress in training
and preparing Iraqis to assume responsibility for security in every province.”90  Thus any 
U.S. officers advocating a greater focus on population security had not only the 
inadequacy of available resources to contend with, but also a policy that pointed in the 
opposite direction. 
 Perhaps inevitably in this environment, the approaches employed by U.S. forces 
in Ramadi varied by subordinate unit and in general improved over time.  Brigade-level 
sweeps were eventually replaced by more small-unit patrolling, and the establishment of 
checkpoints, which provided a modicum of consistent presence in at least a few locations 
in the city.91  This enabled units to improve their ability to collect intelligence and to 
build relationships with the local population to some degree.  Even these adaptations 
                                                
88 Interview 13 (COL David Clark). 
89 Interview 3 (anonymous Army officer). 
90 West, The Strongest Tribe, p. 71. 
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205 
 
were hamstrung, though, by the limited numbers of troops available.  And it was only 
near the very end of 2/2ID’s deployment that units began to refocus their intelligece 
collection efforts away from targeting and toward understanding the socio-p litical 
dynamics of the local population.92 
 Overall, this record returns a somewhat ambiguous answer to the question, “were 
good security operations conducted?”  From a strategic perspective, even allowing for 
variation and improvement over time described above, the variety of problems outlined 
here point to an answer closer to ‘no’ than ‘yes,’ but a qualified answer in any case.   
Was good governance provided? 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of Ramadi during this period was the 
thoroughgoing dysfunction of the government.  Leaders of the provincial and local 
government and of the police were routinely targeted by insurgents for intimidation and 
assassination.  Those who chose to continue to serve in the face of threats against them 
were often killed.  Mayors, provincial governors, and police chiefs in Ramadi tended to 
have short tenures in office that ended in death, resignation, or arrest for participation in 
the insurgency.   
Hence governance of any sort, good or otherwise, was a scarce commodity in 
Ramadi during 2004-2005.  Most interviewees stressed the severe limitations on 
reconstruction efforts that prevailed due to the violence and intimidation.  Reconstruction 
projects were regularly attacked, and Iraqis who were seen or suspected of working ith 
the U.S. or taking funding from them were threatened and murdered.93  One interviewee, 
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93 Interview 4 (Seth Robson), Interview 6 (Cpl Peder Ell), Interview 27 (Capt Eric Dougherty). 
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who did not want this story attributed, related the following illustration of the severity of 
this problem: 
One time, we detained a guy for two weeks, just so he could then go back out into the 
city and profess to have a major grievance against the U.S. as a cover for taking U.S. 
money and starting a sewer renovation project.  That’s ow reluctant people were to be 
seen to take American money. 
 
This dynamic was particularly damaging because it subverted not only U.S. 
reconstruction efforts and attempts to improve governance, but also efforts to provide 
jobs for Ramadi’s thousands of unemployed military-age males.  Interviewees differed on 
the extent to which unemployment was a cause of the insurgency, but there is no question 
that it facilitated recruitment for the insurgents.94 
Even when U.S.-sponsored projects went forward, they were inevitably more 
complicated and costly than planned.  Bing West reports a good illustration of these 
difficulties:   
One contractor had bid $70,000 to fill a dozen potholes.  [A U.S. Civil Affairs officer] 
estimated that the work should cost $5,000.  The contractor protested that he had to buy 
his own cement trucks.  No one would rent a truck to go to Ramadi.  He had to hire 
guards who insisted on driving their own vehicles.  He paid local officials for ‘licenses’ 
and paid the sheikh who owned the street.  The insurgents demanded their cut.  His work 
crew refused to stay overnight in the city, choosing a four-hour round-trip from Baghdad 
that cut the actual workday to three hours.  Hence, $70 000 for a $5,000 job.95 
 
Insurgents also occasionally targeted civilian infrastructure, further sugge ting a 
deliberate attempt to make the city ungovernable.  For example, just in 2/2ID’s first 
month in Ramadi, insurgents blew up an agricultural center and the Red Crescent office, 
and then blamed the attacks on U.S. forces.96  Another obstacle to improving governance 
                                                
94 John Hendren, “U.S. Troops Still Dying In Ramadi Amid ‘Relative Peace, Tranquility’,” Los Angeles 
Times, December 1, 2004, Interview 35 (LTC John Fant). 
95 West, The Strongest Tribe, p. 97. 
96 “US Military Says ‘Insurgents’ Blew Up Red Crescent Offices in Al-Ramadi,” Agent France Press, 
October 8, 2004, FBIS Report EUP20041008000429. 
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was corruption and a certain lack of civic culture.  Colonel David Clark offered one of 
many examples:  
We spent a lot of money getting the water purification system rebuilt and operational, and 
we got that all set up – should have been a tremendous victory for the people.  But before 
long, it shut down, why?  Because the guards were st aling the gasoline for the engine 
and selling it on the black market.  And all the peo l  along the line were tapping into it 
and contaminated it.97   
 
This general problem was recognized from the lowest to the highest levels of the 
ranks.  U.S. Central Command chief, General John Abizaid, told reporters in May 2005, 
“There are areas where there is relatively little reconstruction becaus  of insurgent 
activity. You go out to Al Anbar province, for example. It's pretty grim out there in trms 
of what has been done versus what could be done.”98 
Shortcomings in the U.S.’s own capacity and planning also hampered 
governance-related initiatives.  One Marine officer complained that  
there was very little done in the way of working with the government. . . I never felt that 
there was a State Department presence or a [provincial re onstruction team]. . . We had a 
civil affairs reservist in our battalion – his job was to coordinate the civil reconstruction 
efforts – it was totally ineffective, we couldn’t get anything done because there was no 
supporting bureaucracy and no unified vision.99   
 
The training of the brigade’s staff and leadership was also quite limited regarding 
execution of infrastructure and civil planning projects.100 
In spite of all these difficulties, there were some governance improvements 
pursued and some success seen, mostly on a relatively small scale.  2/2ID ran a number 
of missions aimed at rebuilding infrastructure and providing humanitarian aid to the
                                                
97 Interview 13 (COL David Clark). 
98 Mark Mazzetti and Solomon Moore, “Insurgents Flourish In Iraq’s Wild West,” Los Angeles Times, May 
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city’s residents.101  Projects included building medical clinics, soccer fields, refurbishing 
schools and Anbar University, expanding police stations, and restoring a badly damaged 
mosque.102  A Marine company commander recalls an attempt to set up a ‘model city’ in 
their area.   
We never quite got there.  But the idea was, how do e get to the future of Ramadi, so 
we envisioned a model city where everything was working the way it should be, with 
sanitation, education, security. . . And we were also able to run some humanitarian aid . . 
. on the western side of the city.  The local peopl in those areas loved it.  They 
appreciated the help.103 
   
Of the projects that were pursued, improving electrical power generation and 
distribution was prominent, and some slow progress was made in this area.  Anbar 
province was receiving less than eight hours per day of electric power as of May2004, 
which was down from its pre-war standards of 9-15 hours per day.104  By March 2006, 
Anbar had gone up to 12-16 hours per day.105 
One measure of the U.S.’s level of activity in attempting to improve the quality of 
life in Ramadi can be found in the records of the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP).  This program provides money that brigade commanders and their 
subordinate commanders can use at their discretion to meet local needs in their areas of
operation.  CERP spending typically, though not exclusively, goes to relatively sma l,
relatively short-term projects, and is also used to pay reparations for property damaged in 
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104 United States General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential 
Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R, June 2004), p. 90. 




combat or to family members of killed and wounded civilians.  In Ramadi, estimated 
CERP spending increased significantly over the months of this case study (see Figur  6).  
Estimated spending by quarter rose from $1.1M (Aug-Oct) to $2.0M (Nov-Jan) to $2.1M 
(Feb-Apr) to $2.4M (May-Jul).106  This represents an increase from beginning to end of a 
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Figure 6: Estimated Monthly CERP Spending in Ramadi 
Some commanders in Iraq claim to have noted a pattern of declining violence in 
the wake of CERP spending, including Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, the MNC-I 
                                                
106 Iraqi Reconstruction Management System, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 
Division, June 2008.  Available data on CERP spending totals include total funds distributed and project 
start dates and end dates.  The author has estimated onthly and quarterly spending totals based on equal 
division of total funds spent over the number of active months per project.  Project lengths in the datab se 
range from 1 to 40 months, but the average length is 4 months.  As a result, aggregate quarterly spending 
summaries (as reported in the text above) are less likely to be distorted by this estimation technique than 
the monthly spending estimates (as shown in the figure). 
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commander during 2006, and Colonel John Charlton, who commanded U.S. forces in the 
Ramadi area during 2007.107  Charlton, who spent $87 million in CERP funds during 15 
months in his area of operations, claimed that “We did more to win counterinsurgency 
with our CERP dollars than we did with our weapons.”108  However, there is reason to 
question the causal link between CERP spending and violence. 
In the first multivariate statistical analysis conducted on district-level Iraq data,109 
Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro and Joseph Felter found no significant relationship at all 
between CERP spending and insurgent violence through 2006.  They do find some 
correlation between the two starting in 2007, so their work perhaps qualifies Carlton’s 
statement rather than contradicts it.  This analysis will be addressed further in Chapter 8, 
but it does serve here to cast doubt on the often-asserted efficacy of reconstruction 
spending. 
One specific example that suggests a complicated causal relationship between 
spending and security is one of Charlton’s own reconstruction success stories, a glas  and 
ceramics factory that Charlton’s forces invested heavily in and got up and running i  
Ramadi in 2007.  CERP was clearly not the decisive factor in this success story, because 
the U.S. spent over half a million dollars in CERP funds across 11 different contracts on 
                                                
107 Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “Money as a Weapon,” Washington Post, August 11, 2008 (see both 
article and the transcript of the online discussion: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2008/08/10/DI2008081001774.html?sid=ST2008081002653&s_pos=list) (accessed 
July 26, 2009). 
108 Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “In Ramadi, a Counterinsurgency in Cash,” Washington Post, August 
11, 2008. 
109 Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics 
of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” NBER Working Paper 14606 (December 2008). 
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that same glass factory during 2005 without it ever opening.110  Only after Anbar’s Tribal 
Awakening began in the fall of 2006 did the spending begin to have its intended effect. 
Charlton’s comments, themselves, also reveal a certain degree of ambivalence 
about the direction of causation with regard to CERP spending and changes in violence 
levels.  On the one hand, he asserted that “. . . the results [of CERP] were clearly evident 
on the ground.  Attacks in my area went from 30-35 per day down to essentially zero.”  
But he also argues that “The key to any type of reconstruction or stabilization project is to 
establish a secure environment first. . . Once we had [that], we were then able to work
with the Iraqis to rebuild.”111 
This kind confusion is familiar, and reflects one of counterinsurgency’s classic 
recurring dilemmas that has been discussed in earlier chapters – that security is a pre-
requisite for good governance while good governance is a pre-requisite for security.  For 
some interviewees, this dilemma resonated with their experience in Ramadi. 
On the other hand, other interviewees questioned whether this dilemma was, in 
fact, at work in Ramadi.  Without exception, they believed in the dependency of good 
governance on some threshold level of security.  But some doubted the necessary causal 
link in the opposite direction, suggesting that Ramadi residents’ attitude toward U.S. 
forces and the local government was far more linked to security than to any other aspect 
of governance.  In fact, some interviewees reported indifference among the population 
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about demonstrations of good governance – the people were far more interested in 
reliable security.112  2/2ID’s commander commented that  
Security was first and foremost what people wanted.  That was the feedback we always 
got. . . We gave the hospital medical supplies, conducted road repair, installed trash 
receptacles.  But basically, this stuff couldn’t take root while we were there – it didn’t do 
any good coming from us – it had to come from the government.  So for us, these things 
didn’t end up making critical contributions to the fight.113 
 
This observation came not only from U.S. forces, but also from local leaders.  For 
example, the acting governor of Anbar and mayor of Ramadi in October complained, 
“The marines are not protecting us.  It’s true that they’ve helped us with some pr jects 
such as improving the water supply and sewage disposal and rebuilding schools.  But 
people think all that is worthless.  They need security.”114 
Moreover, even measures that were having some positive effects on security were 
viewed with hostility by some of the local population.  In May 2005, some Ramadi 
residents staged a “sit-in” to highlight their grievances against U.S. forces.  According to 
Al-Sharqiyah television news, Ramadi “looked completely empty and paralyzed this 
morning with the start of a two-day sit-in in protest against the US forces' practices 
against its residents.”  Protesters “called for ending the siege imposed on the city for two 
months, the departure of the U.S. forces from the city, the release of prisoners, stopping 
the acts of harassment against the residents of Al-Ramadi, putting an end to raid 
operations against citizens' houses, and stopping indiscriminate shooting.”115  Whatever 
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the validity of those particular complaints, it was clear that the U.S. had a very high bar to 
clear in establishing any modicum of legitimacy for its governance activities in the city. 
Overall, it appears that good governance generally remained beyond the reach of 
the counterinsurgents in Ramadi during this time period.  
Were political agreements addressing ethno-religious cleavages pursued? 
Two major cleavages defined the insurgency in Anbar and Ramadi during 2004-
2005.  The first was between the Sunni Arabs and the new government of Iraq.  The 
second was between those Sunni Arabs and the U.S.-led Coalition.  These two cleavages 
were closed related since, as noted above, many Anbaris saw the U.S. forces as working 
in concert with a Shi’a-led federal government.  To a significant degree, this perception 
was correct – the U.S. was very clearly in concert with the new Iraqi federal government.  
The U.S. would have categorically rejected the characterization of that government as 
“Shi’a-led” or as sectarian in any other way.  Nevertheless, the U.S.’s policies were based 
on a fundamental premise that the institutions of the new Iraqi government were the sole 
instruments of legitimate political power in the new Iraq.   
Proceeding from this premise, U.S. policy from the establishment of the CPA at 
least through the period of this case study was to insist that U.S. cooperation with tribal 
sheikhs and other non-governmental power brokers was contingent on the integration of 
those groups into the security and governance mechanisms of the federal government.  I  
2003, Anbar CPA representative Keith Mines lobbied to create a “loya jirga,” or tribal 
council, to negotiate the distribution of political power in the new Iraq or, failing this, to 
at least empower the sheikhs who came forward to support the U.S.  But the CPA 
leadership was not interested in this, ever fearful of empowering non-governmental 
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militias and hence undermining the larger state-building effort.116  As one intelligence 
officer working in Iraq in 2003 put it, “the standard answer we got from Bremer’s p ople 
was that tribes are a vestige of the past, that they have no place in the new democratic 
Iraq.”117 
This policy then served as a major stumbling block to negotiating any sort of 
political compromise with local leaders in Ramadi.  Colonel Clark acknowledged that, “i  
would have been way outside the box for us to accept [tribal overtures for creation of 
militias] at that time.  It was against the policy, and it would have been difficult to predict 
how large the phenomenon was going to be.”118  General Joseph Dunford’s comments 
cited earlier in this chapter neatly summarize the situation: “[The sheikhs] said they’d 
fight on our side, but refused to go through the government in Baghdad.  In 2005, we 
weren’t willing to accept that deal.”119  The 1st Marine Division commander concurred 
and defended this view: “The problem we had with local militias was that they did not 
work.  The Fallujah Brigade is an example.  So I don’t think this kind of initiative would 
have succeeded in 2005.  It wasn’t a missed opportunity at all.”120  This same reluctance 
continued to prevail under II MEF, which took over control of U.S. operations in Anbar 
province in March 2005.  And the limitations of this policy were certainly not mitigated 
by the 2/2ID leadership’s previously noted slowness in embracing its role in engaging 
local leaders. 
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This is not to suggest that U.S. leaders were unaware of or unwilling to address 
the sectarian grievances of the Anbari Sunnis more generally.  MEF commanders did 
pursue several initiatives to try to bridge the gap between Anbar and the federal
government, such as achieving better Sunni representation in Baghdad, moderating de-
Ba’athification, and advocating a greater role for Sunni officers in the Iraqi Army.121  But 
the effects of such efforts were hampered so long as the U.S. held the tribes’ claim  to 
having their own legitimacy at arm’s length.  This attitude tended to reinforce the 
common cause between the local “resistance” and the Islamist extremists.  The 1/503rd 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gubler, explained the problem this way: “For Sunnis, 
the fledgling Iraqi government can be seen to rely on illegitimate security forces – the 
U.S. and/or Shi’a militias.  Hence, as the [Iraqi Army] becomes larger and more effective 
as a security force, the less likely it is that the Shi’a government will negotiate a power-
sharing deal with the Sunnis.”122 
And for the first several months of 2/2ID’s tenure in Ramadi, seeking local 
leaders who were willing to work with the Coalition and were also not working with the 
insurgents was a challenge.  A Marine company commander who left Ramadi in March
lamented that “We never really nailed down who the real power brokers were.  We dealt 
with the provincial government, but they weren’t the guys who were pulling the 
strings.”123   
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As the split between AQI and the tribes began to open, however, opportunities to 
work with tribal leaders began to present themselves to the U.S. during the spring and 
summer of 2005.  Effective response to these opportunities was slow, given the difficulty 
of even distinguishing real leaders from charlatans and profit-seekers (so-called “fake 
sheikhs”124).  But over time, beginning at company and battalion levels, the U.S. began to 
build some relationships with sheikhs who showed promise as potential allies.  As it 
became clear that the U.S. forces were not leaving the city, even some sheikhswho had 
been working with the insurgency seemed interested in seeking some accommodation 
with the U.S.  Colonel Patton described the evolution of his own thinking on this point:  
The real power base in Ramadi was in the tribes, so if we were going to make any inroads 
in governance, we figured out that we would have to work through the sheikhs and the 
tribes.  That wasn’t something that we understood on ay one, it took us time to figure 
that out. . . Why did it take so long to get to this realization?  Because we were trying to 
work through the government and were not enthusiastic bout propping up centers of 
power outside government channels.125 
 
By the summer, 2/2ID units had developed a “sheikh security council” comprising 
two dozen sheikhs.126  Still, these relationships proceeded fitfully, with a few steps 
forward often matched by a few steps back.  For example, some tribal leaders in the 
1/503rd’s AO requested that the U.S. lift their checkpoints and extend the evening curfew 
by a couple hours.  The U.S. forces complied, but that resulted in violence immediately 
rising again.  The battalion’s executive officer reports, 
At that point, in June, several of the tribal leaders planned a major meeting when they 
were going to get everyone together to discuss and coordinate their actions as part of a 
new effort to oppose the insurgents.  We were prohibited from attending this meeting 
because they were going to great lengths to avoid their efforts being seen as associated 
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with us.  But al Qaeda knew what they were doing, they assassinated guys, and scared 
them away, so the meeting didn’t even happen.127  
 
Carter Malkasian, a civilian analyst at the I MEF headquarters, cited such setbacks in 
tribal organization against AQI as evidence that in 2005, the environment was not yet 
ready for a major shift.  He suggests, “Maybe what was happening was that the 
leadership had started to change its views, but the majority of the insurgents – the foot
soldiers – were still committed to the cause.”128 
In parallel with trying to cultivate tribal allies, development of a cityouncil 
became a key focus for the 2/2ID brigade staff beginning in the spring of 2005.  One of
the principal challenges of this effort was simply identifying who would be amen ble to 
gathering to discuss issues.  Eventually, this effort did bear fruit, and a city council was 
just being stood up when the brigade turned over control of the city to its successor.129  
Even so, there remained a critical gap between the authority exercised by the official 
government and by the tribal leaders.  Colonel Patton explains, “The provincial and city 
governments that were just starting to function were not especially pleased with the tribal 
leaders’ influence.  We knew that bridging this gap was the end game, but basically, the 
sheikhs controlled a lot more people and resources than the nearly absent government 
did.”130  Some interviewees viewed these early in-roads into tribal alliance building as the 
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earliest roots of what would become the Tribal Awakening movements the following 
year.131   
On balance, though, in spite of these early instances of building relationships with 
the city’s tribal leaders, the evidence suggests that during the period of this case tudy, 
the U.S. was not able to pursue any serious political agreements that would address the 
fundamental sectarian cleavage between the disenfranchised Sunnis of Ramadiand the 
new Iraqi government.  U.S. policy at the strategic level resisted the avenues of political 
compromise that were most salient to that cleavage, and the need to move in this 
direction only became clear gradually to counterinsurgents at the operational and t ctical 
levels. 
Was the counterinsurgency successful? 
 The outcomes of the counterinsurgency over the course of 2/2ID’s deployment 
are mixed.  If success is measured only by attack statistics over the coursof the 
brigade’s 10 ½ months in command in Ramadi, then some degree of success is 
discernable.  Unclassified attack data is sparse, though the 1/503rd’s executive officer 
reported that attacks in the eastern half of the city went from 10 per day to 2-3 per day 
over those 10 ½ months.132 
 After returning to the U.S., that battalion’s leadership noted a variety of 
improvements in their area of operations, as shown in Table 6.133  
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September 2004 July 2005 
• Enemy contact everyday – Direct fire 
(RPG, RPK, PKM) & indirect fire 
(rocket & mortar). 
• People did not go into the street, to 
work, school, or market. 
• People scared & refused to talk to or 
support U.S. forces. 
• No ISF; IPs worked w/the enemy 
• Electricity was intermittent 
• No running water in half the city 
• Sewers clogged and trash was piled in 
the city. 
• Enemy contact < once per week – 
IED/SVBIED or Indirect fire 
• MSR Michigan remained ‘BLACK’ 
• Life normalized – People drove & 
walked on the streets; children played, 
Schools, markets & businesses were 
open. 
• People felt safer & tolerated or 
supported CF. 
• ISF present; IP units were forming. 
• Electricity restored to the city.  Power 
outages 2-3 times per wk. 
• Running water to all the city. 
• Sewers were unclogged & trash was 
picked up routinely. 
Table 6: Changes in Eastern Ramadi, September 2004 – July 2005 
The brigade reported a somewhat more modest list of ten “Brigade 
Achievements” in the unclassified portion of its own After Action Report:134   
• Executed a historic deployment from Korea into a combat zone 
• No serious heat casualties during the entire deployment 
• Supported and participated in combat operations in Fallujah, preventing Ramadi from 
becoming a second insurgent stronghold 
• Provided a secure voting environment in Ramadi for the 30 January national elections 
• Local leader engagement facilitated the formation of a Ramadi city council and multi-
agency security council 
• Re-enlisted over 800 soldiers in combat 
• Enabled 99% of 2BCT soldiers to participate in the R&R leave program 
                                                
134 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, After Action Review: Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06, 
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• Developed and employed 5 new Iraqi Army battalions, and built/renovated 6 new 
Iraqi Army compounds 
• Over 2,100 insurgents captured or killed 
• Captured a brigade-equivalent amount of weapons and resources 
The only achievement on the list that resembles something like strategic succes  – the 
claim of preventing Ramadi from becoming a “second insurgent stronghold” – was 
always a close-run thing, and proved to be quite fragile in the months following the 
brigade’s departure. 
Interviewees expressed a wide range of views on how successful their mission 
had been.  Of sixteen interviewees who answered a question about the success or failure
of the mission, five characterized it as success.  Interestingly, four of those five were 
Marines who left Ramadi in March 2005.  One called the mission a failure.  Ten 
interviewees felt that 2/2ID had achieved something in between success and failure.  The 
following two quotes are representative of that view.  From 1/503rd executive officer 
Major Greg Sierra: 
Was this success in counterinsurgency or just succes in combat ops?  Even though we 
had multiple lines of effort, it was almost all combat ops.  So even though we didn’t 
manage to build much in terms of political and economic development, we did start to set 
the conditions, and helped lay the foundation for what happened later, in terms of 
working with the sheikhs.135 
  
And from 2/2ID’s artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Fant: 
I’ve come to the conclusion that we just held the place in check.  We may not have won, 
but we did prevent it from getting so out of control hat it would require another Fallujah 
type operation.  We resisted the overall collapse, and in some ways set the conditions for 
the brigades that followed to help develop the Awakening.136 
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Whatever degree of success the brigade achieved during its time in Ramadi, there 
is little doubt that it was short-lived.  As shown earlier in the chapter, reports frm 
Ramadi in fall of 2005 were relentlessly grim, depicting an environment as bad or worse 
as the one that had greeted 2/2ID upon its arrival in 2004.  By March 2006, a “Provincial 
Stability Assessment” conducted jointly by the U.S. Embassy and MNF-I rated Anbar 
province as “Critical” on a scale of stable, moderate, serious, and critical.  This 
designation was meant to signify the following characteristics:137 
• a government that is not functioning or has not formed, or that is only be [sic] 
represented by a single strong leader; 
• an economy that does not have the infrastructure or government leadership to develop 
and is a significant contributor to instability; and 
• a security situation marked by high levels of [insurgent] activity, assassinations and 
extremism. 
 
Clearly, 2/2ID cannot be held responsible for the deterioration in Ramadi’s 
security environment following its departure from the city.  And without much more 
investigation, it is impossible to estimate how much of that deterioration resulted from 
changes in the environment or the insurgency, itself, as opposed to changes in the U.S.’s 
policy or operations.  Still, it seems fair to conclude, based on both the modesty and the 
evident fragility of the progress achieved by the U.S. during the period of this case study 
that the counterinsurgency mission was not successful in a strategic sense. 
                                                
137 United States Government Accountability Office, Statement of David M. Walker before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, 
























Yes Ambiguous No No No 
Table 7: Case Study Variable Summary for Ramadi 
Table 7 summarizes the simple codings for the study’s framework variables that 
are suggested by the evidence presented in this chapter.  It is clear that identity-based 
cleavages were at the heart of the insurgency in Ramadi and Anbar province.  
Fundamental disagreement over the legitimacy of Sunni versus Shi’a Arab rule in I aq 
and in Anbar was not the only source of conflict, but it was the most important among 
insurgents other than the religious extremists who flocked to the banner of al Qaed  in 
Iraq.  This problem was evident from the beginning of the conflict, and the evidence 
presented here confirms that this dynamic, while evolving, continued to prevail 
throughout the time period of this case study. 
 It is also clear that as of mid-2005, the U.S. was not yet prepared to pursue 
political strategies that would directly address these cleavages.  More precisely, the U.S. 
had staked everything on achieving a grand political bargain at the national level that was 
supposed to have addressed the grievances of Sunnis in Anbar.  But as national-level 
reconciliation efforts remained bogged down, counterinsurgents in Anbar were left to 
fight their inherently political war with little discretion for addressing political 
grievances.  
 To say this is not necessarily to indict the policy choices made.  U.S. leaders in 
Washington and Baghdad were loath to undermine the fragile sovereignty of the new 
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Iraqi government by empowering tribal leaders in Anbar province.  Moreover, as noted 
above, there were good reasons to doubt the viability of Sunni tribal groups fighting AQI 
effectively.  The failed experiment with the Fallujah Brigade loomed large over proposals 
for arming tribal militias.  In retrospect, the advantage of empowering the tribes is 
evident, but the costs of this strategy to the stability of the Iraqi state remain to be seen.138  
Even so, should this case be counted as evidence in support of the general hypothesis on 
the greater importance of identity politics relative to good governance?   
Whatever support the case does provide must be qualified by the fact that the U.S. 
counterinsurgents do not score very highly on security operations or good governance in 
this case.  With security, there is substantial evidence that 2/2ID’s initial approach to 
fighting the insurgency through large cordon and search operations was unproductive at 
best and counterproductive at worst.  At the same time, the decision at strategic lev ls to 
allocate a single brigade combat team to a population center with around a half million 
people did not set 2/2ID up to succeed in its security mission.  On the other hand, both of 
these negative factors were partially mitigated over time, first by 2/2ID’s gradual 
adaptation to smaller scale operations with a growing focus on securing the population; 
and second, by the deployment of Iraqi security forces into the city.  While these 
improvements appear to have been incremental and uneven, they belie an easy negative 
categorization of the quality of security operations for the case.    
The coding of the good governance variable is more clear.  Good governance 
cannot be said to have failed in this case, exactly; perhaps it is more accurate to say that it 
was barely attempted.  By most accounts, U.S. forces believed in the potential value of 
                                                
138 For one expression of such concern, see Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, vol. 50, no. 2 
(April-May 2008), pp. 67-68, 83. 
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improving governance in Ramadi, as signified, for example, by the growing CERP 
expenditures over time.  But they were unable to make significant and sustained 
investments in this objective due to the persistent levels of insurgent violence and 
intimidation in the city.  
So together, the weak contributions of security and governance in this case make 
the marginal impact of the political agreement variable on the outcome harder to isola e.    
Still, the causal link between U.S. policy in 2004 and 2005 of discouraging the 
legitimation of local Sunni tribes and the persistence of the insurgency in Ramadi during 
this period seems strong.  Fundamentally, what institutions of governance existed in 
Ramadi at that time – principally the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, the Iraqi security forces 
– were perceived as illegitimate.  And this perception was not based on failures of 
performance, but rather on presumptions of inherent legitimacy tied to ethno-religi us 
identity.  So in this sense, this case does provide some evidence of the relative 
importance to counterinsurgency of political agreements addressing ethno-religious 
cleavages.   
A relevant counterfactual question here would be, if the U.S. had managed to 
stand up a local government and provide a greater amount of infrastructure 
improvements, basic service provision, and economic development, would the insurgency 
have retained the strength that it did?  The question is impossible to answer, though as 
described above, some interviewees were skeptical that more success in improving the 
quality of governance in the city would have had a great impact on the insurgency.  In 
any case, the conditions that would probably have been necessary to allow for such a 
scenario seem almost categorically precluded by the prevailing political s u tion. 
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 Perhaps the most compelling evidence of this interpretation of causal factorsin 
Ramadi can be found in the Tribal Awakening developments there and elsewhere in 
Anbar in 2006-2007.  A more detailed investigation of the Awakening using this analytic 
lens awaits future research, but even its basic storyline is instructive for these purposes.  
In early 2006, the Coalition was already reporting some positive effects of the expanding 
split between Sunni rejectionists and jihadists among the insurgents.139  AQI had 
continued to alienate Sunni Iraqis with its intolerance and intimidation.  At the same time, 
the first instances of cooperation between U.S. forces and tribal groups were bearing fruit 
in al Qaim in the Western Anbar desert.  Former insurgents began openly fighting each 
other.  In February 2006, six insurgent groups, including the 1920s Brigades and the 
Islamic Movement for Iraq's Mujahideen, released a statement announcing a cooperative 
effort to form a “people’s cell” to oppose AQI and to provide security in Anbar.140 
 Over the course of the next year and a half, Ramadi was transformed from “the 
blackest rat-hole in the dark insurgent sewer of the upper Euphrates valley”, as David 
Kilcullen memorably called it, to a model for effective cooperation between the U.S. and 
the local Iraq population.  Attacks dropped from 100 a day to only a few.141  The reasons 
for this transformation, of course, are numerous and complex.  But improvements in the 
quality of governance in Ramadi or Anbar are conspicuously absent from the 
explanations offered by analysts and participants, alike.142  Bing West dismisses the 
                                                
139 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 
2006), pp. 24-25. 
140 Oliver Poole, “Insurgents Turning Against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” The Daily Telegraph, February 6, 2006. 
141 David Kilcullen, “Religion and Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal Blog, May 12, 2007. 
142 See Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” Military 
Review, March-April 2008, pp. 41-52, Long (2008), Long (2009), McCary.  
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importance of such factors explicitly: “The Awakening wasn’t attributable to economic 
development; Anbar was starved for funds.  It wasn’t due to enlightened governance; 
[Awakening leader Sheikh] Sattar referred to the Baghdad government as ‘those 
Persians.’”143 
 Instead, what appears to have been decisive in the Awakening was the popular 
rejection of AQI’s brutality and the U.S.’s newfound willingness to partner directly with 
and empower local tribes as agents of security and governance.  U.S. Army Colonel Sea  
MacFarland, who took over AO Topeka in the summer of 2006 lists as one of the most 
important lessons from his experience the realization that “The tribes represent the people 
of Iraq . . . No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was capable of 
providing social order and control through culturally appropriate means where 
governmental control was weak.”144  The often-used short hand that the U.S. bought off 
the insurgents or paid them to switch sides, therefore, is extremely misleading.  No doubt 
some individual insurgents may have had their loyalties manipulated by money.  But for
the insurgency in general, the U.S.’s payments to former insurgents cum tribal mil ti s is 
more accurately described as a consequence of the change in loyalties than as a cause of 
the change. 
In Ramadi, who governed appears to have been much more important than how 
those people governed.  
 
                                                
143 Bing West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons From Iraq,” Military Review, March-April 2009, pp. 10-11. 
144 Smith and MacFarland, p. 52. 
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Chapter 7: Tal Afar (May 2005 – February 2006) 
 
This chapter presents a case study of U.S. operations in and around the city of Tal 
Afar from May 2005 – February 2006.  Its focus is on the operations of the U.S. Army’s 
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3ACR) and its subordinate units during that time period.  
Like the cases in previous chapters, this case is presented in seven parts covering the 
following topics: 1) an overview of the background and major events of the case; 2) the 
role of ethnic and religious identity politics in the case; 3) counterinsurgent actions with 
respect to providing security; 4) counterinsurgent actions with respect to imprving 
governance; 5) any efforts toward political agreements that address ethno-r ligious 
cleavages; 6) an assessment of the outcome of the counterinsurgency; and 7) a 
concluding discussion and evaluation of the case in the context of this study’s questions 
and analytic framework. 
Case Background 
Tal Afar and the Insurgency 
The commander of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Colonel H.R. 
McMaster, commented that “If you take all the complexities of Iraq and compressed it 
into one city, it is Tal Afar.”1  Tal Afar is a small city in Iraq’s northern Ninewah 
province.  It is located roughly equidistant (50-60 miles) between Ninewah’s c pital city 
of Mosul to the east and the Syrian border to the west.  Though population estimates for 
Tal Afar range as high as 300,000,2 most estimates are closer to 200,000, and some 
                                                
1 Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Magnet For Iraq Insurgents Is A Crucial Test Of New U.S. Strategy,” New York 
Times, June 16, 2005, p. 1. 
2 Baseline Food Security Analysis in Iraq (World Food Program, September 2004), p. 105. 
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interviewees were convinced that the city’s population by 2005 was much lower, perhaps 
only 100,000 people or fewer.3  Tal Afar’s population is distinct for being less than ten 
percent Arab; 90 percent of the population is ethnic Turkmen.  Tal Afar’s Turkmen are 
Muslims, but split between about 75 percent Sunni and 25 percent Shi’a. 
In spite of its somewhat remote and isolated position, Tal Afar has been a 
strategically important city throughout Iraq’s history, including during the most recent 
war.  Like Ramadi, it has served as something of a gateway for travelers, merchants, and 
smugglers, as well as oil pipelines, transiting in and out of Iraq.  It also straddles the 
boundary among Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab ethnic communities and bears the imprint of 
each of those rival groups.  Though predominantly Turkmen, it was heavily Arabized 
culturally during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and its strategic location is coveted by the 
nearby Kurds.4 
In recent decades, Tal Afar’s economy was primarily based on four sectors: 
agriculture, trucking, smuggling, and government.5  This latter sector became particularly 
important in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion.  Many of Tal Afar’s Turkmen were very 
loyal Ba’athists and had been strong supporters of Saddam.  And, again like Ramadi, 
many current and former soldiers of Iraq’s Army resided in Tal Afar, creating a solid 
basis for technical and tactical expertise in organizing armed opposition to the new forc s 
                                                
3 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh), Interview 17 (1LT Gavin Schwan), Interview 30 (LTC Greg 
Reilly). 
4 Zeynep Gurcanli, “Why Tall Afar?” Istanbul Star, September 17, 2004, FBIS Report 
GMP20040917000111, Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), p. 370. 
5 Hashim, p. 373. 
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in power.6  Tal Afar was disproportionately represented in Saddam’s secret police, so 
much so that the idiomatic expression, “watch out for him, he’s from Tal Afar,” was 
understood to signify a person with connections to Saddam’s ruthless internal security 
institutions.7 
 
Figure 7: Tal Afar and Western Ninewah Province8 
Partly as a result of these relationships, and partly because of its location, the city 
fairly quickly became a focal point of insurgent activity in 2003-2004.  It was both a 
strategic transit point for foreign insurgents entering Iraq, and a home to many loc l 
                                                
6 Interview 14 (COL H.R. McMaster), Interview 17 (1LT Gavin Schwan), “Interview with LTC Paul 
Yingling,” from the collection Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, September 22, 2006), p. 5. 
7 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh). 




Sunnis who were strongly opposed to the U.S. presence and the installation of a new 
government in Baghdad that was friendly with Iran and that equated Ba’athists with 
terrorists.  As in Ramadi, this common cause became the basis for an early alliance 
between Islamic radicals and more secular Iraqis opposed to the new order.  In the 
summer of 2004, this alliance of insurgents routed the local police force and all but took 
control of the city.9  One report referred to the city at the time as a “guerrilla bastion 
where the U.S.-backed interim Iraqi government exerts only limited control.”10   
In September 2004, the U.S.-led Coalition initiated a major offensive against Tl 
Afar, known as Operation Black Typhoon, in an attempt to dislodge the insurgents from 
their stronghold in the city.  Coalition forces conducted what amounted to a siege of the 
city for two weeks.  Then on September 12, two U.S. battalions and an Iraqi National 
Guard battalion moved into the city in a major assault.  As it turned out, they encountered 
little resistance from insurgents, most of whom had apparently fled.11   
But American officials at the time were not committed to conducting 
counterinsurgency in the city.  Instead, in keeping with the Coalition’s larger strategy of 
transition, as well as with the “economy of force” levels of resources available, they 
wanted to get out of the city quickly.  The senior U.S. officer in the area, Brigadier 
General Carter Ham, said, “Having us stay there is exactly the wrong thing.  First of all, 
we don't have enough forces to stay in the city.  But it also sends a message to those that 
                                                
9 Steve Fainaru, “U.S.-Led Forces Retake Northern Iraqi City,” Washington Post, September 13, 2004, p. 
17. 
10 Patrick J. McDonnell, “U.S. Targets 3 Iraqi Cities,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2004, p. 1. 
11 Fainaru, “U.S.-Led Forces Retake Northern Iraqi City”. 
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oppose us.  It lets them say, ‘See, we told you, they really are occupiers. They've taken 
over a city.’”12 
The aftermath of Operation Black Typhoon was very difficult for the people of 
Tal Afar.  Essential services were left non-functional and many of the city’s residents 
were denied the freedom to return to their homes.  Half or more of the city’s residents 
were temporarily displaced.  The resulting humanitarian problems generated g ve 
protests against the U.S. from the Turkish government.13  And insurgents fairly quickly 
reasserted their freedom of action and control in the city. 
The Army unit that took over responsibility for Tal Afar in the spring of 2005 
divided the insurgency there into two groups, borrowing locally-used terms that echoed 
the threat assessment in Ramadi:  “Resistance” and “Takfiri.”  According to that unit’s 
reports, 
The ‘Resistance’ was made up of primarily Sunni Turkoman, supported by internal and 
external Islamic Extremist elements, whose fundamental goal was to prevent the Iraqi 
Transitional Government from succeeding, stall the growing power of the Shia local 
leaders throughout the AO, and prevent the re-establi hment of security forces which 
were not representative of the Sunni Turkoman population or its long term desires.  The 
‘Takfiri’ consisted of Islamic Extremist elements . . . [that] sought to end the occupation 
of the area by Coalition Forces, force the failure of the Iraqi Transitional Government 
(ITG), and establish a Muslim Rule of Law based largely upon the ideology adopted by 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan.14  
 
As in Anbar, these two groups were somewhat distinct but were operating in concert 
against their common enemies, the Coalition and the Iraqi government. 
The “takfiri” elements within the insurgency in Tal Afar received a great d al of 
attention, partly due to the U.S. government’s public emphasis on fighting al Qaeda, and 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 “Turks Angry at U.S. Over Killings in Iraq,” New York Daily News, September 14, 2004. 
14 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Hickey, “Memorandum for Record, 2/3 ACR Actions During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 04-06,” January 30, 2006, p. 5.  
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partly due to their truly grisly acts of terrorism in the city, which featured suicide 
bombings and leaving beheaded bodies lying in the streets.  Colonel McMaster describe  
the enemy in Tal Afar as “the worst of the worst . . . people in the world.”15  
Nevertheless, the available evidence, including from the interviews conducted for his 
research, shows that most of the insurgents in the city were local Sunni Turkmen, not 
foreigners.16  For example, one cavalry troop detained over 350 people over the course of 
its time in the city, 90-95% of whom were local Sunni Turkmen.17  As the regiment’s 
operations officer, Major Michael Simmering indicated, “Everyone talks about Tal Afar 
being an important logistical hub for the foreign fighters coming into the country from 
Syria, but we didn’t really see a lot of that. . . [C]ertainly AQI was present and definitely 
fed the fire, but the insurgency was primarily locally-funded, locally-led, locally-
focused.”18   
The Counterinsurgents 
 Like 2/2ID in Ramadi, 3ACR operated under a divisional headquarters (known at 
the time as Multi-National Forces – Northwest) and a corps headquarters (Multi-National 
Corps – Iraq) in Baghdad.  3ACR, a unit slightly larger but roughly equivalent to a 
brigade combat team, is composed of five squadrons, each the rough equivalent of a 
battalion: three cavalry squadrons, one aviation squadron, and one support squadron.  The 
design and training of a cavalry regiment features elements potentially both advantageous 
                                                
15 “3rd ACR Chief: Rebels ‘Worst of the Worst,’” Colorado Springs Gazette, September 14, 2005. 
16 Hashim, p. 379, Borzou Daragahi, “Nationalism Drives Many Insurgents As They Fight U.S.,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, October 26, 2004, p. 9, Captain Travis Patriquin, “Using Occam’s Razor to Connect 
the Dots: The Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Af r,” Military Review, January-February 2007, p. 21. 
17 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh). 
18 Interview 10 (MAJ Michael Simmering). 
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and disadvantageous to conducting counterinsurgency.  In conventional, high-intensity 
armored warfare, the role of cavalry units is primarily as scouts, performing 
reconnaissance and screening missions in support of larger armored formations.  These 
missions put a premium on both mobility and collection and processing of intelligence.  
The former requirement means that cavalry units tend to be very tied to the armord 
vehicles around which their units are built.  This tactical culture is perhaps an obst cle to 
adapting to counterinsurgency operations that involve foot patrols and extensive 
interaction with the local population.  On the other hand, the focus and force structure 
that a cavalry unit normally dedicates to intelligence does provide a solid foundation for 
adapting to counterinsurgency, a traditionally intelligence-driven type of mission. 
3ACR was originally designated to operate in an area just outside Baghdad, but as 
U.S. commanders grew more concerned about Tal Afar’s deterioration, four of its five
squadrons were reassigned to western Ninewah province shortly after arriving in Iraq.  
First Squadron (“Tiger Squadron”) moved into the expansive Syrian border area and 
western desert, while Second Squadron (“Sabre Squadron”) took responsibility for Tal 
Afar, itself.  The aviation and support squadrons also moved with Tiger and Sabre.  The 
regiment’s units began arriving in Ninewah in April, with about 4,000 troops having 
settled in by the middle of May.  Sabre Squadron, with around 1,300 troops, officially 
assumed responsibility for the city of Tal Afar on May 1, 2005.  3ACR transferred 
authority to its successor on February 19, 2006.19   
 
                                                
19 Ricardo A. Herrera, “Brave Rifles at Tall Afar, Sept mber 2005,” in William G. Robertson, ed., In 
Contact! Case Studies from the Long War, Volume I (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 
2006), pp. 125-152.  
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What Happened (May 2005 – February 2006) 
In the months after Operation Black Typhoon, western Ninewah province had 
received only the thinnest coverage by U.S. forces.  When 3ACR took control of the area, 
it approximately quadrupled the number of troops in the area of operations.  With so few 
forces in the area, the U.S. and the still very weak Iraqi security forces had not been able 
to resist a gradual takeover of Tal Afar by insurgents.  Soldiers describe the city as a 
“ghost town”20 where economic activity had all but ceased,21 families feared leaving their 
homes, and U.S. forces were attacked every time they ventured out from their bases.22  A 
Sabre Squadron platoon leader reported that “the first 3 months were essentially an 
extended armed reconnaissance.”23 
The city’s neighborhoods had become tribal and sectarian enclaves where, for 
example, Sunni Farhats rarely ventured into Shi’a Jolaq areas and vice versa.24  Tal 
Afar’s mayor, a Sunni, was widely known to be working with the insurgents.  The police 
force, meanwhile, or at least what remained of it, was entirely Shi’a.  Describ d by some 
interviewees as little more than a sectarian “death squad,”25 the police tended to stay 
holed up at the city’s Ottoman-era hilltop castle in a Shi’a neighborhood, only venturing 
out to conduct attacks on rival tribal groups. 
                                                
20 Interview 17 (1LT Gavin Schwan). 
21 Interview 16 (2LT Andrew Shealy). 
22 Interview 28 (CPT Alan Blackburn). 
23 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh). 
24 Interview 25 (COL Joel Armstrong). 
25 Interview 9 (CPT James Dayhoff), Interview 14 (COL H.R. McMaster). 
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 3ACR’s first moves were to try to clear some key locations in the city, like around 
the hospital, to secure the main east-west highway and to attempt to start reconstituting 
the police force.  After initial unsuccessful attacks against the U.S. forces, insurgents 
began targeting civilians more.  One local tribal leader complained, “Anyone not helping 
the terrorists can't leave their homes because they will be kidnapped and the terrorists 
will demand money or weapons or make them join them to kill people.  If they refuse 
they will chop their heads off."  A flier posted at a school read, “If you love your 
children, you won't send them to school here because we will kill them.”26  This trend 
was punctuated by a pivotal attack on May 23 when Sunni insurgents detonated two large 
suicide car bombs in the neighborhood of the Jolaq tribe, one of the city’s largest Shi’a 
tribes, killing or injuring more than 40 people.  Sabre Squadron’s commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Chris Hickey, called this incident a turning point for the Jolaq tribe, who turned 
to the U.S. for help and “created the opening needed to allow our soldiers and leaders to 
finally begin understanding the city.”27 
On June 4, in what was to be the beginning of one of Sabre Squadron’s main 
efforts in Tal Afar, Hickey hosted a summit of tribal sheikhs to discuss how to solve the 
security situation in the city.  More than sixty local leaders attended, and to the 
Americans’ surprise, amid a great deal of tension, argument, and raised voices, many of 
the sheikhs in attendance advocated a major military assault on the city.28  In large part, 
however, this reflected a deep sectarian split among Tal Afar’s tribes.  Shi’a tribal leaders 
                                                
26 Oppel. 




were much readier for a military solution than were Sunni tribal leaders, and they each 
lobbied the provincial and federal governments to this effect.29  The minority Shi’a saw 
the U.S. as a potential ally in protecting them from their Sunni rivals and were quite 
ready to paint those groups with a broad insurgent brush.  As one Sabre trooper put it, 
“These guys weren’t interested in fighting insurgency.  They were interested in using an 
armored cavalry regiment to carry out their tribal vendettas.”30     
 For the first half of the blazing hot summer, 3ACR resisted entreaties for a major 
assault on the city, continuing to try to identify and target known insurgents in the city 
while trying to build relationships with the complex network of competing sheikhs in the 
city.  In spite of tactical successes, however, the city remained gripped by f ar and 
violence.  By late July, the regiment had decided that a major offensive would be 
necessary to clear some parts of the city of the worst of the insurgents there.  T us began 
an elaborate, multi-week preparation for an attack focused on Tal Afar’s eastern Sarai 
neighborhood, an attack that would be known as Operation Restoring Rights.   
Key features of these preparations included marshalling several Iraqi Army and 
police commando units, together with their U.S. Special Forces advisors, building a dirt 
berm around the city to limit movement in and out of the city, and constructing a large 
facility outside the city for residents to take shelter away from the combat.31  The 
regiment also brought more than half of Tiger Squadron into the western half of the city 
from its posts in the desert and along the border, and arranged for a battalion of the 82nd
                                                
29 Hickey, p. 30. 
30 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh). 
31 Hickey, pp. 24-25. 
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Airborne Division (2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2-325) to move into 
the targeted Sarai neighborhood immediately following the assault. 
 In some respects, these preparations and the plans for the operation, itself, bore 
the hallmarks of a very conventional combat operation.  Its intent, however, was aligned 
with the regiment’s understanding of the political dynamics in the city, as Lieutenant 
Colonel Hickey explains: 
The overarching purpose of Operation Restoring Rights (ORR) was to set the conditions 
in which political and economic development could proceed.  More specifically, by 
attacking the Takfirists and guarding against the tendency to attack the population 
directly, the Sunni could be reintegrated into the mainstream political process once the 
veil of terror was lifted from their ranks.  Meanwhile, maintaining the support of the 
Shiites could eventually bring unity to the city and establish an environment that finally 
allowed for reconstruction operations and reconciliation of tribal conflicts.32   
 
With this objective in mind, U.S. and Iraqi security forces kicked off the operation 
on September 2.  For nearly two weeks, U.S. and Iraqi forces cordoned off and then 
moved through the Sarai district and other eastern portions of the city, facilitating civilian 
evacuation, targeting known insurgent strongholds, and clearing city blocks.  Resistance 
to the assault force was much lighter than anticipated, in part because of the Iraqi 
government’s insistence on a seven-day pause for civilian evacuation, which some 
believe allowed many insurgents to escape.33 
 By September 15, the operation had concluded, with U.S. and Iraqi forces having 
killed around 150 insurgents and captured another 850.34  Crucially, U.S. forces opted to 
remain stationed inside the city for the first time, with the newly arrived 2-325th battalion 
taking over the Sarai neighborhood and Sabre Squadron taking up headquarters in the 
                                                
32 Ibid., p. 32. 
33 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh), Interview 30 (LTC Greg Reilly), Herrera, p. 142. 
34 President George W. Bush, Remarks to the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio, March 20, 2006. 
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northern and central areas of the city.  This began a period of major reconstruction and 
political activism on the part of 3ACR.  In October, Sabre Squadron established the 
following goals for its operations in the city:35 
• Quickly establish security forces throughout the depth of the city to secure the 
population prior to the return of the majority of the civilians. 
• Establish [traffic control points] and obstacles throughout the city to control the 
ability of the [anti-Iraqi forces] to maneuver freely throughout the city. 
• Recruit, train, equip, and employ a police force representative of the population. 
• Immediately address any claims of damages made by the citizens and pay 
compensation. 
• Begin large scale reconstruction operations to immediately begin altering perceptions 
of security. 
• Target anti-Iraqi forces operating within the city to prevent them from reinitiating 
their campaign of intimidation on the population. 
• Immediately establish new operational police stations throughout the city to begin th  
process of transitioning security responsibilities to local forces. 
• Conduct information operations in order to emphasize the legitimacy of the 
government, the necessity of [Operation Restoring Rights], and the return of peace 
and security to Tal Afar. 
• Ensure each citizen of Tal Afar [is] afforded the opportunity to vote in the October 
Referendum. 
 
                                                
35 Hickey, p. 40. 
239 
 
Three of these goals stood out in importance.  First was the establishment of new 
security stations throughout the city, jointly manned by U.S. and Iraqi forces.  The idea 
behind this initiative was to establish a ubiquitous presence in the city and thus raise the 
confidence of the population while expanding intelligence collection and limiting 
insurgents’ freedom of movement. 
Second was the recruitment of a new police force.  In particular, U.S. forces 
aimed to create a police force that was representative of the sectarian demographics of the 
city, as opposed to being dominated by the Shi’a minority as had been the case 
previously.  As Lieutenant Colonel Hickey explained,  
Prior to [Operation Restoring Rights], Sabre attempted to recruit police from throughout 
the city.  Because of the enemy’s campaign of intimidation, Sunni citizens did not 
volunteer in significant numbers.  The police recruiting process began upon the 
completion of ORR and became an immediate success.  In the first two days of police 
recruiting, over 300 people arrived at the castle to volunteer to become [Iraqi police]; the 
more important part of the number was that 60-70% of the people that arrived were 
Sunni.36   
 
Third was the preparation for the fall elections, the constitutional referendum in 
October and national elections in December.  Substantial popular participation in these 
elections was seen as a critical measure of political development in the fledgling state.  
Sabre Squadron counted the elections as a significant success in Tal Afar.  There were no 
major attacks and an estimated 17,000 people voted in October, and 40,000 in December, 
a great improvement over 1,000 estimated voters in the January 2005 election.37   
 These efforts were accompanied by a significant push to re-establish the basic 
functioning of the city’s infrastructure and services, especially provision of clean water 
and food.  And 3ACR commanders continued their attempts to bring Tal Afar’s tribal 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 41. 
37 Ibid., pp. 44, 51. 
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sheikhs into a political process that might eventually form the foundation for a new city 
government. 
 Violence in Tal Afar plummeted over the fall of 2005.  Figure 8 shows the 
average number of daily attacks in each of the ten months from April 2005 to January 
2006.38  These numbers include attacks by multiple methods against U.S. forces, Iraqi 
security forces, as well as civilian targets in the city.  Attacks declined ov r this period 
from an average of six per day in June 2005 to about one per day in December.  At the 
end of that month, the 2-385th battalion left the city, leaving Sabre Squadron as the main 
U.S. unit in the city.  Nevertheless, violence continued its decline into January, when Tal 













































































INSURGENT ATTACKS - TAL AFAR, APRIL 05 - JANUARY 06
Average Attacks Per Day by Month
 
Figure 8: Average Attacks Per Day in Tal Afar 




 In February 2006, shortly before 3ACR turned Tal Afar over to its successors, the 
1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, the city’s sheikhs held a tribal reconciliation 
meeting.  Leading sheikhs from both Sunni and Shi’a tribes held civil discussions about 
the future administration of the city and proclaimed themselves to be not just Sunni or 
Shi’a, but “Iraqian”.39   
In the months after 3ACR’s departure, Tal Afar was not free from insurgent 
activity or from sectarian violence.  Some of the same tensions that had plagued the city
before persisted,40 not least because of the sectarian violence that swept much of Iraq in 
the wake of the bombing of the al Askariya Mosque in Samarra, only three days after 
3ACR left Ninewah.  But the city did not regress back into the ungovernable war zone 
that it had been.  
The transformation of Tal Afar from insurgent stronghold to a moderately 
functional city quickly became a touchstone for policymakers in conceiving of a shi t in 
U.S. strategy in Iraq toward the concept deemed to have been practiced there: “clea , 
hold, and build.”  In October 2005 Senate testimony, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
cited Tal Afar as a successful example of this approach.41  President George W. Bush 
dedicated an entire speech to 3ACR’s experiences in Tal Afar as an illustrat on of what 
was possible for the U.S. to achieve in Iraq.42  And subsequently, it was featured in the 
                                                
39 Ibid., p. 51. 
40 Peter Baker, “An Iraq Success Story’s Sad New Chapter,” Washington Post, March 21, 2006, p. 1, 
Louise Roug, “Fear Casts A Shadow On ‘Free City’ Touted By Bush,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 
2006. 
41 Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, “Iraq and U.S.Policy,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate 




Army’s and Marine Corps’s new counterinsurgency manual, again as a successf l 
example of “clear, hold, and build.”43 
Were ethno-religious identity-based cleavages significant? 
 There is no question that Sunni-Shi’a identity-based conflict was central to the 
insurgency in Tal Afar.  The conflict was manifest in two mutually re-enforcing 
dimensions:  the national conflict between Sunnis who were increasingly afraid of 
disenfranchisement at the hands of the allegedly sectarian central government; and local 
conflict among tribes who were predominantly Sunni or Shi’a. 
 This sectarian cleavage is something of a historical curiosity because it had not 
been a significant problem among Tal Afar’s Turkmen population prior to the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein.44  To the contrary, Tal Afar’s Sunni and Shi’a were united to some 
degree by pride in the distinctness of their Turkmen culture and language in a majority-
Arab country.  But in the aftermath of the Coalition invasion of Iraq, the Turkmen were 
experiencing what one scholar called an “identity crisis.”45  Their political mobilization 
had been almost entirely based in the Ba’ath party, which was now not only out of power 
but illegal, a problem one interviewee likened to “pulling the spinal column out of 
Iraq.”46  What would replace Ba’athism was uncertain, but to the extent Tal Afar’s Sunnis 
could discern the intentions of the new Iraqi government, they feared sectarian 
discrimination.  One interviewee characterized the views of the Sunni Turkmen elites as 
                                                
43 Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, Department of the Navy, December 2006), pp. 5-22 – 5-23. 
44 Hashim, pp. 371-372, Patriquin, p. 17. 
45 Hashim, pp. 374. 
46 Interview 30 (LTC Greg Reilly). 
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nationalist, but with “almost a colonial mentality; ‘our Shi’a’ are OK, we can handle 
them.  But the ‘other Shi’a’, they are compromised, they have come under the sway of 
the Iranians.”47 
 Additionally, with the collapse of the state that had provided virtually everything 
to the city, from security to food, the people of Tal Afar increasingly looked to their 
tribes for sources of support.  While Tal Afar’s tribes are not entirely religiously 
homogeneous, they do tend to be predominantly Sunni or Shi’a.48  Soon these emerging 
tribal – and increasingly sectarian – grievances were being stoked by the Islamist 
extremists who were taking up residence in the city in growing numbers, thanks in part to 
its strategic location as a transit point between Syria and Mosul and then Baghdad.  T is 
was the environment that became fertile ground for an alliance of convenience betwe n 
nationalist local “resistance” insurgents and the Islamist radicals of a Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) and Ansar al Sunna.  Very quickly, then, the city descended into a nightmare of 
tribal feuds and terror imposed by the insurgents.  In this sense, as one interviewee put it, 
the conflict in Tal Afar was “sectarian-fueled” but not “sectarian-based.”49 
 The sectarian cleavage was further exacerbated by the behavior of many of the 
Iraqi security forces that operated in and around the city.  The police were tak n over by a 
Shi’a chief who quickly purged the leading Sunni officers from the force, prompting 
rumors of the growing local influence of the Iranian-backed Badr Corps militia.50  The 
                                                
47 Interview 24 (anonymous regional specialist). 
48 Interview 2 (Louise Roug), Interview 10 (MAJ Michael Simmering), Interview 11 (Monte Morin), 
Interview 28 (CPT Alan Blackburn). 
49 Interview 21 (CPT Jesse Sellars). 
50 Hashim, pp. 374-375, Hickey, p. 3. 
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Iraqi Army also tended to reinforce the fears the Sunnis had of being marginalized or 
worse.  In Operation Black Typhoon, the Army’s Scorpion Brigade, a heavily Shi’a 
commando unit, was deployed to Tal Afar from Baghdad, inciting loud protests from Tal 
Afar’s Sunnis.  Voicing a common complaint, one resident complained that all the 
official security forces “are from the Badr Organization and the [Kurdish] pesh merga.  
They wear the military uniform for disguise.  Their treatment is very bad.  They were 
taking people to detention prisons just because they are Sunnis since the start of the 
military campaign.”  Another resident agreed, saying: “The Iraqi army are the real 
terrorists. Even what they write on our walls is evidence, like ‘Long live pesh merga’ or 
‘Long live Badr.’”51  And just as Tal Afar’s Sunnis had begun to see Badr behind every 
Shi’a, Shi’a were quick to label any Sunni as a terrorist.52    
Another measure of the division and animosity that had developed in the city was 
the reactions of Sunnis in the Sarai district when told that they needed to evacuate 
through a Shi’a neighborhood.  The majority of them refused to do so, having been 
warned that Shi’a residents and police in that neighborhood would attack them if they left 
in that direction.  One man explained, “I would rather die from American bombs in my 
home with my family than walk south.  People are saying the Shiites will kill you or 
kidnap you."  Another resident of the Sarai neighborhood commented: "There are no bad 
people in Sarai. If you come with me, I will take you to all the houses and you can see. 
The bad people are the Shiites in the south [of the city]."53 
                                                
51 Jonathan Finer, “Iraqi Forces Show Signs Of Progress In Offensive,” Washington Post, September 22, 
2005, p. 1. 
52 Hickey, p. 3. 
53 Jonathan Finer, “With Death At Their Door, Few Leav  Iraqi City,” Washington Post, September 7, 
2005, p. 20, Interview 2 (Louise Roug). 
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Tal Afar’s appearance as something of a microcosm of a brewing civil war was 
not lost on Iraqi leaders in Baghdad.  As Operation Restoring Rights went forward in 
September 2005, debates raged over it in Baghdad, with Sunni and Shi’a politicians 
leveling accusations of sectarianism with equal gusto.  Shi’a politicians cast the 
operations as a legitimate government intervention aimed at ceasing Sunni oppressi n of 
the city’s Shi’a minority.  For example Ali Al-Dabbagh claimed that “we support [what 
the government is doing] 100 percent.  Tall Afar has been a bleeding wound in Iraq’s 
heart for a year now.  There was a clear case of racial and ethnic cleansing in the city.”  
Others contended that the conflict was not originally a sectarian one, but that the 
government response was making it one.  Sunni lawmaker Salih al-Mutlaq, for example, 
said, “The tension is between the people and the government, not between the Sunnis and 
Shiites.  [In Tal Afar, the government is waging] a very ugly ethnic war.”54  Another 
Sunni politician, Fakhri al-Qaysi, argued that accusations of terrorism were only a pretext 
for marginalizing the political participation of Sunni communities.  “The ruling political 
parties and the U.S. forces are trying to provoke the Sunni Arabs . . . and press to harp on 
the tune of sectarianism as they have been doing since the first day of occupation.”55 
Were good security operations conducted? 
 A description of security operations in Tal Afar may usefully be divided into the 
periods before and after Operation Restoring Rights.  Before the operation, U.S. forces 
mostly lived on forward operating bases outside the city and would move into and around 
                                                
54 “Defense Minister Discusses Tall Afar, Urges Iraqis To ‘Drive Out Terrorists,’” Al-Arabiyah Television, 
September 12, 2005, FBIS Report GMP200509125380002. 




the city in their armored vehicles.  Dismounted patrols were conducted regularly as well, 
but the “commute” to work was an important feature of operations.  Frequently, 
operations took on the character of “movement to contact,” where the patrol’s agenda 
would be set by responding to enemy engagements. 
 3ACR forces also conducted a good deal of targeted operations – raids, and 
strikes – against insurgent suspects or facilities.  However, the quality of the intelligence 
it used for targeting was significantly hampered by two closely related f ctors.  First, 
because of their sporadic presence in the city, they had to rely on informants to generate 
much of what intelligence could not be gathered electronically.  But in the regiment’s 
first couple months in the area, members of Shi’a tribes were the only local residents 
willing to work with the U.S. forces.  Over time, 3ACR learned that many of these allies 
were not only unreliable, but counterproductive.  Interviewees report incidents where 
informants had identified individuals, or even just groupings of houses as being tied to 
the insurgent, when in fact, they were simply pursuing tribal rivals.56  As a result, until 
U.S. forces recognized that they were being manipulated, they “actually ex cerbated the 
problem to some extent, by rolling up Sunnis, not all of whom were bad guys,” said 
Major Simmering.57  One troop commander lamented that “our increased cooperation 
with the Shi’a tribes confirmed the Sunni population’s worst fears.”58  Another said 
simply, “up until Operation Restoring Rights, we were pretty much fighting a losing 
battle.”59 
                                                
56 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh), Interview 30 (LTC Greg Reilly). 
57 Interview 10 (MAJ Michael Simmering). 
58 Interview 21 (CPT Jesse Sellars). 
59 Interview 28 (CPT Alan Blackburn). 
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 After Operation Restoring Rights, however, the situation changed dramatically.  
Many factors changed in that period, including some of those that will be described in th  
next two sections.  But one of the most important initiatives of this time was the 
movement of U.S. forces (specifically Sabre Squadron and 2-325th) into the city and into 
small, neighborhood outposts that were jointly manned by U.S. and Iraqi forces. 
It was only at this point that U.S. forces were really able to start providing a 
strong, constant presence, which in turn allowed them to develop the relationships with 
the people that generated good intelligence.  Troop commanders reported that staying in 
the city was a tough sell to their troops at first, but that the visible changes their pres nce 
brought were eventually very good for morale.60  More patrolling was done, both by U.S. 
and Iraqi forces, and it was done at section and squad level rather than platoon level, 
because the improved security environment allowed it.  As a result, Lieutenant Colo el 
Hickey said, “the perception of the amount of coalition forces operating within the city 
changed significantly as more and more units became visible to the populace on a daily 
basis.”61 
U.S. security operations in Tal Afar were also aided significantly by the 
availability and generally good performance of Iraqi security forces.  Throug  most of its 
tenure in Ninewah, 3ACR was partnered with the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Iraqi Army 
Division.  The brigade was predominantly Kurdish and Shi’a, which did sometimes 
generate friction with Tal Afar’s Sunni majority, as noted above.  However, the unit 
received praise from many interviewees for its skill, professionalism, and leadership, 
                                                
60 Ibid., Interview 21 (CPT Jesse Sellars). 
61 Hickey, p. 41. 
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especially the commander of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division, Major General Khorsheed 
Saleem al-Dosekey.62  In Colonel McMaster’s judgment, “the most important aspect of 
building local legitimacy was the legitimacy of the [Iraqi security forces].”63 
 Another key factor in security operations was the sheer number of forces that the 
Coalition was able to bring to bear on the fight for Tal Afar.  Precise counts are difficult, 
and the forces focused on the city varied considerably over time.  But by virtually any 
measure, the military presence in Tal Afar was quite large relative to th  size of the city 
and its population.  At its peak during Operation Restoring Rights, the force presence in 
the city included 2,000-4,000 U.S. troops and 3,000-6,000 Iraqi troops, including Army, 
police, and commando units.  As noted, population estimates for this time also vary 
greatly, but even the most conservative estimate of the force-to-population ratio would be 
1:40, and it could have gone as high as 1:10.64  Anywhere in this range would qualify as a 
relatively high troop density, especially considering that the city of Tal Afar only covers 
approximately 9 square kilometers.  Interestingly, McMaster initially wanted even more 
troops for the assault.65  His judgment on the importance of troop density was that 
success “could have been possible with a smaller number of troops, but it would have 
taken a lot longer.”66  Of course fewer forces were present for most of the period of the 
case study, but during the critical months of September to December, both Sabre 
                                                
62 Interview 8 (2LT Dan Driscoll), Interview 9 (CPT James Dayhoff), Interview 18 (SGT Chad Stapp), 
“Interview with LTC Paul Yingling”, p. 6.  
63 Interview 14 (COL H.R. McMaster). 
64 Interview 17 (1LT Gavin Schwan), Interview 25 (COL Joel Armstrong), Interview 28 (CPT Alan 
Blackburn), Interview 30 (LTC Greg Reilly), Herrera, pp. 140-141. 
65 Interview 9 (CPT James Dayhoff). 
66 Interview 14 (COL H.R. McMaster). 
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Squadron and 2-325th Battalion, as well as large portions of the Iraqi Army’s 1st Brigade, 
3rd Division were exclusively focused on the city.   
 The combination of troop density and persistent presence throughout the city 
clearly played a major role in reducing the violence in Tal Afar and setting the city back 
on a path toward a semblance of normalcy.  On balance, this record suggests that good 
security operations were conducted in Tal Afar. 
Was good governance provided? 
As with security operations, the 3ACR’s efforts to improve governance in Tal 
Afar were quite different before and after Operation Restoring Rights.  When the 
regiment arrived, Tal Afar’s city government was all but abandoned, and basic service  
had drastically deteriorated.  Responsibility for taking care of the city’s people had 
largely devolved to the city’s many tribal leaders,67 but economic activity had largely 
ceased, creating an epidemic of unemployment for many of those who did not leave the 
city.  In some cases, infrastructure failures fell disproportionately on the Shi’a tribes.  
One prominent grievance was the collection of the raw sewage that drained into a 
wooded area next to one of the city’s mainly Shi’a neighborhoods – a site that 3ACR 
soldiers dubbed the “Shitwood Forest.” 
 Echoing 2/2ID’s experience in Ramadi, most of 3ACR’s efforts to re-establish 
good governance in its first few months in the city were frustrated by the persistent 
violence and the absence of many reliable Iraqi partners willing to work with them.  First 
Lieutenant Brian Tinklepaugh described an example of the difficulties facing projects 
aimed to improve governance during this time.  His troop established a program to 




deliver water in trucks to a predominantly Sunni neighborhood that was suffering from 
unreliable water pressure and electricity.  They hired Sunni truck drivers and sent along 
police to provide security for the trucks.  The Shi’a police soon told the U.S. soldiers that 
they were hiring insurgents.  When the U.S. then arrested the truck drivers, they alienated 
those drivers’ tribes, whose leadership stopped supporting the Coalition’s reconstruction 
operations.68 
Rebuilding the city and re-establishing the basic functions of governance beyond 
security were central to the planning behind Operation Restoring Rights.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Hickey called reconstruction the most important phase of the operation.  He 
explains,  
Regardless of how many people Sabre captured or killed, f the people didn’t feel secure, 
essential services were not re-established, and viable alternatives to engaging in terrorist 
activities were not made available, Tal Afar would fall back into the trap of being a home 
for terrorist activities.  Immediately upon completion of combat operations, water trucks, 
food & water drops, and other humanitarian assistance missions became the standard 
throughout Tal Afar.69 
 
Over the course of October and November, the Coalition initiated projects worth millions 
of dollars focused especially on the restoration of water, electricity, schools, and medical 
services.  Sabre Squadron created a civil military operations center in the city that 
became a focal point for interacting with the local population on a wide variety of issues.  
Similarly, Sabre Squadron soldiers were active in rejuvenating the city council and 
several other municipal institutions.70   
                                                
68 1LT Brian Tinklepaugh, personal correspondence with the author, April 10, 2009. 
69 Hickey, p. 39. 
70 Ibid., p. 42. 
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The Coalition’s spending in Tal Afar via the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) also rose dramatically in the fall of 2005.  As outlined in Chapter 6, this 
program provides money that brigade commanders and their subordinate commanders 
can use to meet local needs in their areas of operation.  CERP funds typically go to 
relatively small, relatively short-term projects, and are also used to pay re rations for 
property damaged in combat or to family members of killed and wounded civilians.  
Estimated CERP spending in Tal Afar increased significantly over the period of the case 
study.  Estimated spending by quarter rose from $399K (May-July) to $418K (Aug-Oct) 
to $1.1M (Nov-Jan) to $1.3M (Feb-Apr).71  This represents an increase from beginning to 
end of a factor of 3.3.  
The results of these large investments, not only CERP, but other investments 
made by the Coalition and the Iraqi government, were evident in relatively short orde .  
Tal Afar’s markets and schools re-opened, and basic services were gradually restored to 
some level of working order.  A British reporter visiting Tal Afar in December 2005 
reported that “the streets are full of building sites. New sewers have been dug and the 
fronts of shops, destroyed in the U.S. assault, were replaced within weeks.  Sunni police 
have been hired and 2,000 goats were even distributed to farmers. More remarkably, the 
approach of an American military convoy brings people out to wave and even clap.”72   
                                                
71 Iraqi Reconstruction Management System, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region 
Division, June 2008.  Available data on CERP spending totals include total funds distributed and project 
start dates and end dates.  The author has estimated onthly and quarterly spending totals based on equal 
division of total funds spent over the number of active months per project.  Project lengths in the datab se 
range from 1 to 40 months, but the average length is 4 months.  As a result, aggregate quarterly spending 
summaries (as reported in the text above) are less likely to be distorted by this estimation technique than 
the monthly spending estimates (as shown in the figure). 
72 Oliver Poole, “Iraqis In Former Rebel Stronghold Now Cheer American Soldiers,” The Daily Telegraph, 
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Figure 9: Estimated Monthly CERP Spending in Tal Afar 
Some interviewees noted the importance of improvements in governance in 
building the legitimacy of the Coalition and the local government in the eyes of the l cal 
population.  One U.S. squad leader called the difference made “night and day – people 
really appreciated it.”73  A troop commander said “The population continuously gave us 
praise for what we did there.  They were very appreciative and looked on us favorably.”74  
An engineering platoon leader believed that “Improving those kinds of quality-of-life 
conditions was one of the most important things that swayed the population over to 
supporting the Coalition.”75 
                                                
73 Interview 18 (SGT Chad Stapp). 
74 Interview 28 (CPT Alan Blackburn). 
75 Interview 20 (2LT Jared Leinart). 
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At the same time, as in Ramadi, some interviewees noted serious limitations to 
the effects of some of the reconstruction projects pursued, and believed that the local 
population was far more interested in and appreciative of the security provided by the 
Coalition.  A regimental staff officer commented that “We dumped a ton of money into 
construction projects that they weren’t interested in – schools, parks, etc.”76  A reporter 
who spent a few months in Tal Afar during this period commented that “People would 
always complain about water and electricity. . . [But] that whole argument about basic 
services – the main public utility is security.  This is more important than anything 
else.”77  Another interviewee, Lieutenant Tinklepaugh, stated plainly that,  
the reconstruction activities that we engaged in were a consequence of our success in 
marginalizing the insurgency, not a cause of it.  The population was appreciative, but 
they rarely commented on it.  What they were much more appreciative of was the 
security. . . They were real upset about the lack of electricity and the lack of water 
pressure (and these problems exacerbated each other).  And this created a problem with 
the sewage system, which was also exacerbated by all of the drainage issues created by 
the problems in the streets – caused by our vehicles as well as by the combat.  But these 
problems didn’t cause people to want to become insurgents, it caused people to become 
apathetic.78 
  
3ACR’s commander, Colonel McMaster, seemed to share this perspective, arguing that 
“The most important thing is securing the population.  And you can’t do much positive 
until you’ve established this. . . Governance projects were important factors in our 
progress, but they came at a different time – it was more of a reward for cooperation.  It 
happened in areas that were already secured.”79 
 
                                                
76 Interview 9 (CPT James Dayhoff). 
77 Interview 11 (Monte Morin). 
78 Interview 12 (1LT Brian Tinklepaugh). 
79 Interview 14 (COL H.R. McMaster). 
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Were political agreements addressing ethno-religious cleavages pursued? 
From fairly early in 3ACR’s deployment, its leaders were focused on the 
importance of reaching a political accommodation among Tal Afar’s tribal groups, whose 
increasingly sectarian loyalties were pushing the city toward something like civil war.  
Lieutenant Colonel Hickey was the regiment’s point person in this effort, and by all 
accounts he focused tirelessly on building relationships with Tal Afar’s sheikhs and on 
attempting to bridge the divides between them. 
Initially, as noted, only the Shi’a sheikhs were willing to talk seriously with U.S. 
leaders about the future of the city.  Hickey began spending forty or fifty hours a week 
with these sheikhs, working to convince them of the U.S.’s commitment to securing their 
people.  Then, as Hickey began to make inroads with Sunni sheikhs, “the Shia freaked 
out,” as Hickey told journalist George Packer.  They questioned the purpose of, as they 
viewed it, consorting with the enemy.  “Because I’m trying to be balanced,” Hickey 
recalled telling the Shi’a leaders.  “I’m trying to stabilize your city.  If I just talk to you, 
I’m not going to stabilize your city.” 80   
This shift toward cultivating relationships among the Sunnis was not necessarily 
an intuitive choice on the U.S. side either.  “At the troop level,” Captain Jesse Sellars 
said, “this was unpopular, because this means we have to go make friends with the guys 
who are blowing us up instead of with the guys who are feeding us fried chicken.  But 
[Hickey] was absolutely right.”81 
                                                
80 George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Af r,” The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, p. 53. 
81 Interview 21 (CPT Jesse Sellars). 
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Whenever possible, Hickey tried to arrange and moderate meetings among 
sheikhs where they could air grievances with each other and with U.S. forces and discuss
potential resolutions.  In time, one theme Hickey came to stress in such meetings and that 
the regiment tried to impress more broadly upon the city’s residents, was the common 
cause Tal Afar’s Sunnis and Shi’a ought to share against the terrorism being perpetrat d 
against them by the “Takfiris.”  As Hickey described, “the ‘Resistance’ had the potential 
to be quelled through involvement in the ongoing political process IF they could escape 
the intimidation campaign of the [insurgents] living among them.”82  In Major 
Simmering’s view, the real purpose of Operation Restoring Rights was not “to clear the 
town of insurgents . . . it was to protect the Sunni population who were willing to 
participate in the political process.”83 
 After Operation Restoring Rights, rebuilding the police force also became one of 
3ACR’s most important tools for addressing the sectarian conflicts in the city.  Abuses by 
the Shi’a police force had been a major contributing factor to Tal Afar’s downward 
spiral, and as a result, U.S. forces believed that “the first step towards reconciliation 
among the populace meant recreating a police force that was representative of the 
population.”84  Police recruiting focused heavily on the city’s Sunni population. 
The insurgents may well have recognized the strategic importance of this 
development and tried to counter it.  In the first several weeks after the end of Operation 
Restoring Rights, Tal Afar was rocked by three major suicide bombing attacks, which 
                                                
82 Hickey, p. 23 (emphasis in original). 
83 Interview 10 (MAJ Michael Simmering). 
84 Hickey, p. 41. 
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together killed around 70 people and injured more than 130 others.85  Two of these three 
attacks were directed specifically at police recruits.  Nevertheless, the police recruiting 
efforts remained a focus of the regiment’s strategy, and ultimately saw a great deal of 
success.  By the end of its deployment in Tal Afar, 1,400 new police officers had been 
recruited, 60 percent of whom were Sunnis.86 
The rebalancing of the police force was part of a broader attempt by the 3ACR’s 
leadership to rebuild a sense of national identity in the city.  As the regiment’s executive 
officer, Major Chris Kennedy, told a reporter, “What we're working toward is a national 
army, a national security force, not a Shiite or a Kurdish force, and anyone who thinks 
otherwise doesn't know the situation.”87  George Packer describes seeing Lieutenant 
Colonel Hickey “ask a group of police trainees at a new station whether they wer  Sunni 
or Shiite, and when they started to answer he said, ‘No – Iraqi!’”88 
 In combination with all of the Coalition’s other operations, these political 
overtures aimed at reducing sectarian antagonism did appear to pay off over time as he 
city’s sheikhs began to take steps toward aligning their own activities with those of the 
nascent city government, as well as with the counterinsurgency goals of the U.S. and 
Iraqi security forces.  A 3ACR intelligence officer described the progress he saw over the 
fall of 2005: 
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The real difference since [Operation Restoring Rights] as been in the reporting and 
cooperation from the locals, both Shia and Sunni, to turn in anyone who is causing 
problems and there have even been fights reported between Sunni groups as the 
previously-intimated are fighting back, even against members of their own tribe or sect.  
The long-simmering feud in Tal Afar between the Shia Jolaqs and the Sunni Farhats . . . 
has cooled down significantly after several weeks of heikh meetings to iron out their 
long-running disputes.89 
 
In describing the evolution of the meeting with the city’s sheikhs, Major Simmering said, 
“Where we got to wasn’t perfect, but what was a screaming match in June was a civil 
conversation in January.”90 
None of this is meant to imply that the sectarian conflicts that had created so 
much strife had been solved.  Indeed, the wounds of the tribal feuding ran deep, even 
though they were young in historical terms.  Those tensions and grievances persisted.  
Sectarian murders continued, and discrimination on the basis of sect and tribal affil ation 
was rampant.  In December, a self-appointed council of sheikhs and clerics published a 
formal statement complaining about the persecution of the Sunni population in Tal 
Afar.91   
And Tal Afar’s reformed police were not necessarily a picture of professionalism 
or blind justice.  George Packer had this exchange with an officer named Hassan one 
during his visit in early 2006.  Hassan told Packer,  
“If the Americans weren’t here, we could get more out f our interrogations.”   
“You mean torture?”   
“Only the terrorists.”  
“How many terrorists and sympathizers are there in Tal Afar?”   
Hassan considered it for a moment.  “A hundred and fifty thousand.”  This was 
approximately the number of Sunnis in the city.92 
                                                
89 Craig T. Olson, So This Is War: A 3rd U.S. Cavalry Intelligence Officer’s Memoirs of the Triumphs, 
Sorrows, Laughter, and Tears During a Year in Iraq (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2007), p. 132. 
90 Interview 10 (MAJ Michael Simmering). 
91 Ferry Biedermann, “Tel Afar’s Ethnic Tug Of War Puts Iraq Army To The Test,” Financial Times, 
January 18, 2006. 




 What the record does demonstrate, however, is that the U.S. forces fighting the 
counterinsurgency in Tal Afar were keenly aware of the sectarian roots of some of the 
insurgency they were facing and they took deliberate and extensive measures to reach 
accommodation between competing sectarian parties.  As journalist Louise Roug 
observed, “the military leadership had a very sophisticated understanding of the groups in 
the city, and who was aggrieved and why.  And they did try to prop up the groups who 
felt disenfranchised.”93 
Was the counterinsurgency successful? 
According to the journalist Tom Ricks, “When U.S. military experts conducted an 
internal review of the three dozen major U.S. brigades, battalions, and similar units 
operating in Iraq in 2005, they concluded that of all those units, the 3rd ACR had done the 
best at counterinsurgency.”94  There is no doubt that 3ACR’s operations in Tal Afar have 
been widely perceived by policymakers and the press as a model of successful 
counterinsurgency.  As noted above, the experience was cited in this vein by, among 
others, the military’s new counterinsurgency manual, Secretary of State Rice, and 
President Bush.  
This view was not confined to Americans.  During Operation Restoring Rights, 
the Iraqi Defense Minister, Sa’dun al-Dulaymi (a Sunni Arab) told the press that Iraq’s 
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leaders “consider what is going on there an example and a model to be followed in other
areas . . . in Iraq.”95   
Tal Afar’s mayor during 3ACR’s deployment, Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri, asked 
for the regiment’s tour to be extended and wrote a letter of glowing tribute to th unit.  
He credited the regiment with liberating the city, transforming it “from a ghost town, in 
which terrorists spread death and destruction, to a secure city flourishing with life.”  He 
said “this military operation was clean, with little collateral damage, despite the ferocity 
of the enemy.  With the skill and precision of surgeons, they dealt with the terrorist 
cancers in the city without causing unnecessary damage.”   He called the American 
soldiers “not only courageous men and women, but avenging angels sent by The God 
Himself . . .”96  Even allowing for some inevitable public relations spin97 and Arabic 
hyperbole, this registers as high praise and recalls the letter to Captain David Galula from 
a town mayor in Algeria that was quoted in Chapter 4. 
 Sabre Squadron summed up its own performance as follows:   
. . . the 1,300 cavalrymen of Sabre Squadron decisiv ly defeated the insurgents, re-
established legitimate security forces at nearly 41 locations throughout the area and 
revived a local government and economy on the brink of annihilation. . . the citizens of 
Tal Afar and the surrounding areas . . . acknowledge that participation in the political 
process is the primary avenue to a future peace in Iraq.98 
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 The regiment listed the following comparisons of the “enemy situation” in itsarea 
of operations near the beginning and the end of its deployment.99 
June 2005 January 2006 
• Enemy retained the initiative, capable of 
complex attacks and defensive ops 
• Western Ninewah avenue for insurgents 
and access to external support 
• Tal Afar safe haven for leadership and 
“Title 10” functions 
• HUMINT access limited 
• Organization was cohesive and militarily 
structured 
• Multiple cells in urban areas  
• Tribal violence pervasive 
• Enemy reactive, only capable of IED 
and IDF attacks 
• Western Ninewah difficult to traverse 
with reduced external support 
• Tal Afar now a non-permissive 
environment 
• HUMINT unlimited 
• Leadership disrupted and displaced 
• Few cells operating in small 
communities outside urban areas  
• Tribal tensions exist, no open violence 
Table 8: Changes in Western Ninewah, June 2005 – January 2006 
These assessments are supported by the striking drop off in insurgent attacks 
experienced in this time period and shown in Figure 8.  And interviewees universally, 
albeit with varying degrees of qualification, described Tal Afar as a counterinsurgency 
success story.   
As with any celebrated event, a certain mythology has developed around the 
3ACR’s experience in Tal Afar, and in fact, the success the regiment enjoyed there was 
not as “decisive” as the paeans above suggest.  There were troubling signs just a month 
after the regiment left Iraq.  One resident told a reporter, “the armed men are fewer, but 
the assassinations between Sunni and Shiites have increased.”  Another resident said, 
“Al-Qaeda has started to come back again.  They have started to kill Shiites and Sunnis 
who cooperate with the Americans.”100  Another report suggested that “Fear is palpable 
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in the streets . . . Residents complain that the city is increasingly divided as tribal 
violence sharpens the boundaries between Sunni and Muslim neighborhoods.”  Even with 
a large Iraqi and U.S. troop presence, “families complain of no-go areas in the city, 
boundaries drawn up by sectarian violence or intimidation by rebels.101  The insurgency 
continued in western Ninewah province, and U.S. forces continued to fight there for 
months and years after the period of this case study. 
Moreover, interviewees fully acknowledged the fragility of the stability that Tal 
Afar had attained on their watch.  In one platoon leader’s judgment,  
We defeated the insurgency, but we weren’t really ab e to rebuild the government – there 
wasn’t enough time for that. . . When I first saw the city on April 21 or so, it was just an 
absolute ghost town.  That day seven IEDs went off, people were shooting, everybody in 
the city was hiding from us, but watching us.  Compare that to the last patrol I did on 
February 13, the market was open, the place was mobbed, there was garbage pick-up, we 
were talking to people . . . That said, for the most part, people still tended to stick to their 
areas.  The neighborhoods remained somewhat segregated, like Route Barracuda, 
everything south was Shi’a, everything north was Sunni, and many people were not 
comfortable crossing that line.102 
 
A regimental staff officer concluded, “I certainly won’t say we solved or defeat d the 
insurgency throughout the province.  I will say, though, that with the help of very 
effective Iraqi leaders . . . we were able to establish security conditions that allowed 
progress in security force development and essential services.”103 
Tal Afar never, at least through the time of this writing, fell back into the 
terrorized state of dysfunction that it had suffered through during 2004-2005.  And the 
alliance that had formed between the Sunni tribes and the Islamist extremists of AQI was 
radically diminished.  A reporter visiting Tal Afar in April 2005 was told by a soldier in 
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the city’s operations center that there were then 3-5 sectarian murders a w ek in the city.  
The Coalition did not seem especially concerned about it, and the reporter said, “at that 
time, this sounded like success to me too, not only compared to other places in the 
country, but also compared to Tal Afar the previous year.”104   
This is where the difference between “victory” and “success” becomes 
analytically important.  Counterinsurgency operations in Tal Afar during this per od did 
not result in victory in the sense that they ended the insurgency.  But it is more than fair 
to call the 3ACR’s achievements there a success on the basis of the significant and lasting 
gains in security made there. 
Evaluation 
 Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 9: Case Study Variable Summary for Tal Afar 
Table 9 summarizes the simple codings for the study’s framework variables that 
are suggested by the evidence presented in this chapter.  Conditions for positive codings
of all five variables were present in this case.  Sunni-Shi’a conflict was very clearly 
central to the insurgency, not only along the local-national axis as in Ramadi, but also 
along local tribal axes.  On balance, counterinsurgents conducted good security 
operations.  Following Operation Restoring Rights, the Coalition committed a large 
number of troops to security, kept them living among the people to focus better on 
population security, and worked closely with relatively professional indigenous secrity 
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forces.  And the counterinsurgents dedicated significant resources, manpower, and 
leadership focus both to improving governance in the city and to working toward political 
agreements among the city’s warring groups that would address their sectarian and tribal 
grievances. 
From an analytic perspective, the Tal Afar case shares the same problem as the 
Malayan case: success was overdetermined, thereby clouding any effort to parse the 
relative contributions to success of different factors.  This is where the opinions of 
participants on causation must be given special weight. 
Even here, though, the evidence is mixed.  Some interviewees emphasized the 
dominant role of the force density that the U.S. was able to bring to bear in Tal Afar.  
Tiger Squadron’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Greg Reilly argued that “saturating the 
area with forces is guaranteed to have a major effect.  Up until the regiment left, it still 
had a pretty sizable footprint in the city, and this accounts for a lot of the improvement in 
security and stability.  But there was still a high level of sectarian tension.”105 
Other 3ACR soldiers certainly saw some causal connection between their 
initiatives to improve governance and the marginalization of the insurgents in Tal Afar.  
Sabre Squadron troop commander Captain Sellars laid out the case for this logic 
succinctly:  “Getting people back to a more normal life, giving them something to lose, 
provides the foundation for getting more to the political processes, and addressing tribal 
and sectarian differences.”106  Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gibson, who commanded 2-325 
in the Sarai neighborhood, later wrote, “The nascent governing entity must provide basic 
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services to bolster its legitimacy with the people. . . The water and electricity departments 
were key – they must be effective and impartial in the distribution of service.”107  
Lieutenant Colonel Hickey, in many ways the principal architect of the Tal Afar success, 
concluded that “the ability of the Squadron to enable the Iraqi Government to meet the 
needs of the population served to strengthen relations between the local government and 
the populace as well as establish a path towards reconciliation.”108  Here the implied 
causal chain goes from government performance to political reconciliation am g 
competing groups. 
But in the very same document, in explaining the strategic logic behind Operation 
Restoring Rights, Hickey also says, 
. . . by [the Coalition] attacking the Takfirists and guarding against the tendency to attack 
the population directly, the Sunni could be reintegrated into the mainstream political 
process once the veil of terror was lifted from their ranks.  Meanwhile, maintaining the 
support of the Shiites could eventually bring unity to the city and establish an 
environment that finally allowed for reconstruction perations and reconciliation of tribal 
conflicts.109   
 
In this description, the apparent causal chain runs from political reconciliation to 
improved government performance, not the other way around.  This logic matches two of 
the comments cited earlier in the chapter: Lieutenant Tinklepaugh’s assertion that “the 
reconstruction activities that we engaged in were a consequence of our success in 
marginalizing the insurgency, not a cause of it”110; and Colonel McMaster’s observation 
that “Governance projects were important factors in our progress, but they cam at  
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different time – it was more of a reward for cooperation.  It happened in areas that were 
already secured.”111 
And, of course, some indeterminate degree of security must precede both of those 
other factors.  Lieutenant Colonel Gibson, while lauding the importance of “basic 
services,” also argues that “No amount of money or kindness, and no number of 
infrastructure programs, will facilitate winning over the populace if COIN forces cannot 
provide security to the population.”112   
 Are these counterinsurgents contradicting each other and themselves?  That is one 
plausible interpretation of the evidence.  Equally plausible, however, is that these 
perspectives on causal relationships are compatible with each other.  By this logic, 
because the variables are at least somewhat mutually dependent, different causal 
directions among the variables may predominate at different times.  The implication of 
this explanation would be that it may not be possible to draw a more precise conclusion 
than that a positive value for each of the variables may be necessary but not sufficient by 
itself for success in counterinsurgency.  In his own summation of what accounted for his 
squadron’s success, Hickey takes just this approach and does not discriminate among 
factors: 
The cumulative effect of Sunni participation in thepolitical process, establishment of 
security throughout the city, reconstruction, money distribution, positioning of [2-325] in 
Sarai, and the establishment of a comprehensive reconnaissance and surveillance plan 
resulted in a dramatic drop in attacks during the period following [Operation Restoring 
Rights].113 
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McMaster seemed to be of a similar mind, observing near the end of 3ACR’s tour, “It is 
so damn complex.  If you ever think you have the solution to this, you’re wrong, and 
you’re dangerous.”114 
 
                                                
114 Packer, p. 57. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Implications 
 
This final chapter sums up the preceding analysis in five sections: an application 
of the analytic framework to the Iraq case studies, conclusions, policy implications, 
methodological implications, and an overview of potential priorities for further res a ch. 
Applying the analytic framework to Coalition experience in Iraq – comparison of the 
cases 
Table 10 summarizes the codings applied in the two Iraq case studies for each of 
the framework’s key variables.  The table also includes codings for the Awakening 
movement in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar province during 2006 and 2007.  Clearly, 
as this case was not addressed formally in the analysis, these codings are tentative.  But 
they are included as potentially useful discussion points.  And, to reiterate an earlier 
point, binary codings of these factors are inevitably crude and meant to be useful as 





















Yes Ambiguous No No No 
Tal Afar 
2005-2006 




Yes Ambiguous Ambiguous Yes Yes 
Table 10: Variable Summary for Iraq Case Studies 




H1: Good governance is not necessary for counterinsurgent success.  
Would be supported by: c=No, y=Yes. 
 
 The Iraq cases do not strongly support this hypothesis.  Many interviewees did 
believe that good governance was a less important contributor to success than addressing 
ethno-religious cleavages and, especially, simply providing security.  And good 
governance does appear to have played a subordinate role in the Anbar Awakening.  
However, no one claimed outright that good governance is unnecessary.  To the contrary, 
some cited the important contribution social and economic reconstruction played in 
building people’s confidence in the capabilities and the good will of the Coalition and the 
Iraqi government.   
This result is similar to the one identified in Chapter 4, where the Algerian case 
cast doubt on the decisiveness of good governance’s effect on counterinsurgent success,
but certainly did not prove that it was an unnecessary factor. 
 Hypothesis H2 addresses cases with no ethno-religious cleavages and therefore is 
not relevant to the Iraq cases. 
H3: If ethno-religious cleavages are present, then good governance and 
good security together are not sufficient for counterinsurgent success.  
Would be supported by: a=Yes, b=Yes, c=Yes, y=No. 
 
This hypothesis goes hand in hand with the study’s overarching hypothesis stated at he 
beginning of Chapter 3:  
In the presence of major ethno-religious cleavages, good governance will 
contribute much less to counterinsurgent success than will efforts toward 
reaching political agreements that directly address those cleavages. 
  
Essentially, hypothesis H3 is a stronger, more categorical form of the latter hypothesis.   
The Iraq cases considered in this study do not satisfy the conditions of hypothesis 
H3, but they do support the hypothesis in its more general form.  In Ramadi, the 
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grievances that fuelled the insurgency had far more to do with a deep sense of 
disenfranchisement within Iraq’s Sunni community and the related fear of sectarian 
persecution than it did with any failure in the government’s performance.  The causal 
links between variations in the quality of governance and the fortunes of the 
counterinsurgents are difficult to establish precisely given the simultaneous weaknesses 
of the security and political lines of operation in Ramadi.  Nevertheless, the evidence 
from the interviews in this case points toward major limitations to how much popular 
loyalty and legitimacy could be won through the improvement of governance.  Other
factors – namely security, itself, and identity-based concepts of legitimate rule (both 
tribal and sectarian) – appeared more decisive.  This interpretation is strongly supported 
by the dramatic shift that eventually occurred in Ramadi, which seems to have been 
rooted in two key changes: the exhaustion of the population with violence and terror; and 
a new willingness of the Coalition to decouple the legitimacy of local rule fom the 
legitimacy of national rule.   
Tal Afar’s story is quite different, but suggests a similar conclusion.  There is no 
doubt that the quality of governance mattered to the way both the population and the 
counterinsurgents conceived of legitimacy.  At the same time, however, it appears that 
what improvements in governance were achieved in Tal Afar were at least as much a 
consequence as a cause of successful counterinsurgency.  Without both the 3ACR’s 
dense presence in the city and its intensive focus on brokering compromises among the 
city’s largely sectarian tribal conflicts, improvements in governance likely would never 
have taken root.  And, even recognizing some degree of mutual reinforcement, the 
dependency of the factors probably did not run in the opposite direction.  This 
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interpretation echoes that of the Algerian case in Chapter 4, where ethno-religious 
cleavages were shown to subvert the effectiveness of the governance-based tools of 
counterinsurgency.     
 Further evidence in support of the general form of the hypothesis can be found in 
the only quantitative analysis of the Iraq war published to date that uses official
Department of Defense time-series, district-level data.1  Authors Eli Berman, Jacob N. 
Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter use multivariate econometric techniques to assess the 
relative importance of, among other things, economic factors and provision of basic 
services in affecting levels of violence across 104 districts (the sub-provincial 
administrative level) in Iraq.  At first glance, the results of their analysis, which show a 
correlation between at least the economic dimensions of good governance and subsequent 
improvements in violence, appear at odds with this dissertation’s hypothesis. 
However, their conclusions are qualified by two critical factors that actually bring 
them closer into alignment with the arguments presented in this dissertation.  First, the 
authors make the following explicit assumption in their model:  
non-combatants make a decision about sharing information based on a rational 
calculation of self-interest, rather than due to an overwhelming ideological commitment 
to one side or another.  This is not to say that such an ideological commitment is 
irrational or unusual, just that on the margin both governments and rebels can influence 
the decisions of noncombatants through concrete action: provision of services and threats 
of retaliation.2  
 
This assumption is plausible, but it bypasses the central question at issue in this 
dissertation regarding the sources of legitimacy.  It is difficult to rebut the idea that the 
mechanisms of loyalty would work the way they are assumed to here “on the margin”; 
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but for those marginal effects to be representative of the main dynamics of the system, 
the noncombatants would need to be basically indifferent between rule by the insurgents 
and rule by the government apart from the factors of service or retaliation.  This premise 
is not consistent with observed group solidarity of various kinds, including ethno-
religious.   
 The other critical caveat to that analysis is that it shows that up until 2007, CERP 
spending, the model’s proxy for service provision, had essentially no effect in reducing 
violence.  Only beginning in 2007 – a very different environment from previous years 
due to the Awakening and the Coalition troop “surge” – does the beneficial effect of 
CERP spending become evident.3  The authors attribute this change to the military’s 
improved ability to garner intelligence in part because of its better integration with the 
population, but mainly because tribes were willing to share information.  This 
explanation is fine as far as it goes, but what accounts for that shift, itsel?   
The Ramadi case here suggests that the shift had much to do with a change in the 
Coalition’s political strategy as it related to Iraq’s sectarian ivalries.  Specifically, in 
2004-2005, U.S. policy was to insist that Coalition cooperation with the Sunni tribal 
groups in Anbar was contingent on their integration into the security mechanisms of the 
federal government.  This was a deal breaker for the tribes because they viewed th  
federal government as a tool of Shi’a sectarian interests.  Those political institut ons were 
illegitimate by virtue of their perceived identity.  Cooperation became possible only when 
the Coalition decoupled its own support from the requirement to integrate with Baghdad.  
By this logic, it was not primarily better intelligence that allowed CERP to have its 
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natural salutary effect.  Instead, what made the difference was the establishment of an 
authority, in the form of tribal leaders, that had both capacity and local legitimacy, both 
of which had been lacking theretofore.  So the service provision improvements followed 
the legitimacy, not the other way around.  
Conclusions 
 In assessing the meaning of this research beyond Iraq, what conclusions emerge
about counterinsurgency?  
Chapter 2 attempted to establish a few important premises for the research based 
on observations about the intellectual history of counterinsurgency strategy.  Those point  
can be summarized as follows. 
• Prevailing policy and strategy for counterinsurgency in the United States hav  tended 
to reflect assumptions about the bases of political legitimacy that are rooted in 
Western political philosophy and Cold War history. 
• In particular, conception of counterinsurgency as a competition of governance 
between insurgents and counterinsurgents is based on a materialistic view of social 
welfare, justice, and legitimate authority that is not universally held. 
• A substantial body of scholarship establishes that conflicts where ethnic and religious 
identities are politically salient have different dynamics than other confli ts. 
From these premises was derived the study’s main hypothesis that in the presence 
of major ethno-religious cleavages, good governance will contribute much less to 
counterinsurgent success than will efforts toward reaching political agreements 
that directly address those cleavages.   
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Following from this question, the analysis presented in the study suggests 
three conclusions about the nature of counterinsurgency.  
1. Identity politics shape counterinsurgency outcomes. 
The case studies presented in this research demonstrate the importance of ethno-
religious identity politics in shaping the outcomes of insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies.  In all three of the cases analyzed where ethno-religious cleavages 
were clearly salient to the conflicts – Algeria and both Iraq cases – direct causal 
relationships are evident between the counterinsurgents’ attentiveness to the politics of 
ethno-religious identity and the subsequent course of the insurgencies. 
These cases also provide some qualified support of the study’s central hypothesis.  
In Algeria and Iraq, competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents over the 
quality of governance was a clearly less important factor in determining the conflict 
outcomes than the disposition of political agreements related to ethno-religious 
cleavages.  Furthermore, though the evidence is not conclusive, it is even plausible that 
providing good governance was neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving 
counterinsurgent success in Algeria, Ramadi, or Tal Afar. 
This is not to say, however, that providing good governance was irrelevant.  Even 
if good governance is evidently less important than cross-cleavage political agreements, it 
still is shown in the case studies to be a contributor to counterinsurgent success, and its 
absence an impediment to success.  As will be discussed in the next section, the policy 
implication of this conclusion about the relative importance of providing good 
governance is not that counterinsurgents should ignore the quality of governance in the 
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places they are fighting.  Rather, it is that they should not invest all their hope of 
establishing legitimacy through activities focused on improving governance. 
This conclusion should be seen as a qualification, but not a contradiction of recent 
insights from the academic literature on the endogeneity of group identity and violence.4  
To conclude that identity-based factors affect the dynamics of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency is not to deny that the reverse is also true to some extent.  This 
conclusion should not be interpreted as a deterministic assertion of the intractability of 
ethno-religious conflict.  Rather, the point is simply that such loyalties have important 
linkages to perceptions of legitimacy and therefore to the viability of counterinsurgent 
strategies.  Or to put it in the terms used at the beginning of the study, who governs can 
be even more important than how whoever governs governs. 
2. Identity politics are local. 
One implication of the first conclusion is the need for a subtle shift in analytic and 
planning emphasis away from considering individual loyalties and preferences toward 
considering group loyalties and preferences.  However, this shift in emphasis should not 
be extended to its logical extreme, which would be an assumption that ethno-religious 
groups will be reliably similar across wide swaths of geography, time, and circumstance.  
That assumption is not valid.  Iraq demonstrates that national-level observations of 
identity-group politics in the midst of counterinsurgency are relevant but inadequate 
guides to explaining and affecting local behavior.   
Tal Afar’s sectarian conflict certainly mirrored Iraq’s national sectarian conflict in 
some ways.  But both the conflict’s escalation and its subsequent moderation in 2005-
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2006 were driven primarily by local grievances, local conditions, and local compromises.  
The connection between Tal Afar’s Sunni-Shi’a political rivalries and those in Baghdad 
were much more symbolic than causal.  Even in Ramadi, where sectarian conflict existed
primarily in relation to Baghdad, not locally, the fortunes of the counterinsurgents turned
at least as much on local manifestations of those identity politics as on national ones.  
Specifically, the tribal Awakening movement that did so much to undermine the 
insurgency in Anbar province did not result from the successful resolution of national 
issues that were dividing Sunnis and Shi’a, such as constitutional provisions for power 
sharing, federalism, allocation of oil revenues, or control of federal ministries.  To the 
contrary, the Awakening occurred in spite of ongoing rancor over these issues in 
Baghdad.  Instead, the transformation in Anbar was based, in combination with mounting 
popular frustration with al Qaeda, on the Coalition’s willingness to expand tribal and 
other local leaders’ degree of control over their own territory and people.  
It seems clear that local legitimacy and loyalty develop with a significa t degree 
of independence from national identity group dynamics and institutions.  A cavalry troop 
commander summed it up this way: “Ninety percent of the population does not look at 
the situation from a strategic standpoint.  They think of it as ‘how does this affect me on
my block.’  They’re not just neutral, waiting to be influenced – they’re leaning.  But they 
will be strongly influenced by what happens on their own blocks.”5 
 
 
                                                
5 Interview 21 (CPT Jesse Sellars). 
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3. Population security is still the most important factor in shaping counterinsurgency 
outcomes. 
Recognizing the importance of ethno-religious identity politics should do nothing 
to take away from the fundamental primacy of population security in counterinsurge cy 
strategy.  This conclusion is not new, but the Iraq case studies clearly underscore the 
point, so it bears repeating here.  Almost all of the counterinsurgents interviewed for this 
research emphasized the criticality of establishing people’s confidence in their own 
physical security as a prerequisite for accomplishing anything else in a counterinsurgency 
environment.  Civilian analyst Andrea Jackson, who conducted hundreds of interviews 
with Iraqis during 2003-2006, reported that “I asked every person I interviewed . . . 
what’s the biggest concern for you and your family?  They all said security, uniformly.”6 
In this research’s case studies, good security operations are always associated 
with counterinsurgent success, and in two instances – Algeria and Vietnam after 1968 – 
are associated with ambiguous counterinsurgency outcomes.  This suggests that 
establishing population security is necessary, but perhaps not sufficient for 
counterinsurgent success.  This interpretation is intuitive and is also borne out by the 
narratives of the case studies in question. 
It is important to note one key caveat to this conclusion.  As described in Chapter 
3, there is a tautological hazard in discussing the causality between security and 
counterinsurgent success.  The distinction between the cause and the effect – between 
what Jeffrey Race calls tactical security and strategic security7 – can be subtle and 
                                                
6 Interview 1 (Andrea Jackson). 
7 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 146. 
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subjective.  If “success” is defined too narrowly in terms of short-term levels of violence, 
then the link between good security operations and success is mere tautology.  What is 
required to maintain this distinction, in both analytic and strategic planning contexts, is a 
definition of success that focuses on the sustainability of security over time and with 
diminished commitment of military resources. 
As with the first conclusion, this one benefits from being situated in the context of 
Stathis Kalyvas’s recent work.  Kalyvas proposes that in the midst of civil conflict, 
“collaboration” of local populations is more a consequence than a cause of successful 
physical and institutional “control” by politico-military actors.8  This study corroborates 
that theory, though it continues to emphasize the importance of popular loyalties, 
attitudes, and grievances in explaining the viability of such control over time.  As 
Kalyvas understands, the causation here runs in both directions, but the key is that 
security, or the fear of insecurity, “operates as a first-order condition that makes the 
production of loyalty possible.”9  That conclusion seems clear from the evidence in the 
Iraq cases.  It is the dynamics of the second-order conditions that are the province of 
identity politics as well as more materialist sources of legitimacy, nd where the first 
conclusion above becomes most relevant.  
 
In sum, these conclusions do not overturn any of the traditional tenets of 
counterinsurgency, but instead should help to sharpen some of them.  Based on this 
research the conventional wisdom that successful counterinsurgency depends on 
                                                
8 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), Chapters 4 and 5. 
9 Ibid., p. 115. 
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establishing legitimacy, which in turn demands coordinated political and military 
programs, remains valid.  To the extent that “winning hearts and minds” is used to 
describe this principle, that phrase remains applicable.  
 What this research adds to our understanding of counterinsurgency is an 
appreciation for identity-based sources of legitimacy which can rival and even eclipse the 
legitimacy that flows from good governance.  Accordingly, the political component of a 
counterinsurgency strategy must be political not only in the sense of being focused on 
government and how government exercises power.  It must also be sensitive to the 
distribution of that power across key identity groups.   
Policy implications 
 Moving from description and analytic inference to prescription is an inevitably 
treacherous step on the scholarly path.  Few single studies of complex social phenomena 
can hope to be comprehensive or definitive enough to produce unambiguous policy 
recommendations with much confidence.   
On the other hand, the applicability of the work’s insights to real-world problems 
is, in the end, one of the most important measures of its quality.  And, while this study’s 
results are far from the final word on its subject, they do suggest several important 
implications for policy makers and counterinsurgent leaders.   
1. Counterinsurgency strategy must account for the role of traditional social hierarchies 
and forms of legitimacy. 
The intermediation of relationships between people and their government by 
tribes or clerics or other non-governmental group leaders is a strategically important 
factor in counterinsurgency.  Iraq is a clear illustration that these traditional hierarchies 
 279
can be relevant even in societies that appear in many respects to be quite “modern” or 
developed according to the Western model.  This creates an imperative for 
counterinsurgents, at a minimum, to understand what power hierarchies exist among the 
people where they are fighting, and to explicitly examine the role of group loyalty and 
identity politics in their assessments of their operational environment.  In instace  where 
these factors appear salient, they must become integral to strategy development as well.  
These traditional hierarchies and identity-based loyalties may be potential assets for the 
counterinsurgents, or they may be obstacles to their larger strategic goals.  
Or, as with the tribes of Anbar province, they may be assets and obstacles 
simultaneously.  Empowering those tribes was a step backward in the Coalition’s eff rt to 
create a strong, unified central government, but at the same time was critically important 
in undermining the worst elements of the insurgency.  Even participants in the 
counterinsurgency during that time may continue to differ about whether the proper
trade-off was made in that case.10  All the same, it is not necessary to settle this point in 
order to simply recognize the utility of anticipating the importance of such trade-offs in 
advance rather than stumbling upon them a few months or years into a conflict.  That is 
what makes this factor a critical element of the initial assessment and strategy 
development phase for any prospective counterinsurgency. 
 
 
                                                
10 For example, contrast David Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal blog, August 
29, 2007, with Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, vol. 50, no. 2 (April-May 2008).  Both 
Kilcullen and Long were advisors to Coalition forces during that time.  
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2. Counterinsurgents should always be prepared to employ the full range of tools 
addressing security, governance and identity. 
David Galula believed that each military, political, judicial, and other line of 
operation in counterinsurgency is indispensible, arguing that “if one is nil, the product 
will be zero.”11  This may not always be the case, but it remains a valid, conservative 
guide to planning. 
Notwithstanding this study’s emphasis on the potentially high importance of 
addressing ethno-religious cleavages, the dynamics of identity politics and group 
loyalties are likely to be so fluid, opaque, and variable across localities that 
counterinsurgents cannot afford to neglect any element of its legitimacy-building tool kit.  
They should be prepared to build political stability on foundations of both identity and 
quality of governance simultaneously.  This is not to say that it is impossible to make 
distinctions about where certain tools may be more or less effective.  Rather, it is saying 
that the complexity and uncertainty associated with the problem recommends a 
conservative approach that does not exclude any potentially valuable contributor to 
building support of the people for the counterinsurgent’s control. 
To reiterate the point made under the first conclusion above, the policy 
implication of recognizing the limitations of providing good governance is not that 
counterinsurgents should ignore the quality of governance in the places they are fighting.  
Rather, it is just that counterinsurgents should adopt a heightened sense of caution 
regarding what can be achieved through improving governance alone in the absence of 
the larger political strategy that addresses power distributions among identity groups. 
                                                
11 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1964), p. 87. 
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It is worth noting that this implication is consistent with a recent recommendation 
coming from a U.S. Department of Defense study on “ungoverned areas” that argued for 
a shift in the focus of foreign assistance from “capacity-building” to “legitimacy-
building.”12  According to this perspective, “capacity-building,” which is focused on 
states’ abilities to execute certain governance functions, is insufficient to enhance 
stability if it is not coordinated with locally specific ways in which legitimate power is 
distributed and exercised.  As in the context of counterinsurgency, this concept does not 
discredit capacity-building, per se, but rather invests it with limited promise and expected 
utility as the singular basis for building political stability. 
3. Local, specialized knowledge trumps doctrine and theory. 
Because the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency are so sensitive to 
variations in local conditions and events, strategies should be based to the maximum 
extent possible on local, specialized knowledge and relationships.  Counterinsurgency 
doctrine and theory are useful for providing frameworks and guidelines for strategy 
development, but in developing strategies for particular conflicts, as David Kilcullen said, 
“There is simply no substitute for what we might call ‘conflict ethnography’: a deep, 
situation-specific understanding of the human, social, and cultural dimensions of a 
conflict, understood not by analogy with some other conflict, but in its own terms.”13 
The U.S. military’s new Capstone Concept for Joint Operations document 
recognizes the importance of this point, imploring its readers to “Address each situation 
                                                
12 Robert D. Lamb, “In the new security environment, ‘capacity-building’ should give way to ‘legitimacy-
building.’” unpublished working paper, December 2008. 
13 David Kilcullen, “Religion and Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal blog, May 12, 2007. 
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on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit 
the situation to a preferred template.”14   
4. Do not economize on force size. 
No matter how sophisticated the counterinsurgency strategy, it is unlikely to 
succeed without the allocation of enough security forces to create a visible and ubiquitous 
presence where the insurgency is active.  Case study interviewees consistently reported 
that some degree of physical population security was a pre-requisite for gaining traction 
on any other element of the counterinsurgency strategy.  The contrast between the two 
Iraq case studies illustrates the value of large densities of troops in urban 
counterinsurgency as well as the challenges of spreading troops thinly.  Stalin’s famous 
dictum on conventional war applies to irregular warfare just as well: quantity has a
quality all its own. 
5. Avoid getting involved in counterinsurgency.   
One final implication of this research is simply a reinforcement of the enduring 
and yet apparently unpersuasive point that winning counterinsurgencies is extremely 
difficult, especially for foreign powers.  In important respects, the issues at stake in 
insurgencies are not especially amenable to change through the instruments of foreign 
governments and militaries.  For governments under attack, of course, this is a moot 
point.  However, for governments making commitments beyond their borders to fight this 
kind of warfare, it is quite salient.  While the track record of counterinsurgency is not
entirely one of failure, it is universally one of costs and complications that far exceeded 
initial expectations.   
                                                
14 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 
15, 2009), p. 12. 
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 This point recapitulates some of the closing words of Douglas Blaufarb’s analysis 
of the first “counterinsurgency era” of the 1950s and 1960s:   
No lesson is easier to state and harder to apply than t at a decision to become involved 
once again in a counterinsurgency situation should be preceded by intense and prayerful 
study. . . The fundamental lesson to draw from our misadventures of the 
counterinsurgency era is the one already emphasized by many – the lesson of the limits of 
American power.15   
 
And if counterinsurgency in general is difficult, it is made only more difficult, by 
the presence of significant ethno-religious cleavages.  This dynamic is intuitive, but at the 
same time has perhaps been underappreciated by Western leaders unaccustomed to 
looking at politics through the eyes of peoples beyond their borders.  Journalist Jeff Stein 
captured this phenomenon nicely in a darkly comic piece where he exposed several 
senior U.S. government officials’ ignorance of the distinctions between Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslims.  One member of Congress, after hearing Stein’s description of the differ nce 
between the two sects and their history of contentious politics, commented, “Now that 
you’ve explained it to me, what occurs to me is that it makes what we’re doing over ther  
extremely difficult, not only in Iraq but that whole area.”16  These are words to the wise. 
Methodological implications 
Analysis of the case studies in Chapters 4-7 suggests a revision of the model for 
counterinsurgency strategy’s causal logic that was presented in Chapter 3.  Figure 10 
shows a new version of that logic.  Recall that events are represented by the lettered
descriptions, and causal processes are represented by numbered arrows.  This version of 
the diagram adds one event and two causal processes.  Event I represents 
                                                
15 Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present 
(New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 301-302, 310-1. 
16 Jeff Stein, “Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?” New York Times, October 17, 2006. 
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counterinsurgent attempts to achieve a political agreement addressing ethno-religious 
cleavages.  This leads directly, via process 10, to event D, the decline of popular support 
for the insurgency.   
Counterinsurgents attempt to improve governance
Improvements in governance are realized






























Figure 10: Revised Causal Logic of Counterinsurgency Strategy 
 The other addition to this model is causal process 11, which directly links 
counterinsurgent security operations to popular support for the insurgency.  This addition 
reflects the strong findings from the case studies that popular attitudes can change based 
on who is effective at providing security, independent of the factors of governance and 
political agreements.  This type of militarized security does not lead directly to event H, 
stable peace, but it does contribute to it, not only through events E and F, but also through 
event D. 
 The effect of these updates is not to invalidate any of the prior assumptions about 
causal relationships.  Instead, as is consistent with the evidence from the case studies, it 
dilutes the apparent importance of process 3, which links improvements in governance to 
decline in popular support for the insurgency.  That process remains valid, but shares its 
influence on event D with events B and I. 
 In relating this research to the literature on ethnic conflict, the conclusions offered 
here clearly seek to raise the profile of ethno-religious identity as a c usal factor in 
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explaining the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency.  However, these 
conclusions should certainly not be construed as an endorsement of a primordialist view 
of identity or of deterministic theories of group conflict.  To the contrary, the evidence 
compiled here corroborates those accounts of identity and conflict that propose the most 
complex and fluid descriptions of their interactions.   
 Such complexity has a major methodological implication that has been alluded to 
throughout this study:  the most important variables in analysis of civil conflict – such as 
grievances, popular loyalties, mechanisms of control, and violence – are all partly 
endogenous to the conflict environment, itself.  As a result, isolating and coding values 
for such variables and inferring causal relationships among them can only be done with 
much validity by close examination of detailed, localized history of causal processes.  It 
does not follow from this implication that the dynamics of counterinsurgency cannot be 
effectively explored with statistical techniques.  It does mean, however, that aggregating 
data over geography and time means sacrificing a great deal of important information.  It 
also means that statistical correlations of factors should be accompanied wherever 
possible by micro-level investigations of how those factors interacted, or else policy 
implications derived from such correlations risk placing the analytic cart before the horse. 
Priorities for further research 
 An almost unavoidable hazard of research is raising as many or more questions a  
one has answered.  This research is no exception.  Additionally, there are many ways in
which the analysis in this study could be strengthened.  Some of the most potentially 
valuable priorities for further research on this subject are as follows. 
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 In Chapter 4, two hypotheses were offered about governance and 
counterinsurgency.  Specifically, these hypotheses suggested that among the factors that 
win the loyalty of a population and establish legitimacy, distributional effects may be 
more important than absolute effects, and political effects may be more important than 
economic effects.  These hypotheses are worthy of greater specification and, if a suitably 
specific framework can be built from such specification, empirical testing. 
A key limitation of the analysis presented in this study is the absence of 
significant input from Iraqi sources.  Practical considerations prevented collcti n of 
much of this kind of data, but clearly, a fuller examination of how Iraqis think about 
legitimacy and the politics of ethno-religious identity would include the results of direct 
discussions with Iraqis, themselves.  If this research inspires further work on I aq or any 
other cases of counterinsurgency or civil conflict, investigators should certainly seek 
opportunities where possible to draw in perspectives of the people whose loyalty and 
security is being contested. 
Future research on this topic may also benefit from employing an analytic 
framework somewhat more complex than the one used in this study.  Complex 
frameworks have clear drawbacks, and as described in Chapter 3, the relative simplicity 
of the five-variable framework employed here was adopted purposefully, in part so as to 
capture the kinds of intuitive categories of decision variables that actually prevail in real 
policy-making.  However, there is a price that is paid for this strategy in terms of precise 
specification and explicit inclusion of some variables.  Accordingly, the analytic strategy 
adopted in this study would be well complemented by research using a more detailed 
framework with a larger number of more specific variables.   
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This analysis would also certainly benefit from inclusion of a larger number of 
case studies.  Small numbers of case studies inevitably constrain the process of 
generalizing insights to draw conclusions and derive recommendations for policy and 
strategy.   
Finally, though further analysis of these topics will of course not be limited to 
recent American experiences with counterinsurgency, it is worth noting that more 
detailed analysis of more local cases should become increasingly feasible as data from 
Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan becomes more available, in both classified 
and unclassified contexts.  Those experiences will provide a rich basis for comparative 
case analysis of counterinsurgency for the next generation of scholars and analysts and 
beyond.  
 
 A U.S. Army veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan recently wrote that “The 
problem with war narratives isn’t lying.  The problem is there’s too much truth. . . The 
enterprise is so vast that almost everything is true, and writers can choose which ver 
truths support a particular thesis.”17  Even as an analyst armed with data and the time to 
think long and hard about the problem, it is difficult to avoid drawing the same 
conclusion as this veteran does.  Few hypotheses about insurgency and counterinsurgency 
seem to be completely without evidence, and even fewer seem immune to 
counterexamples.   
                                                
17 Roman Skaskiw, “E-Mail From Afghanistan,” The Atlantic, October 2008. 
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 But if this research has done nothing else, it has highlighted one truth about 
counterinsurgency to place alongside the others: that who governs can be even more 





Appendix:  Interview List 
 
 I conducted 37 interviews in support of the case studies detailed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation.  Interviews 
were conducted over the period of March 29 – May 13, 2009.  Four interviews were conducted in person, th  rest by telephone.  
Interviews ranged in duration from 40 minutes to 140 minutes, and averaged around 70 minutes.   
The single criterion for invitation to be interviewed was having first-hand knowledge of events at the times and places 
addressed in the case studies.  Interviewee candidates were identified by th ir names appearing in contemporary news coverage 
or in other primary source documents or through recommendations by other interviewees.  Initial contact was made via e-mail, 
and all interviewees reviewed and agreed to the terms of the Informed Consent Form requi ed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board for the purposes of conducting this research.  In all cases, requests for attribution to be withheld 
were honored.  In most cases, this applied to a small number of the interviewees’ comments, if any.  However, four 
interviewees requested that none of their comments be attributed, so these interviwees are identified in the lists below only by 
their interview number, date of interview, and general professional background.   
Legend for Abbreviations in Tables 
1/3 ACR: 1st Squadron (Tiger), 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) 
1/503rd Infantry: 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) 
1/506th Infantry:  1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) 
2/2ID:  2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (U.S. Army) 
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2/3 ACR: 2nd Squadron (Sabre), 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) 
2/5 Marines:  2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Infantry Regiment (U.S. Marine Corps) 
2/17th Field Artillery:  2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (U.S. Army) 
3ACR:  3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) 
4/3 ACR: 4th Squadron (Longknife), 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) 
I/II MEF:  1st / 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (U.S. Marine Corps) 
CNA:  Center for Naval Analyses 
MNC-I:  Multi-National Corps – Iraq 
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Table A1:  Interviews for Ramadi Case Study (Chapter 6) 
 
Number 
Date                 
(in 2009) Name 
Rank (at time of case 
study) Organization Job/Title 
Interview 
Mode 
1 March 29 Andrea Jackson Civilian II MEF, MNC-I researcher in person 
3 April 1 anonymous Army officer 
4 April 2 Seth Robson Civilian Stars and Stripes reporter phone 
5 April 5 Ed Rapisarda Captain (Capt) 2/5 Marines company commander phone 
6 April 6 Peder Ell Corporal (Cpl) 2/5 Marines combat engineer phone 
7 April 8 Sean Kuehl Captain (Capt) 2/5 Marines battalion intelligence officer phone 
13 April 11 David Clark Colonel (COL) 1/506th Infantry battalion commander phone 
15 April 13 anonymous Army officer 
19 April 15 Greg Sierra Major (MAJ) 1/503rd Infantry battalion executive officer  phone 
23 April 21 Carter Malkasian Civilian I MEF, CNA analyst in person 
26 April 22 Tony Perry Civilian Los Angeles Times reporter phone 
27 April 22 Eric Dougherty Captain (Capt) 2/5 Marines company commander phone 
29 April 23 Gary Patton Colonel (COL) 2/2ID brigade commander in person 
31 April 26 Jaime Sutton Lance Corporal (LCpl) 2/5 Marines weapons platoon marine phone 
32 April 27 Justin Gubler Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) 1/503rd Infantry battalion commander phone 
33 April 28 Richard Natonski Major General (MajGen) First Marine Division division commander phone 
34 April 29 Brian Fennema Staff Sergeant (SSG) 2/2ID tactical humint team member phone 
35 May 1 John Fant Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) 2/17th Field Artillery battalion commander phone 
36 May 8 anonymous Army officer 




Table A2:  Interviews for Tal Afar Case Study (Chapter 7) 
 
Number 
Date                 
(in 2009) Name 
Rank (at time of case 
study) Organization Job/Title 
Interview 
Mode 
2 April 1 Louise Roug Civilian Los Angeles Times reporter phone 
8 April 9 Dan Driscoll Second Lieutenant (2LT) 2/3 ACR platoon leader phone 
9 April 10 James Dayhoff Captain (CPT) 2/3 ACR battery cmdr / regimental ops officer phone 
10 April 10 Michael Simmering Major (MAJ) 2/3 ACR squadron operations officer phone 
11 April 10 Monte Morin Civilian Stars and Stripes reporter phone 
12 April 10 Brian Tinklepaugh First Lieutenant (1LT) 2/3 ACR platoon leader phone 
14 April 13 H.R. McMaster Colonel (COL) 3ACR regimental commander phone 
16 April 13 Andrew Shealy Second Lieutenant (2LT) 4/3 ACR air defense officer phone 
17 April 14 Gavin Schwan First Lieutenant (1LT) 2/3 ACR platoon leader phone 
18 April 14 Chad Stapp Sergeant (SGT) 2/3 ACR squad leader phone 
20 April 17 Jared Leinert Second Lieutenant (2LT) 113th Engineers platoon leader phone 
21 April 17 Jesse Sellars Captain (CPT) 2/3 ACR troop commander phone 
22 April 17 Jon Finer Civilian Washington Post reporter phone 
24 April 22 anonymous regional expert 
25 April 22 Joel Armstrong Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) 3ACR deputy regimental commander phone 
28 April 23 Alan Blackburn Captain (CPT) 2/3 ACR troop commander phone 








Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007). 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso Press, 1991). 
Lisa Anderson, Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power: Social Science and Public Policy in 
the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).  
David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1965). 
Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday and Company, 1975). 
Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century 
(New York: Putnam, 2004). 
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq (London: 
Saqi Books, 1978). 
Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966). 
Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 
to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977). 
Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas and Their 
Opponents Since 1750 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001). 
Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice 3rd Edition (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1996 (originally published in 1906)). 
Robert Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and 
Irregular Warfare (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). 
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New 
York: Knopf, 2006). 
Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam 
(New York: Praeger, 1966). 
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). 
Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort 
to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2005). 
Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
294 
 
Milton J. Esman, Introduction to Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004). 
David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1970). 
Marion Forouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship, 3rd Edition (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001). 
Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War 
Without End (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1964). 
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New Perspectives on the Past) (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983). 
Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997). 
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005). 
Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993). 
Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: 
Zenith Press, 2004). 
Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics 2nd Edition 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004). 
Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: New York 
Review Book, 2006). 
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1985). 
Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968). 
Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency 
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004). 
295 
 
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War 
(New York: Random House, 2000). 
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy At War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 
Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986). 
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: G.H. Doran, 1926). 
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on 
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970). 
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977). 
Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963). 
Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and 
the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: 
Praeger, 1961). 
Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Routledge, 1996). 
Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2004). 
Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-1960 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1990). 
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
Craig T. Olson, So This Is War: A 3rd U.S. Cavalry Intelligence Officer’s Memoirs of the 
Triumphs, Sorrows, Laughter, and Tears During a Year in Iraq(Bloomington, IN: 
AuthorHouse, 2007). 
Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd Edition 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005). 
George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2005). 
Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the 
Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 1975).  
296 
 
Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in 
Vietnam (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1979).  
Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956). 
Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts 
Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill and London: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999). 
Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 
Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2006). 
Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
Sam Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1976). 
Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2006). 
Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005). 
D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New 
York: Random House, 1988). 
Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1962). 
Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The 
Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991). 
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: 
Knopf, 2007).   
Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's 
Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999). 
Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes (And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in 
Iraq) (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Inc., 2006). 
297 
 
Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-
1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
Robert G. K. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; The Lessons of Malaya and 
Vietnam (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966). 
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: 
Praeger, 1964). 
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 
Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, translated by 
Ephraim Fischof  (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978). 
Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).   
Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: 
Bantam, 2005). 
Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: 
Random House, 2008). 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative 
Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992).  
Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 
1969).  
Elizabeth Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). 
 
Journal Articles, Monographs, Book Chapters, Reports, Opinion 
 
Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, 
“Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics, vol 4, no. 4 (December 2006). 
Faleh Abdul-Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of 
Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and 
Hosham Dawod, eds., Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East 
(London: Saqi Books, 2003). 
Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military 
Review, November-December 2005, pp. 2-15. 
298 
 
James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton, et al, The Iraq Study Group Report, December 
2006. 
Jim Baker, “Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies,” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 4 
(Winter 2006-07). 
Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies, 1991-1996,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 29, no. 1 (February 1997). 
Ian F. W. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute, January 2005). 
Ian Beckett, “The Future of Insurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 16, no. 1 
(March 2005). 
Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? 
The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” NBER Working Paper 14606 (December 
2008). 
Richard Betts, “Blowtorch Bob in Baghdad,” The American Interest, vol. 1, no. 4 
(Summer 2006). 
Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006. 
Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, “Categorically Wrong? Nominal Versus Graded 
Measures of Ethnic Identity,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 
35, no. 3 (2000). 
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society, vol. 
29, no. 1 (February 2000). 
Robert M. Cassidy, “Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Vietnam and Other Small Wars,” Parameters, Summer 2004. 
Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity 
onto Nationalist Insurgencies,” American Political Science Review, vol. 101, no. 1 
(February 2007), pp. 173-185. 
Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, John Nagl, ”Principles, Imperatives, and 
Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, March-April 2006. 
Juan R.I. Cole, “The Rise of Religious and Ethnic Mass Politics in Iraq,” in David Little 
and Donald K. Swearer, eds., Religion and Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 28126, October 21, 2001. 
Anthony Cordesman, “Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 
Working Notes, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2005. 
Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Abele MacIver, “The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic 
Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and 
Lebanon,” Comparative Politics, vol. 23, no. 2 (January 1991). 
299 
 
James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review, vol. 
27, no. 1 (February 1962), pp. 5-19. 
Hosham Dawod, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the Stat : the 
Case of Iraq,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., Tribes and Power: 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003). 
Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #50, December 2005. 
Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See? Explaining 
the Prevalence of Civil War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, no. 3 (June 
2002). 
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 2 (February 2003). 
Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 379, 2006). 
David Galula, Pacification in Algeria (1956-1958) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1963). 
Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” 
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.  
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gibson, “Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: The Path 
Forward in Iraq,” Military Review, September-October 2006. 
Patrick Graham, “The Message From The Sunni Heartland,” New York Times, May 22, 
2005. 
Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler, “Reconciling Counterinsurgency with Civil War: A 
Strategy for Stabilizing Iraq,” unpublished paper, March 26, 2007. 
Henry Hale, “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and 
Collapse,” World Politics, vol. 56, no. 2 (January 2004). 
Thomas X. Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review, July-
August 2006. 
Ahmed Hashim, “Iraq’s Chaos: Why the Insurgency Won’t Go Away,” Boston Review, 
May 2005. 
Ricardo A. Herrera, “Brave Rifles at Tall Afar, September 2005,” in William G. 
Robertson, ed., In Contact! Case Studies from the Long War, Volume I (Ft. Leavenworth, 
KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), pp. 125-152.  
Beatrice Heuser, “The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 30, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 151-171. 
Miles Hewstone and Ed Cairns, “Social Psychology and Intergroup Conflict” in Daniel 
Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and 
Possible Solutions (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001). 
300 
 
Alice Hills, “Hearts and Minds or Search and Destroy? Controlling Civilians n Urban 
Operations,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 13, no. 2 (Spring 2002). 
Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters, Summer 2007. 
Donald Horowitz, “The Sunni Moment,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2005. 
William J. Hurley, Joel Resnick, Alec Wahlman, Improving Capabilities for Irregular 
Warfare (Volume I: Main Text) (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007). 
In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis Group, Report 
No. 50, February 15, 2006. 
“Introduction,” Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., Tribes and Power: 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003). 
Wray R. Johnson, From Counterinsurgency to Stability and Support Operations: The 
Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine for Foreign Internal Conflict, 1961-1996, 
unpublished dissertation, The Florida State University, 1997. 
Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil 
Wars,” Perspectives in Politics, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 2003). 
Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher, “Violence and Control in Civil War: An 
Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES),” unpublished manuscript presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 
27, 2003. 
Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “Ethnic Cleavages and Irregula  War: 
Iraq and Vietnam,” Politics and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (June 2007). 
Thair Karim, “Tribes and Nationalism: Tribal Political Culture and Behaviour in Iraq, 
1914-20,” in Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., Tribes and Power: 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003). 
Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil War,” 
International Security, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996). 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 4654, June 2008. 
Zalmay Khalilzad and George W. Casey Jr., “A Path to Success in Iraq,” Los Angeles 
Times, April 11, 2006. 
David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival, vol. 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07). 
David Kilcullen, “Religion and Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal blog, May 12, 2007. 
David Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal blog, August 29, 
2007. 
Robert W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, February 1972). 
Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005. 
301 
 
Melvin Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 2005. 
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of 
Ethnic Conflict,” International Security, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996). 
Robert D. Lamb, “In the new security environment, ‘capacity-building’ should give way 
to ‘legitimacy-building.’” unpublished working paper, December 2008. 
Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2 (January 
1969). 
David Little and Donald K. Swearer, “Introduction,” in David Little and Donald K. 
Swearer, eds., Religion and Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
Austin Long, On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency 
Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006). 
Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, vol. 50, no. 2 (April-May 2008). 
Austin Long, “War Comes to Al Anbar: Political Conflict in an Iraqi Province,” 
unpublished paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, 
February 2009. 
Richard Lowry, “What Went Right,” National Review, May 9, 2005. 
Edward Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” 
Harper’s, February 2007. 
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, vol. 63, no. 1 (Winter 2009). 
Kanan Makiya, “A Model for Post-Saddam Iraq,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 3 
(July 2003), pp. 5-12. 
Kanan Makiya, “Present at the Disintegration,” New York Times, December 11, 2005. 
Carter Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: 
The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-05,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 3 
(September 2006).   
Carter Malkasian, “Did the U.S. Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46 (3rd Quarter 2007), pp. 120-126. 
Thomas A. Marks, “Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War 
Distortions,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 107-128.  
John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 2009). 
Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic 
Nationalism” in Daniel Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., Ethnopolitical Warfare: 
Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, 2001). 
302 
 
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation 
as Political Prescription,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 5, no. 4 
(October 2007). 
John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon, “Integration or Accommodation? 
The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation,” in Sujuit Choudhry, ed., Constitutional 
Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
Constantin Melnik, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, April 23, 1964). 
Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993). 
Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007). 
Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, I surgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st
Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, November 2004). 
Keith Mines, “Economic Tools in Counterinsurgency and Post-conflict Stabiliz tion: 
Lessons Learned (and Relearned) in al Anbar, Iraq, 2003-04,” E-Notes, Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, September 29, 2006. 
Thomas Mockaitis, “Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism,’” Small Wars 
and Insurgencies, vol. 14, no. 2 (March 2003). 
Brendan O’Leary, “Nationalism and Ethnicity: Research Agendas on Theories of their 
Sources and their Regulation,” in Daniel Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., 
Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions (Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association, 2001). 
Captain Travis Patriquin, “Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba’ath Party 
and the Insurgency in Tal Afar,” Military Review, January-February 2007. 
Commander Randall Peck, et al, Voices of the Enemy: Quotations from Al-Qaida and 
Associated Movements (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2007). 
Ralph Peters, “The Hearts-and-Minds Myth,” Armed Forces Journal, September 2006. 
Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008). 
Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, vol. 35, no. 1 
(Spring 1993). 
Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," 
Policy Sciences, vol. 4, 1973. pp 155-169. 
Robert I. Rotberg and Deborah L. West, “The Good Governance Problem: Doing 
Something About It,” World Peace Foundation Report #39, 2004. 
Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A 
Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part I),” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, 
no. 3 (June 2001). 
303 
 
John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of 
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986).   
Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-
Building: Lessons from Recent Cases,” Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 3 (September 
2005). 
Indraneel Sircar, Transnational Consociation in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-
Hercegovina: The Role of Reference States in Post-Settlement Power Sharing, 
unpublished dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2006. 
Roman Skaskiw, “E-Mail From Afghanistan,” The Atlantic, October 2008. 
Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” 
Military Review, March-April 2008, pp. 41-52.  
Jeff Stein, “Can You Tell a Sunni from a Shiite?” New York Times, October 17, 2006. 
Riley Sutherland, Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya, 1948-1960, 
Memorandum RM-4174-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 1964). 
Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 
3 (April 1973), pp. 430-436. 
Lin Todd, et al, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate (Global Resources Group, 
June 2006). 
Understanding Islamism, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report 
No. 37, March 2, 2005. 
Reidar Visser, “Introduction,” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield,” eds., An Iraq of 
Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2008). 
Michael Vlahos, “Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars,” Military Review, 
November-December 2007. 
Tyson Voelkel, “Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A 
Bottom Up Review,” in Jay W. Boggs and Joseph R. Cerami, eds., The Interagency and 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in 
Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2008). 
Max Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination,” in Michael Hechter, ed. Theories of 
Social Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978). 
Gita Welch and Zahra Nuru, ed., Governance for the Future: Democracy and 
Development in the Least Developed Countries, United Nations Development 
Programme, 2006. 
F.J. Bing West, “Iraqification, Part II,” Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2004, p. 10. 
Bing West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons From Iraq,” Military Review, March-April 2009. 
304 
 
Andreas Wimmer, “Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq,” Survival, vol. 45, 
no. 4 (Winter 2003-4). 
 
Newspapers, Magazines, Radio, Television 
 
“3rd ACR Chief: Rebels ‘Worst of the Worst,’” Colorado Springs Gazette, September 14, 
2005. 
Hamid Abdallah, “With the Americans’ knowledge and consent, the Iraqi defense 
minister holds negotiations with the Iraqi resistance,” Al-Jazirah, April 4, 2005, FBIS 
Report GMP20050404000175. 
 “Al Jazirah Interviews Journalist on Situation in Al-Ramadi,” Al-Jazirah Satellite 
Channel Television, November 17, 2004, FBIS Report GMP20041117000050. 
“Al-Ramadi Residents Begin 2-day Sit-in in Protest of US Forces’ Practices,” Al-
Sharqiyah Television, May 7, 2005, FBIS Report GMP20050507542005. 
May al-Shirbini, interview with correspondent Ammar Ali, Al-Arabiyah Television, 
December 1, 2005, FBIS Report GMP20051201546007. 
John Ward Anderson, “A Gruesome Find, With A Difference,” Washington Post, March 
19, 2005. 
Associated Press, “More Than 50 Dead Following Series of Attacks,” USA Today, 
October 12, 2005, p. 13. 
Anna Badkhen, “Balancing Act,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 13, 2005. 
Peter Baker, “An Iraq Success Story’s Sad New Chapter,” Washington Post, March 21, 
2006. 
Anne Barnard, “US Forces, Hit By Raids, Fault Their Iraqi Allies,” Boston Globe, 
August 1, 2004. 
Elena Becatoros, "Top U.S. General: Iraq Conflict Shifting to Internal Struggle," 
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 22, 2006. 
“Behind the News,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, June 27, 2005, FBIS Report 
GMP20050627535004. 
Ferry Biedermann, “Tel Afar’s Ethnic Tug Of War Puts Iraq Army To Theest,” 
Financial Times, January 18, 2006. 
John F. Burns and Erik Eckholm, “In Western Iraq, Fundamentalists Hold U.S. at Bay,” 
New York Times, August 29, 2004, p. 1. 
Borzou Daragahi, “Nationalism Drives Many Insurgents As They Fight U.S.,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, October 26, 2004, p. 9 
“Defense Minister Discusses Tall Afar, Urges Iraqis To ‘Drive OutTerrorists,’” Al-
Arabiyah Television, September 12, 2005, FBIS Report GMP200509125380002. 
305 
 
Mike Dorning, “Marines Grow Weary of Even Friendly Faces,” Chicago Tribune, 
September 16, 2004. 
Steve Fainaru, “U.S.-Led Forces Retake Northern Iraqi City,” Washington Post, 
September 13, 2004, p. 17. 
Jonathan Finer, “Iraqi Forces Show Signs Of Progress In Offensive,” Washington Post, 
September 22, 2005, p. 1. 
Jonathan Finer, “With Death At Their Door, Few Leave Iraqi City,” Washington Post, 
September 7, 2005, p. 20. 
Joseph Giordono, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Soldiers Round Up Suspected Insurgents in 
Iraq,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, October 24, 2004. 
Joseph Giordono, “A Year On the Edge: 2nd BCT Bound for Colorado After Grueling 
Tour in Ramadi,” Stars and Stripes, July 31, 2005. 
Michael R. Gordon, “In Baghdad, Struggle Ties Security to Basic Services,” N w York 
Times, April 22, 2008, p. 1. 
Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “Rumsfeld’s Memo on Iraq Proposed Major 
Change,” New York Times, December 3, 2006. 
Zeynep Gurcanli, “Why Tall Afar?” Istanbul Star, September 17, 2004, FBIS Report 
GMP20040917000111. 
Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “Money as a Weapon,” Washington Post, August 11, 
2008. 
Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “In Ramadi, a Counterinsurgency in Cash,” 
Washington Post, August 11, 2008. 
John Hendren, “U.S. Troops Still Dying In Ramadi Amid ‘Relative Peace, Tranquility’,” 
Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2004. 
Pamela Hess, “Ramadi Posts Seen As ‘Symbol of Occupation’,” Washington Times, 
September 7, 2004, p. 11. 
“Highlights: Iraqi Press 2 Aug 04,” August 2, 2004, FBIS Report GMP20040802000241. 
“Highlights: Iraqi Press 29 Aug 04,” August 29, 2004, FBIS Report 
GMP20040829000187. 
“IECI Head, Members in Al-Ramadi Tender Resignation,” Al-Sharqiyah, January 28, 
2005, FBIS Report GMP20050128000194. 
“Iraqi Defense Minister Says 18 Arms Caches Found in Tall Afar, Gives Update,” Al-
Sharqiyah Television, September 11, 2005, FBIS Report, GMP20050911538001. 
Joe Klein, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, September 18, 2005. 
Ellen Knickmeyer and Othman Mohammed, “Governor In Iraq Is Found Dead,” 
Washington Post, June 1, 2005, p. 16. 
Gary Langer, “Security Gains Reverse Iraq’s Spiral Though Serious Prblems Remain,” 
ABC News/BBC/NHK/ARD National Survey of Iraq, March 17, 2008. 
306 
 
Tom Lasseter, “Insurgents Have Changed U.S. Ideas About Winning,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, August 28, 2005, p. 1. 
Anthony Lloyd, “Bungling Raids by U.S. Troops Fuel Iraqi Anger,” Times (London), 
December 11, 2004. 
Mark Mazzetti and Solomon Moore, “Insurgents Flourish In Iraq’s Wild West,” Los 
Angeles Times, May 24, 2005. 
Patrick J. McDonnell, “U.S. Targets 3 Iraqi Cities,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 
2004. 
Solomon Moore, “A Promising Iraqi Province is Now a Tinderbox,” Los Angeles Times, 
January 3, 2007, p. 1. 
Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Magnet For Iraq Insurgents Is A Crucial Test Of New U.S. 
Strategy,” New York Times, June 16, 2005, p. 1. 
George Packer, “Letter from Iraq: The Lessons of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, April 10, 
2006. 
Tony Perry, “Ramadi At Heart Of Iraq Election Hopes,” Los Angeles Times, January 22, 
2005. 
Tony Perry, “U.S. General Gets Earful From Men In Sunni City Who May Forgo Polls,” 
Los Angeles Times, January 30, 2005. 
Tony Perry, “Polls Stand Empty In Sunni Stronghold,” Los Angeles Times, January 31, 
2005. 
Oliver Poole, “Iraqis In Former Rebel Stronghold Now Cheer American Soldiers,” The 
Daily Telegraph, December 19, 2005. 
Oliver Poole, “Insurgents Turning Against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” The Daily Telegraph, 
February 6, 2006. 
Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Sadr, A Question Mark Etched in Black,” 
Washington Post, September 11, 2006, p. 10 
James Rainey, “Aiming for a More Subtle Fighting Force,” Los Angeles Times, May 9, 
2006. 
Sean Rayment, “U.S. Tactics Condemned by British Officers,” The Daily Telegraph, 
April 11, 2004. 
Thomas E. Ricks, “The Lessons Of Counterinsurgency,” Washington Post, February 16, 
2006. 
Seth Robson, “2nd BCT Settles Into Iraqi Home,” European Stars and Stripes, September 
11, 2004. 
Seth Robson, “2nd BCT Hopes to Keep Ramadi From Turning Into Another Fallujah,” 
Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 20, 2004. 
Seth Robson, “2nd Brigade Combat Team Roundup Has Yielded 75 Suspects in Iraq,” 
Pacific Stars and Stripes, October 8, 2004. 
307 
 
Tom Roeder, “Carson Unit Says Tide Is Turning,” Colorado Springs Gazette, April 18, 
2005. 
Louise Roug, “Suicide Attack Kills 30 in Northern Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 
2005. 
Louise Roug, “Fear Casts A Shadow On ‘Free City’ Touted By Bush,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 26, 2006. 
Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqi City On Edge Of Chaos,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2004, 
p. 1. 
Jackie Spinner, “Marines, Iraqi Forces Launch Offensive in Ramadi,” Washington Post, 
February 21, 2005. 
Sabrina Tavernise, “Suicide Blast by Woman in Iraq Kills 8 Others; 57 Are Hurt,” New 
York Times, September 29, 2005 
Sabrina Tavernise, “Unseen Enemy Is At Its Fiercest In A Sunni City,” New York Times, 
October 23, 2005, p. 1. 
“The Iraqi Scene,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, September 18, 2005, FBIS 
Report GMP20050918564001.  
“Turks Angry at U.S. Over Killings in Iraq,” New York Daily News, September 14, 2004. 
Jasim Muhammad Tuzlu, “The Demographic Map, Elections, and Forecast Figures of 
Social Components,” FBIS Report in Arabic (GMP20041210000187), December 8, 
2004. 
Ann Scott Tyson, “To The Dismay Of Local Sunnis, Shiites Arrive To Police Ramadi,” 
Washington Post, May 7, 2005, p. 13. 
“U.S. Holds Secret Talks With Insurgents in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 21, 2005. 
“US Military Says ‘Insurgents’ Blew Up Red Crescent Offices in Al-Ramadi,” Agent 
France Press, October 8, 2004, FBIS Report EUP20041008000429. 
Edward Wong, “In Anger, Ordinary Iraqis Are Joining the Insurgency,” New York Times, 
June 28, 2004. 
Edward Wong, “Provincial Capital Near Falluja Is Rapidly Slipping Into Chaos,” New 
York Times, October 28, 2004, p. 1. 
Bob Woodward, “CIA Said Instability Seemed ‘Irreversible,’” Washington Post, July 12, 
2007. 
Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan: For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the 
beginning,” The New Yorker, September 11, 2006. 
Nancy A. Youssef and Yasser Salihee, “Gunmen Kidnap A Governor In Iraq,” 






U.S. Government Publications 
 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, January 15, 2009). 
Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (undated). 
Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, December 2006). 
Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Army, January 1981). 
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: Special Inspector 
General for Iraqi Reconstruction, 2009). 
Iraqi Reconstruction Management System, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf 
Region Division, June 2008. 
Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (Version 1.0) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, September 11, 2007). 
Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms a  amended 
through September 17, 2006. 
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), 
quarterly reports, July 2005 – March 2009. 
National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008). 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (W shington, DC: Executive 
Office of the President, 2006). 
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the 
President, November 2005). 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006). 
Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Department of 
State), quarterly reports, October 2004 – July 2008.   
U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, January 2009). 
United States Agency for International Development, Iraq Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams, Fall 2007.  
United States Department of State, Future of Iraq Project, Democratic P inciples and 
Procedures Working Group Report, “Final Report on the Transition to Democracy in 
Iraq,” November 2002. 
United States General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, 
Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R, June 2004). 
309 
 
United States Government Accountability Office, Statement of David M. Walker before 
the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Rebuilding Iraq: 
Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges (GAO-06-697T, April 
25, 2006). 
Words That Work and Words That Don’t: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication, 
Counterterrorism Communications Center, vol. 2, issue 10 (March 14, 2008). 
 
Other Primary Documents 
 
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, After Action Review: Operation Iraqi 
Freedom 04-06, August 2004 – August 2005. 
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, “Operation Restoring Rights O&I Update,” unpublished 
briefing, August 27, 2005. 
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, “Operations and Intelligence Brief,” undated briefing. 
Baseline Food Security Analysis in Iraq (World Food Program, September 2004). 
President George W. Bush, Remarks to the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio, March 20, 
2006. 
Constitution, Republic of Iraq. 
First Marine Expeditionary Force, http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/div/history.asp (accessed 
July 26, 2009). 
Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler and Command Sergeant Major Dennis P. Bergmann, 
Jr., “Task Force Rock Operating Guidance,” undated annotated briefing. 
Lieutenant Colonel Justin C. Gubler and Command Sergeant Major Dennis P. Bergmann, 
Jr., “Task Force Rock Introduction to Ar Ramadi: Its People and the Enemy,” undated 
briefing. 
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Hickey, “Memorandum for Record, 2/3 ACR Actions 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 04-06,” January 30, 2006.  
“Interview with LTC Paul Yingling,” from the collection Operational Leadership 
Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 
Institute, September 22, 2006). 
Christopher K. Ives, “Interview with LTC John A. Nagl,” from the collection 
Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism (Ft. Leavenworth, 
KS: Combat Studies Institute, January 9, 2007). 
Proclamation of the Algerian National Front, Liberation Front, November 1954. 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, “Iraq and U.S. Policy,” Testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2005. 
310 
 
Walt W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas,” Speech at the U.S. 
Army Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 1961. 
Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, International Republican Institute, April 11-20 2005 
Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, International Republican Institute, March 23-31 2006.  
